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
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ON
THE PHILOSOPHY
OF
THE MIND.

BY
JAMES DOUGLAS, ESQ. OF CAVERS.

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CONTENTS.

PART FIRST.

	Page.
SPECULATIVE OPINIONS,.....	5

PART SECOND.

SECTION I.

PERCEPTION,.....	153
------------------	-----

SECTION II.

MEMORY AND SUGGESTION,.....	193
-----------------------------	-----

SECTION III.

THE TRAIN OF THOUGHT,.....	231
----------------------------	-----

SECTION IV.

REASONING AND LOGIC,.....	273
---------------------------	-----

+

	Page.
SECTION V.	
<i>EMOTIONS</i> ,.....	290
SECTION VI.	
<i>TASTE</i> ,.....	303
SECTION VII.	
<i>FREEDOM AND THE WILL</i> ,.....	322
SECTION VIII.	
<i>MORALS</i> ,.....	337
SECTION IX.	
<i>RELIGION</i> ,.....	355

INTRODUCTION.

THE Philosophy of the Mind is of recent origin, and of slow growth. Its genuine materials are therefore very scanty. Most works upon the mind are chiefly occupied in refuting former errors, and these errors being derived from ancient theories, the true Philosophy of the Mind, though conducted on very different principles, still continues to be involved in some degree in the disputes of Metaphysics. A brief notice of the history of Speculative Opinions is therefore useful, both as indicating the sources of several errors which still prevail, and as accounting for the slight and partial attention which the genuine study of the subject has yet received.

All our knowledge is gained by experience, and even this truth we must learn by experience too ; it is a hard lesson, and slowly taught by the disappointment of some thousands of years, and many writers have not yet learned it, that the mind can only acquire some knowledge of itself by slow and patient

reflections on its own operations. By the constitution which God hath given it, the mind does not rest on its own contemplation,—it spreads itself out over all the objects that surround it. But, on the contrary, it is the aim of mental philosophy to withdraw the mind within itself, in order that it may view steadily and separately each operation as it arises. Thus reflection is the most painful and the most difficult act of the mind, and goes against the general bent of its nature.

This of itself were difficulty enough, but a new obstacle arises: the mind can exert but one act at a time. When we think of any one thing, we are forced to quit our former thought; by the very act of reflecting we lose the emotions or the ideas which we would wish to fix and to analyse; they are no longer present to us; we can only recall them by an effort of memory.

The utility also of analysing our mental operations is not immediately obvious. As in matter it is not the elements themselves that minister to human wants so much as the compounded bodies into which they unite, so in the mind it is not our feelings and thoughts, in their primitive and metaphysical nakedness, which are applicable to the uses of life, but the vast variety of combinations into which they enter without our will. So strong is the tendency to combination amongst our ideas, that it is as fruitless, in

the present state of knowledge, to attempt to exhibit them in their primitive forms, as it would be to exhibit some of the metallic bases uncompounded with the oxygen of the atmosphere. The elementary acts of mind escape our notice as much as the elementary atoms of matter escape our view. The Philosophy of the Mind, if it ever reach perfection, will consist in the complete history of all the acts of the mind, the enumeration of each of its feelings and powers, with all the combinations into which they enter. This is a bourne at which perhaps no discoverer can ever arrive. At all events, one inquirer after another must be contented to proceed but a step or two on the way.

Another obstacle to the progress of our knowledge of the mind proceeds, not only from the few who have gained the power of steadily reflecting upon their own thoughts, but also from the small degree of interest that is taken in such studies; an intelligent reader requiring in some degree the same qualifications as an intelligent writer. Nothing perhaps but the prevalence of some dangerous error relating to the mind can confer sufficient importance upon the subject to procure for it any considerable portion of attention. This is not the case at present: errors and truths respecting the mind are treated with too much indifference for the one to be hurtful, or the other profitable.

But though no inducement now exists to examine any part of the Philosophy of Mind minutely, a rapid and combined sketch of the subject may not be without its use. For Stuart justly observes, “that in the infancy of every science, the grand and fundamental *desideratum* is a bold and comprehensive outline ; somewhat for the same reason that, in the cultivation of an extensive country, forests must be cleared, and wildernesses reclaimed, before the limits of private property are fixed with accuracy, and long before the period when the divisions and subdivisions of separate possessions give rise to the details of curious and refined husbandry.”

A sketch is perhaps not equally favourable to the Speculative Opinions of the ancients, many of which would require minute and accurate pencilling in order to their being represented with complete justice. Yet even here an outline is of use in the absence of a finished treatise ; for notwithstanding the number of works which have attempted to enumerate the tenets and disputes of Speculative Philosophy, a standard work upon the subject is still a deficiency, and likely long to continue so. Indeed, as the systems of the ancients are diminishing in interest and importance the more we recede from them, it becomes less likely that any one will devote the genius that such a work would require to reanimate the lifeless theories of antiquity.

THE
PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND.

PART I.

SPECULATIVE OPINIONS.

No two things can be more different than Metaphysics and the Philosophy of the Mind, yet they are closely entwined. Theory is continually the precursor of truth : we must pass through the twilight and its shadows to arrive at the full and perfect light of day.

Metaphysics have occupied a large space of attention ; the philosophy of the mind is but of yesterday. Almost innumerable minds, and some of them of the mightiest energy, since man first began to think, have been piling up the shadowy Babels of metaphysics, in the vain hope that they might reach the heavens. The foundations of the philosophy of the mind, the work of a few labourers, and of humbler pretensions, are scarcely yet laid.

Religion and philosophy have their origin in the same law of thought which ascribes every event to a cause. It is not wonderful, therefore, that true philosophy is connected with true religion, and that false religions have given rise to fantastic theories of the universe. The earliest philosophy sprang from mythology. The first causes to which the operations of nature were ascribed were the imaginary deities,—the personifications of nature,—and in this theory of causation consisted the learning of the priesthood. The second class of assigned causes were the imaginary powers of nature, and in this consisted the learning of the philosophers.

As all the objects of thought may be divided into two great classes of phenomena,—those of matter and of mind,—so we find the earliest philosophy beginning to separate itself into two branches, the one sensible, the other abstracted, according as observation or reasoning prevailed amongst the nations where philosophy was first cultivated. The examples of this divergence are found in the speculations of the Egyptians and the Hindoos; and the contrast may be traced beyond their philosophy to the early periods of their mythology.

The Egyptians, who considered Egypt as the gift of the Nile, were well disposed to give the universe an aqueous origin; the Phenicians, who derived their livelihood and their importance from the sea, con-

sidered the ocean the sovereign deity; and the Greeks, who received the seeds of civilization from both, and who themselves pursued a maritime life, revered the ocean and the earth as the eldest of beings. From such a mythology the theory of the first philosopher Thales sprang with an easy and almost insensible transition.

On the other hand, the philosophy of the Hindoos derives matter itself from mind; and while the theory of the Egyptians and the Ionic school can be traced step by step from the simple worship, and the obvious appearances of nature, there is a chasm in the theory of the Hindoos which requires to be filled up from other sources. In their earliest writings the doctrine of emanation is already complete. This of itself would lead to the supposition, that the Bramins entered India with a mode of life, and with a creed already established, with a fixed priesthood, and inveterate usages. The circumstances of India confirm this. Among the hills there are the remains of earlier languages and simpler rites that have nothing in common with the system of the Bramins. Language gives a new solution of the origin of Hindoo philosophy. The Sanscrit shews its near affinity to the ancient Persian tongue; and in the ancient Persian creed we possess what the Sanscrit itself cannot afford,—the first elements of that belief which was common to both. The Persians worshipped the sun

the earliest and simplest form of superstition. The next step was to adore the universal fire of which the sun was but a portion. The third step was to consider fire as the origin of all things, and to assert that matter, darkness, and evil differed only from the source of creation and excellence by different degrees of distance and privation. Assuming light as the primeval fountain of existence, it is easy to see how naturally all things were explained by the doctrine of radiation, and that creation should be considered as emanation. Thus the Deity was viewed as the eternal ocean of light, which, gradually withdrawing its beams from a circular vacancy, to prepare a space for creation, flowed into the sun as the first reservoir of its energy, and from the solar fount into the ten successive circles of brightness which complete the sphere of existence. From this doctrine of emanation we are enabled to deduce, without any break or chasm, the emanative system both of the farthest east, and west, of the Hindoos, and of Pythagoras.

It must be owned that, from distance of time, difference of language, and uncertainty of tradition, the first rude and disjointed theories are lost in clouds and conjectures. It is only in Greece that we can obtain authentic records of the many but vain efforts of the human mind to arrive at speculative truth. And it is to be regretted, that, even for the history of Grecian philosophy, the materials are exceedingly

defective, and such as they are have never yet been done justice to. Diogenes Laertius affords the nucleus for such a history in the fragments which he has thrown together, collected often at second-hand, without connection, and without discernment. These are to be eked out by later collectors still inferior, united to what aid may be procured from the works that still survive of Plato, Aristotle, &c., whose criticisms are seldom impartial, whose notices are brief, and whose means of information were often limited and imperfect. Cicero has afforded us some delightful glimpses into the regions of ancient philosophy to make us regret that he who could have embalmed the fragments of former speculations should have treated of ancient systems, rather with the object of pointing out their absurdities and repugnances, than with the view of unfolding the connection of the parts, and the general harmony of the whole. Brucker, who was possessed of erudition and not destitute of judgment, stripped the materials he has collected of their beauty and spirit, and flung them together a mere mass destitute of symmetry and life ; while the later German historians of metaphysics have looked at ancient philosophy through the discolouring medium of some modern sect, and have been more anxious to enlist the ancients into the disputes and modes of thinking of the Germans, than to revive the just proportions and native form of ancient philosophy,

and to reanimate it with the pure genius of antiquity.

Whether a just history of ancient opinions will ever be written, is very doubtful ; the great abilities and industry which it would require, find so many more tempting fields of employment. The difficulties also are great, not only of discovering what the ancients thought, but still more of expressing how they thought. It is no easy task to depict the broken outline without filling it up, and to catch the uncertain rumours without adding to them by conjectures ; and even when the writings are still preserved, to give such a transcript from them as will leave that obscure which was darkened in the writer's mind, and not represent as prominent, that which was only the dim filling up of the back ground. The very act of stating and explaining the tenets of an imaginative and discursive writer, places them in an altered, and in some degree, false point of view. Volatile and dilated as they first rose upon the mind, they were suffered to escape into infinity ; but had they been brought into near view, and subjected to strict investigation, they would immediately have been discarded even from the imagination of the propounder or inventor.

Thales, the earliest philosopher of Greece, forms an uninterrupted link between the philosophy of Greece and of the barbarians, as well as between the

mythology of the poets and the cosmology of the philosophers. Born a citizen of Miletus, he was, according to Herodotus, of Phenician origin, and again renewed the intercourse with the east, and the abodes of earlier civilization, by studying under the priesthood of Egypt. Previous to writing, the only two modes by which tradition could hand down abstract notions, was either by verse, the usual mode, or by short and pithy sentences in the form of proverbs. It is doubtful whether Thales committed his doctrines to verse, certainly not to writing; most likely he uttered them in proverbs, as "The beginning of all things, water." "The world has a soul and is full of intelligences." "In the soulless souls." "Where there is motion there is soul." He is "reported," for report is the utmost we can reach to, to have answered to the questions: "What is most ancient? God, for he is unbegotten. What is most beautiful? The world, for it is a divine work. What is greatest? Space, for it contains all. Swiftest? Mind, for it permeates all. Strongest? Necessity, for it governs all. Wisest? Time, for it discovers all." And these, if not his exact sayings, are, at least, in the spirit of what he said, and convey an example of the earliest mode of teaching.

Both Laertius and Stobæus agree in ascribing to Thales that excellent rule of right: "Do not yourself what you blame in others."

Anaximander, the friend of Thales, and Pherecy-

des of Syros, who was rather younger, and who is chiefly remembered as the master of Pythagoras, may be considered as the successors of Thales. Pliny ascribes the commencement of prose-writing to Phercydes, and this assertion is strengthened by the beginning of his work being preserved by Laertius, the style of which decidedly marks the transition from verse to prose, where he describes as the ever-existing principles, Jupiter, time, and the earth; but though the measure was descending to prose, the figurative language of poetry was still retained while he celebrated "the robe large and beautiful which Jupiter wrought, and in it depicted the earth, and the ocean, and the ocean dwellings." Slight fragments, but which have a value from their high antiquity, and being the first lessons which Pythagoras received in philosophy, and shewing the wide interval between the instructions he received in his youth and the learning he acquired in the east.

Anaximander and his scholar Anaximenes, maintained the glory and the spirit of the school of Miletus, still seeking for a material principle, but placing it not in water, like their master, but in the infinite, and in the air.

Anaxagoras, said to be the scholar of Anaximenes, but shewn from dates to be only of his school, carried the Ionic philosophy to its greatest height; the beginning of his work is brief, simple, and sublime.

"All things were together; when mind coming, separated them into order." The chaotic state arose from the seeds of all things existing everywhere intermixed, being "all in all," and the order which mind introduced was the law of affinity which drew "like to like." This is the "homoiomereia" exaggerated by Lucretius, but which evidently deserved the praise, instead of reprehension, of the Atomic philosophers, having been copied by Democritus. The sayings imputed to the early philosophers, having been changed and transferred by the idleness of the later sophists from one great name to another, deserve the less notice, but some of those ascribed to Anaxagoras are stamped with the impress of his lofty character. Neglecting politics to observe the stars, he was asked if he had no concern for his country? "Yes, the greatest for my country, but it lies there," pointing with his finger to the heavens. Told of the death of his children, he said, "You tell me nothing unforeseen; born as they were of me I necessarily knew them to be mortal." When condemned to death for his sublime views of the universe, he said, "Nature had already passed that sentence both upon him and upon his judges." It is a noble picture, even were it an imaginary one, when Anaxagoras, impoverished by neglect of his affairs, and overlooked by Pericles in the hurry of public business, sat down to die of famine and covered his

head in his cloak, and turning to Pericles, at last apprised of his design, and beseeching him not to deprive him of the counsel of so wise and faithful a friend, said, "O Pericles, those who wish a lamp to shine upon them, must feed it with oil." In his old age he was universally revered, but when offered all funeral honours, he only desired that the anniversary of his death might be a perpetual holiday to the scholars of Lampsacus. And when asked where he chose to be buried, he said it mattered not, the road to the invisible world was every where alike open. The belief of a Deity forming the world has been ascribed to Thales by some, and to Anaxagoras by others; the reason of this discrepancy is, that Thales held a mundane, Anaxagoras a supramundane soul. Thales considered mind as immersed in matter, acting upon it, and at the same time reacted upon. Anaxagoras considered mind as without the world, impassive and immaterial.

While the Ionic school were endeavouring to deduce the material changes of the world from its supposed original state, Pythagoras was attempting to discover the laws of nature from the contemplation of the divine mind. If the Ionic school are difficult to be understood from the broken fragments that alone remain of their tenets, Pythagoras is darker still from the additional veil of religious mystery which is drawn over his opinions. Born at Samos,

taught by Pherecydes, then undergoing a long initiation in Egypt, perhaps visiting the Chaldeans and the Magi, at least becoming acquainted with their doctrines, he returned to his country like the tutelary Deity of his own Dorian race, "the Apollo from the Hyperboreans," to whom, for the beauty of his person, he was often compared; bringing light from afar, and the promise of "a golden summer;" restoring the Italian cities to the ancient Doric institutions, and reforming the manners of Grecian Italy.

We have to regret that we owe the account of the Pythagorean mode of life to so late a writer as Jamblicus; an account which blends the Doric institutions with the sacredness of the priesthood of Egypt, and with some later traits intended to rival the Christian Eremites of Egypt. Pythagoras studied the physiognomy of his disciples before receiving them,—weighed their manners, habits, and pursuits, and appointed them, when admitted probationers, a term of silence, varying according to their supposed dispositions. Those who failed in perseverance were dismissed; what they had thrown into the public stock was returned to them, and a tomb was erected to them as if deceased. But if their term of probation was completed, they were admitted within the veil where Pythagoras himself taught. There they might talk, question, write or express their opinions. These Esoterics, from living with their wives and

children in one spacious house, and forming but one large family, subject all to the same rules, were first called Cenobites. And this was the manner of their life: On awakening they pondered what they were about to do, as at night they considered what they had done, during the day. Then they rose with the rising sun, adoring it. Morning and evening they sang songs accompanied by the lyre, to attune their minds, and cast away the cares of secular business. Then they went to the prescribed studies and to contemplative morning walks in silent and undisturbed retreats; nor till their mind was thus prepared, held they converse with any one. Having walked, they met together, in temples, if possible, if not, in places of similar solemnity. Then preparing for bodily exercise, they oiled their limbs, ran or leapt. This done, they dined on bread and honey; wine was not tasted through the day. After dinner they treated of worldly affairs. In the evening they walked, not solitary, but by twos and threes. From their walk they went to meet in a party of not more than ten. When assembled they made a libation and offered incense, and went to a supper which ended before sunset. After supper, and a second libation, they read—the youngest reading, the eldest presiding. Then came the concluding libation, when the elder dismissed them with an exhortation to observe all the moral precepts of life.

The great aim of Pythagoras was to unite the Dorian discipline with eastern learning. He was no less a politician than a philosopher, and his utmost wish appears to have been to revive the Doric aristocracy in Italy, which was falling into decay, and with the aristocracy, the ancient institutions and manners. The Dorian differed from the modern notion of aristocracy—their nobility consisted not in riches or in titles, but in being well born, or of an heroic race—well taught and well disciplined, and asserting their pre-eminence in the state by superior knowledge and virtue. The riches which the Italian colonies early obtained by commerce, first disturbed the balance of power—then the losses which the Dorian nobles sustained in war, from having the post of honour and of danger, not to mention the gradual relaxation of discipline, had thrown the Italian cities into that state of anarchy which forebodes the change or the dissolution of the government. Pythagoras restored the ancient manners, and with them the ancient laws; his pupils, three hundred in number, (and the number is remarkable as coinciding with the threefold division of the Dorians into tribes,) retaining in their hands the supreme power, formed, according to the Doric notion, nearly a perfect aristocracy where the state was best administered by the best men. But the changes which time was introducing were too strong for the changes which philosophy was attempt-

ing; and the citizens rose against their rulers, and Pythagoras in his old age, if rumour is correct, perished with his disciples in the tumult. But if Pythagoras could not enforce good laws upon the Italian Greeks, his school at least furnished excellent law-givers, who proved that the discipline of Pythagoras was still superior in polity to what it was in speculation. None of the sayings imputed to Pythagoras display a profounder genius than that which implies how greatly men are moulded by the laws under which they live; and that if good laws are inefficacious without good morals, good morals can never be permanent without good laws. "How shall I best educate a son? by seeing that he is the citizen of a state with well ordered laws." It may be presumed that Pythagoras, observing the aristocracy were losing the reverence derived from their ancient and heroic birth, endeavoured to bestow upon them the veneration which he saw conferred on the priesthood in Egypt, and as he could not separate them by the mysteries of religion from the rest of the community, he substituted for these the mysteries of philosophy; and by his secret doctrine hoped to secure to the Doric nobility a long pre-eminence in wisdom and virtue. Pythagoras founded his philosophy upon abstractions. The most natural form of these abstractions were the ideas and exemplars subsisting in the divine mind, such as afterwards were

adopted by Plato. Pythagoras chose numbers for a less obvious reason, but with greater utility, perhaps, to the advancement of knowledge. The original number is the monad dwelling in the divine mind. All other numbers flow from that; and by movement from that central point complete the sum of existence. Number is either pure in itself, or arithmetic;—or in movement, when it becomes music;—or proceeding into magnitude, when it becomes geometry, in which a point is as one,—a line as two,—a superficies, three,—a body as four;—or lastly, when magnitude itself is considered as in motion, it becomes spherics, and affords the laws which regulate the movements of the spheres.

The most remarkable singularity of the ancient philosophers is, that they entertained right notions respecting the solar system, borrowed, as they professed, from the Egyptians. This anticipation of true knowledge has never been rightly accounted for; we eagerly turn to Aristotle, not for the sake of the poor sophisms with which he opposed this doctrine, but to get a glimpse of the arguments which were used on the other side; as far as the meagre account which Aristotle gives allows, we may conclude that these reasons were not philosophic but religious, which placed the sun in the centre, the most dignified position for that body which was most divine. A less arbitrary reason might perhaps be found in the

system of emanation, which, considering the sun as the second fountain of existence, deduced all other existence from him in concentric spheres of descending life.

The end of philosophy is this, according to Pythagoras, that by contemplating the eternal numbers we may become like to the gods, and gods ourselves ;— that this may prosper, let God be invoked, and the tutelary genius. For Pythagoras adopted the opinion, prevalent all over the east, of the soul's being a portion of the divine substance, imprisoned in an earthly body ; and the consequent belief that the soul ought to be weaned from the senses to a more intellectual life, in order that it may anticipate the time when freed from its dungeon it shall return to that ocean of bliss from which it had been exhaled like a vapour. As the fountain to the stream, so is God to nature. Nature and the stream ever renovated from their source, are eternal, but individuals, like the drops of water, are fleeting away. The objects of sense being infinite and continually changing, cannot be the objects of knowledge, which must be conversant about things which are definite in their number and permanent in their being. Matter, therefore, with its ever varying forms and ever shifting appearances lies under the sway of variable and shadowy opinion ; while the Deity and the eternal natures alone are the high and immutable objects of knowledge. The earth, the air, and the sea are filled with innumerable

and various beings, the unseen spectators and guardians of mankind. Death is but the renewal of existence—the soul passes in endless change from one body to another—again and yet again must it hope and fear—again feel the glow of youth, and again approach to a second birth by the slow decay of age. But while all on earth are whirled about with unceasing change, and mortal life alternately rises and sets in darkness, the soul that purifies its heavenly fire from the soil of matter, at death leaves this lower order of things and springs to its own ethereal region upon the wings of virtue. Below the moon every thing is fugitive as the unsubstantial vapour.

All sublunary beings are born but to die ;—and before death proceed care and pain, the necessary attendants on mortality ;—but in the pure regions above the moon, the serene is undisturbed and perpetual, its inhabitants partake of its blessed calm and freedom from change, and joy waits upon immortality.

Such were the opinions of Pythagoras, if we may be allowed to piece the broken fragments, paraphrase the occasional expressions, and decipher the hidden characters, which partly revealed and partly concealed his doctrines. The historians of speculative opinions have not sufficiently observed that Pythagoras uses hierophonetics instead of hieroglyphics. Instead of the emblems deeply engraved upon stone or projecting on the sacred edifices of Egypt, Pythagoras em-

plays an emblematic language, at once to assist the memory and to retain his tenets within the circle of the initiated.

If innovation in opinions could ever possibly be checked, it would have had no place among the disciples of Pythagoras, who silenced every rising doubt by the Pythagorean "ipse dixit," and affirmed the truth of their doctrines by oaths as well as arguments, swearing by the name of their master, the demigod who had revealed to them the innermost secrets of Nature. And amidst the general inconsistency of the Greek sects, they do present a marvellous example of fidelity to their teacher. But as in pouring liquor from one vessel to another, a minute portion is generally lost, and a secret taint may be received; so opinions adapt themselves to the mind that receives them, and the same words in another mouth have no longer the very same significance, for their meaning is in some degree qualified or clouded, coloured or expanded. To the eye of the passing observer, the current of opinion may seem to run smooth in its ancient bed, nevertheless it is all the while wasting away the opposing banks, and preparing for itself another channel. The philosophy of Pythagoras, as he himself fabled of the wanderings and transmigrations of the soul, gradually descended from the height of the empyrean, lost its spiritual purity, and became more and more immersed in matter.

The eternal natures of Pythagoras, pictured by his sublime imagination, which turned all subjects into poetry, as celestial and immortal shapes, whose dwelling was in the heaven of heavens, and in the inmost mind of man, were affirmed by Ecphantus to be corporeal elements differing in size, and form, and power; moved, however, not by impulsion, but by a divine mind. Ecphantus too, who was the Tycho Brahe of antiquity, tried to make the astronomy of Pythagoras meet half way that of the vulgar philosophers, by supposing the earth to be indeed placed in the middle of the world, but that it revolved round its centre eastward.

From the soaring spirit of Empedocles, the philosophy of Pythagoras received a rebound into a higher region. This lofty-minded sage, who refused the kingly power at Agrigentum from the citizens, grateful for the royal benefits he had conferred upon them; and who, from the ardour of his pursuit of science, was foolishly fabled to have thrown himself into the crater of Etna, maintained that all was dark to mere sense; that not sense but reason was the judge of truth; and that all existence must be traced to an active and a passive principle,—to the monad, and to matter. In general, he agreed with Pythagoras, but placed beyond the world not a void but a chaos. Prior to the elements, there are small molecules which are the elements of the elements—they are round,

and similar, and eternal. The first elements have two original qualities, friendship and discord, (a poetical personification of attraction and repulsion) which are excited or restrained by the monad or divine intelligence. The poet Delisle is surprised, but with little reason, that Lucretius, who, as an Epicurean, renounced the agency of the gods, should yet at the commencement of his poem, assign an active part in carrying on the order of nature to Mars and Venus,—but the Mars and Venus of the Roman poet are the friendship and discord of our philosopher, whose works the Epicureans were in the habit of studying and of admiring, though, at the same time they ridiculed the too lively sallies in which he indulged his fancy.

Philolaus, or his widow, by breaking the oath which bound the disciples of Pythagoras to secrecy, and by selling the mysterious volumes of their sect to Plato, transferred to another school the peculiar doctrines of their master, and the Pythagoreans gradually disappeared, till a desire to penetrate into the secrets of remote antiquity, gave a partial revival to the tenets of Pythagoras in later times. To the last the school maintained its pre-eminence in mathematical science. The celebrated Archytas of Tarentum was renowned for his mechanical skill ; and Eudoxus, who closed the sect with mathematical lustre, wished that, like Phaeton, he might be burned up in the chariot of the

sun, provided that, by the sacrifice of his life, he might obtain a nearer view of what it was composed.

The sect of the Eleatics, which flourished contemporaneously with the Pythagoreans at Elea or Velia in Italy, proceeded upon still more abstract principles than those of Pythagoras. Xenophanes of Colophon who founded it, maintained, that since nothing can arise out of nothing, whatever is, is eternal,—what is eternal is infinite,—what is infinite is everywhere similar, and one, that is, the Deity, who is thus identical with the universe. Hence, Xenophanes exchanged the emanative system of the Pythagoreans for strict Pantheism, and arrived at that stage of speculation so well described by Gravina in his “Wisdom of the Ancients.” “A similar opinion to this, of all things being God, and God all things, was prevalent among the Egyptians, for they believed that all things had one common nature, immense and infinite, which produces all species and forms from its own infinity, from its innate and everlasting motion, and its continual circumvolution on itself, and that this nature expanded itself into the twofold universe of matter and mind, by the unceasing production of individual bodies and individual souls; bestowing as much of itself upon each created thing as the nature of what is finite would receive of infinity.” This opinion was represented by the Egyptian deity Proteus, who

escapes from the senses, by assuming all forms except his real one.

Hence the opposition between sense and reason, which occupies the largest portion of the attention of the Eleatics, and which has been so little understood by many of the commentators,—the senses represent existence as many and finite,—the reason of the Eleatics represented it as infinite and one. Hence the continual war which the Eleatics waged with their senses, and the treasury of sophisms which they heaped up against the reality of sensible objects, and which enriched the later sceptics with most of their arguments against an external world. As the Pantheism of the Eleatics finds its counterpart in the Vedas, so the scepticism of the Eleatics is reflected in the *Maya* of the Hindoos. And this is the key to the dark fragments of the verses of the Eleatic school, while they are continually contrasting science and opinion, the purity of essence, and the multiplicity of appearances, and complaining that “opinion everywhere prevailed amongst mankind,” while science was the attainment of so few.

Parmenides takes up the same strain in the verses in which he continued the doctrines of his sect,—“Firm is the heart of faithful truth, but there is no true faith in the opinions of mankind.” He seems, however, to have relaxed from the highly metaphysical system of Xenophanes in giving less abstraction

to his notion of the universe, and allowing a part (while Xenophanes merged all parts in the whole,) to be more active and divine than the rest. This soul of the world, or proper deity, is "the crown which circles with intensity of light the circuit of the heavens."

His pupil Zeno, who accompanied him to Athens, and whose noble countenance was worthy to be transferred to brass and marble by the hand that sculptured the Phidian Jupiter, and whose contempt of death and undaunted love of liberty entitled him, according to his country's creed, to an eminent station in the Isles of the Blest, may be justly considered as the bestower of a doubtful gift to mortals. He has the best title to be esteemed the author of logic, but his logic is directed against a no less adversary than nature herself, and as the mode of his arguments gave birth to logic, so the matter of them afforded strength to scepticism. They may be ranked under four heads,—1st, Plurality of existence implies contradiction, for, if there be two objects, they must be similar in order to enable them to be classed as two—dissimilar, in order to enable us to individualize them. 2dly, Extension or divisibility implies contradiction, for that which is divisible is finite, and yet it is infinitely divisible. 3dly, On the same principle he attempted to prove that space was both finite and infinite; and, 4thly, That the notion of space involved

this absurdity, that every portion of space was contained in space, and that *ad infinitum*.

In the midst, however, of this scepticism with respect to external existence, the Eleatic school were acute in deducing inferences from the appearances of nature,—from the existence of shells in marble, they concluded that that marble had been deposited in the depths of the sea, and as what was once sea had become dry land, so in the cycle of changes dry land would again become sea,—the human race would be swept away by the ocean, and a new world would arise out of the ruins of the former.

The philosophy of early Greece was derived from three sources : the Ionic from Thales ; the Italic from Pythagoras, of which the Eleatic may be considered as a branch ; the third origin still remains to be considered in the speculations of Heraclitus, who, though he formed no proper sect in his own time, yet derived great reputation from his dark and oracular tenets, and contributed, in after ages, much to the foundations of the Stoical philosophy. By many, Heraclitus is thought to have borrowed his doctrines from the Pythagorean school ; it is more likely that he obtained them directly from the east. Ephesus his native city, and Diana of the Ephesians, whose temple was a usual resort of Heraclitus, were central points of mutual communication and intercourse, and the Diana of the Ephesians more resembled the alle-

gorical objects of worship in the east than the simpler and more beautiful forms that were enshrined in Greece. Like the orientals, Heraclitus considered that the universal fire was the principle of all things, and, like the orientals, ascribed to its action periods of intensity which formed ever recurring cycles of renovation and destruction, during which the material worlds were alternately produced and reabsorbed into its universal essence. The soul a divine spark, by abstraction, quits appearances and attains to truth, withdraws itself from matter and tends to reunite itself to the infinite mind. Appearances are vanishing and deceitful, "the universe is flowing like a stream." Two principles prevail—war and peace; peace, like the eddy in the stream, seems to unite the conflicting particles for a moment, but the force which is about to disunite them prevails, and hurries them away. There is no lasting peace, no undisturbed repose till individuals are again restored to the universe, and the stream of finite existence be again absorbed in the ocean of being.

So we interpret his dark oracles. "They say" that when Euripides brought his works to the notice of Socrates, Socrates answered, "What things I understand are noble, perhaps what I do not understand are so too, but they have need of a Delian diver." If the works when entire, were obscure, the few scattered fragments that remain are like the Sybilline

leaves. All that remains of him are, indeed, as Socrates observed, noble, breathing a lofty and independent spirit, indignant at the corruptions which were spreading over the republics of Greece. "The democracy," he said, "should defend the law as they would defend the wall of their city." Nothing can be more admirable than the ironical decree which he proposed when the Ephesians expelled his friend Hermodorus on account of his public spirit and his many virtues. "Let no one among us be profitable, (to his country), but if there be any such, let him be elsewhere and with others."

So far the philosophy of the Greeks bears some resemblance to that of the barbarians from which it sprung. After this, it may be considered as dividing itself into two unequal streams which are purely Grecian, and without foreign mixture,—the material or atomic theory of Leucippus and his followers,—and the moral philosophy of Socrates, and of those to whom the genius of Socrates gave their first impulse and direction.

The philosophy of Leucippus, which is sometimes termed the lower Eleatic school, sprang from that of the former, as contraries rise from each other. The elder Eleatics had extended the bounds of reason by depreciating sense, and heaping up sceptical arguments against all sensible appearances, till reason itself was undermined by what was so injudiciously

intended in its favour. Leucippus, by a not unfrequent revulsion, discarded the transcendental universe of the elder Eleatics, and placed the foundations of his theory in the world of the senses. The world, according to him, consists partly of a plenum, and partly of a vacuum; where it is full, it is filled with atoms. As the world is infinite, and these atoms are continually in movement, their rapid and incessant motion occasion a number of immense vortices, and these in their turn form worlds, the heavier bodies tending to the centre, and the lighter to the circumference; and as heat proceeds from movement, the bodies at the circumference which are whirled most rapidly round, kindle by their velocity into warmth and light, and become the stars.

The opinions of Leucippus the master, and Democritus the scholar, as might naturally have been expected from their sameness, are much intermixed by the historians of speculative opinions, nor is it possible altogether to appropriate to each their peculiar share in forming the sect. What is certain is, that Leucippus gave the outline, and that Democritus filled it up by his superior genius, and gave much of its plausibility to the atomic theory. The report that Democritus received much of his learning from the Magi in return for the hospitality which his father shewed to them and to Xerxes, is not countenanced by any of the tenets that Democritus held, altogether

averse to the genius of oriental learning. He evidently addicted himself entirely to complete the theory of Leucippus, retaining however many of the arguments of the elder Eleatics against sensible appearances, to such an extent as by some to have been considered one of the founders of scepticism ; so that the sceptics had stoutly to defend their originality against the charge of having borrowed from Democritus, not a portion of their arguments, which might well be, but even the whole.

There appears a remarkable coincidence, which does not seem to have been noticed, between Democritus and Anaxagoras, the atoms of the elder Atomists are not similar but dissimilar, the variety of bodies arises not from the varieties of combinations of atoms so much as from the variety of atoms themselves. Hence the elder Atomists stop short in their theory, and do not recede in effect from the homoiomereia of Anaxagoras, and they employ the same law of affinity that he does—the affinity of like for like.

The atomic theory in the hands of the three great successive masters, Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, is still evidently imperfect ; and what is remarkable, instead of gaining improvement by time, is most imperfect in the last of these, Epicurus, who, as Cicero justly observes, did not attain to the acuteness or the reach of mind of Democritus. All of them are apt to forget their own principles. They

make space infinite, and yet they assign descent as the direction of motion in infinite space. In another place, however, Democritus describes the atoms in everlasting motion through the endless void, in which there is neither height, nor depth, nor middle, nor extremity. Again, inconsistently with their own theory, they fall into the notion prevailing in their times, of returning cycles of existence. Now, when time is infinite, and the number of possible changes finite, such a repetition of events would perpetually take place in equal periods; but the movement of innumerable atoms through an infinite void, would form an infinite number of changes which can never be exhausted, and would exclude, in the atomic theory, the necessity of the recurring circle.

Democritus resolved all knowledge into sense, and all sense into touch and tangible form. The senses perceive by means of the idola, or images, which were continually flowing off from the surfaces of things. The deities themselves were some of these images, whose abode was in the air, and who, appearing to men in dreams, gave the first origin to religion and religious terrors. So huge are some of these shadows, that they might almost encircle the world. Time is the image of day and night, and, on the same principle, eternity might be considered as the image of time, the shadow of a shade. The chief good, and the end of all our pursuits should be cheerfulness,

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for the best of all things is a joyful mind. To this definition of the *summum bonum*, Democritus owes his reputation as the laughing philosopher, while the dark and retired disposition of Heraclitus, in order that Democritus might not be without a contrast, gave rise to the fable of the propensity of the philosopher of Ephesus to shed tears. The mind is well regulated when it is cheerful with its present possessions, and does not regret that which is out of its power. Democritus distinguished in motion between action and reaction. He anticipated Darwin in accounting for the young of animals immediately sucking, from the way in which they had been nourished previous to their birth; and in some degree he anticipated the monads of Leibnitz, by attributing to every atom an approximation to life.

Protagoras the disciple of Democritus, is chiefly celebrated for his sceptical maxim, that "man is the measure of all things," and thus assigning only a subjective existence to truth. What we perceive exists, and nothing more, thus resolving all things, according to the phrase of Kant, into phenomenism, and being to a certain extent the precursor of Hume.

The sophists, amongst whom Protagoras may be considered a distinguished leader, furnished with the sceptical arguments of the Eleatics, and prepared and practised to speak upon either side of every question, were perplexing the boundaries of right

and wrong, truth and falsehood, when the genius of Socrates arose a salutary light to Greece, and more than revived the spirit of ancient philosophy. The father of Socrates was a statuary, and the additional aid of his mother was required whenever the Athenian matrons invoked the assistance of Lucina. And to this it were needless to advert, did not Socrates in a spiritual sense consider himself of his mother's profession, and borrow his metaphors from it, when adverting to the education of the mental faculties, instead of drawing more beautiful allusions from the profession of his father. We have the portrait of Socrates, it appears, by universal consent, in the image of Silenus, or of the satyrs, but what hand, save that of Shakspeare, could draw the effigies of his mind—so versatile, and almost contradictory. The stranger who observed him must first have been struck with his appearance, and then with his manners,—so like, and yet so unlike the Sophists; everywhere, and at all times in the open air, generally in the public places, accosting all who would converse with him, and the Athenians were by no means averse to display their talents in conversation; by his irony and profession of ignorance inflating the vanity and self-importance, in the first instance, of the persons whom he addressed; then striking them, as they expressed it, with the benumbing touch of the torpedo, when he forced upon them the convic-

tion that their ignorance was real, and that his was only assumed. The mortification of some, the anger of others, and the derision of the surrounding idlers, might be suddenly interrupted by the appearance of Xanthippe, in her peculiar style of eloquence recalling her husband to the consideration of his domestic affairs, and when arguments were ineffectual, extending her hand, and rending away his cloak ; while the spectators loudly encouraged Socrates to return blow for blow, Socrates replying, " No, by Jupiter ; all you want is, that you may cry out in turns, while we are using our fists, Well done Socrates—well done Xanthippe !" No wonder and small blame that Aristophanes should mistake Socrates for one of the Sophists whom he opposed, and should judge his face too admirable for a mask to be omitted in his comedy. But how different is Socrates in the day of battle. Alcibiades is in danger, or Xenophon lies bleeding on the ground, and the genius of Homer alone can do justice to the lion-like retreat of the sage—rather Ulysses already represents him, rousing his magnanimous heart to stand firm, whilst the bravest of the Greeks are deserting the contest around him. The stern and prominent eyes of Socrates turn upon every side, like the eye of the bull when spurning the ground, and preparing to rush upon the enemy ; but the hostile spears respect him and pause, and he bears upon his back the most beautiful of the Greeks,—(a satyr car-

rying the youthful Apollo—a model of contrast for the statuary),—and preserves Alcibiades for the ruin of Athens, and Xenophon to be the saviour of the ten thousand Grecian heroes.

Again, what a contrast at the banquet of Agathon. The beautiful Agathon expects the admirer of the beautiful in vain; Socrates sits in the vestibule plunged in deep thought—in such a trance of meditation as occupied him at the siege of Potidea for a day and a night, insensible to the clash of arms and to the misery of war. The attendants long seek to rouse him, and when he does join the party, he still seems of another world. But Alcibiades appears, with all the graces of person and gifts of mind, to do honour to the festival of Agathon, and compares Socrates to the images of Silenus that were ordinarily to be met with for sale—that were rough and horrid without, but which opened and divided into two, and then you beheld the exquisite images of the gods within. He then bears testimony to the steadiness of Socrates' head, who, though he drank as much as any one, had never yet been seen intoxicated—who delighted his companions by his cheerfulness and serenity amidst the hardships of war, while he traversed the field of battle with as much composure as if he were pacing up and down his accustomed walk in the Agora of Athens; then he speaks of the fascination of his conversation, which, like the melody of Marsyas, charmed

not only when performed by an exquisite musician, but even when repeated by the stupid and the illiterate. Then Socrates, whether warmed by the praise, the wine, or the presence of his two beautiful friends, shews himself, even in the friendly description of Plato, more in the character of Silenus or the satyrs than of those celestial intelligences that were supposed to inhabit his breast.

Again, we behold him in a different point of view, when, for a wonder, he leaves the streets of Athens, and breathes the air of the neighbouring fields. Unsaddled, as usual, he wades with bare feet through the cool current of the Ilissus, his friend following him, urged by his example; and they find the chillness of the water not unpleasant, from the time of the year and of the day. Socrates, as unused to rural scenes, admires the lofty planes, the consecrated fountain that gushed out at their feet, the reviving breeze of spring, that sighed through the branches, and the scent of the opening blossoms; yet spoke of this easy and neighbouring pleasure as one in which he would but seldom indulge. The country taught him nothing: he must be ever learning, and from the conversations of men in the city—those conversations which brought upon him universal odium, a violent death to himself, and a lasting disgrace to his country.

Knowledge, according to Socrates, is the only good, and ignorance the only evil; but knowledge,

with Socrates, stands for the knowledge and the practice of duty. Happiness consists in the observance of duty. To the practice of virtue we require two things,—self-knowledge and self-controul. The deity is the foundation of duty and of morals. He is discerned internally and externally, from the nature of the mind, and from the structure of the universe. Socrates himself practised strict and habitual temperance, grounded upon the maxim, that he who has the fewest wants approaches nearest to the divine nature. The best State is that, where the greatest encouragement and largest rewards are proposed to virtue. Tried by this rule, how low would his native Athens stand in the scale of governments; and yet, in condemning him to drink the poisoned cup, it conferred upon him a nobler and more lasting immortality than if it had enrolled him among his country's gods, and erected altars to his worship.

Socrates is to be admired for what he thought himself—for his few tenets, but of excellent use—still more for what he did not think, for the vain and frivolous disputes which he rejected—most of all, for the thoughts which he excited (and this he considered his proper vocation) in the minds of others.

As all the Greek poets are indebted to Homer, so all the later philosophers are indebted to Socrates. Each, according to the scholastic maxim, received according to the capacity of the recipient. Æschines

repeated, without mixture or addition, the lessons he received; Cebes gave them a slight colouring of the Pythagorean philosophy; Xenophon transferred them into action—what Socrates spoke Xenophon performed.

The Cynics exaggerated both his tenets and his manners. Socrates walked without his shoes indeed, but Antisthenes threw away his tunic, took up the scrip and staff, and imitated the appearance of a strolling beggar. Socrates asserted that the end of man was to live virtuously. The Cynics, as foreign to this great aim, neglected the civil arts, and all the improvements of life. They rejected all but naked virtue—even the decency of drapery. Diogenes only requested of Alexander that he would not deprive him of the sunshine. The critics have been still harder, for they have deprived him of his tub also, assuring us that it is a vain and foolish figment. No one, however, can justly deprive him of that pine crown which he placed on his own head at the Isthmian games, as having overcome more formidable assailants than the Greek *athletæ*, having conquered poverty and the passions,—a noble anticipation of those frequent allusions in St. Paul between the Christian warfare and the games of Greece, between the obtaining a crown of everlasting life, and a fading chaplet. Diogenes justly laid the greatest stress upon exercise, both of body and mind: nothing valuable in life can be accomplished without it. The end

of philosophy with him is to overcome the passions. In this more is to be assigned to Nature than to law ; for her laws are truly efficacious, and the state of the world alone is well governed.

The Megaric and the Eretriac school chiefly cultivated the logic of Socrates. Euclid, before he had attended Socrates, had previously studied with the Eleatics, and made use also of their arguments against the Dogmatists. Euclid, and the subtle Stilpo of Megara, are said to have limited truth to identical propositions ; but the records of these schools are obscure and uninteresting, and they are chiefly distinguished for that over-acuteness, so congenial to Grecian genius, in the subtleties of logic, and for having, at a later period, furnished with arguments the Dogmatism of the Stoics, and hedged it in with some of the most thorny refinements of Dialectics.

Socrates had united pleasure and virtue. Aristippus of Cyrene retained pleasure as the chief end, making virtue the handmaid of pleasure, instead of pleasure the attendant of virtue. According to the philosophy of Aristippus, our senses, on account of their imperfections and distance from their objects, and these objects being continually changing, are inadequate fully to discern external things. Our impressions, indeed, are true, if they are considered as indicating merely the manner in which outward

things affect us ; but false, if they are believed to represent outward things themselves. Therefore, just reasoning relates either to our impressions or sensations. Sensations are of two kinds,—pleasure and pain. One pleasure does not differ from another in kind or in dignity. Happiness is not different from pleasure, but is merely the sum of pleasures past, present, and future. The basest pleasures were therefore equally valued by Aristippus as the most honourable, provided the enjoyment was equal in amount. The pains and pleasures of the body are, in his view, more lively than those of the mind, for the latter are but the copies and reflections of the former.

No wonder that this school of pleasure closed in deep shades of melancholy, and that Hegesias the Cyrenaic was called the death-persuader, and forbidden to lecture, for fear of inducing men to escape from the pleasures of a life so greatly over-balanced by pains ; where pleasures are imaginary and fugitive, but pains are real and intense ; where pleasures quickly reach their height, and put an end to themselves by satiety, but where pain is only terminated by the termination of life.

But by far the most illustrious of the philosophers who sprung from the school of Socrates, was Plato, of reputed divine descent, tracing his line on the father's side, through the family of Codrus to Neptune, or in prosaic language, to those strangers who brought

civilization to Athens over the sea ; and allied by the mother to the family of Solon—a writer of dithyrambs, and of epic poetry, which he burnt after he had compared his productions with Homer ; afterwards, by the advice of Socrates, he gave up public business for the pursuit of wisdom, though still retaining in the midst of his philosophy his poetical imagination, and his ideal politics. Socrates, just before Plato attached himself to him, dreamt that a cygnet came from the altar of love, and alighted in his bosom, thence soaring to the heavens, it soothed men and gods with its song. Plato, however, was never a pure Socratic, he had previously studied the opinions of Heraclitus and Parmenides ; and Socrates, at every period of his discipleship, might justly have complained, how many things does this young man put into my mouth that I never spoke. After the death of Socrates he added still a larger accession of foreign materials by his intercourse in Italy with the Pythagoreans, and his purchase of their books, and united with these the traditions of ancient times, and the learning of distant countries. It seems hard that Socrates should be introduced as uttering all these strange poetical and foreign doctrines which he would have been the first to have attacked with his irony, and to have shewn how much they were averse from the scope of his philosophy, while the character of Pythagoras, to whom they really belonged, is not in-

roduced, though in bringing him forward the imagination of Plato might have had ample scope in half withdrawing the veil that hid the mystic teacher from the general view. One reason, perhaps, for the employment of the name of Socrates in dialogues which have no reference to his opinions, might be suggested. Socrates was never initiated, and the coincidence of what he spoke, with the purer religion taught in the mysteries, would be no betrayal of those secrets which might have subjected others to punishment. As it is, it requires all the genius of Plato to harmonise the two discordant elements which exist in his writings—the irony and Socratic doubt of Socrates, with the dogmatism and almost inspired tone of Pythagoras.

From this mixture, it is not wonderful that several learned men have thought with the poet Collins, that

— “ Science pranked in tissued vest,
By reason, pride, and fancy drest,
Comes like a bride so trim array'd,
To wed with doubt in Plato's shade :”

Or that the later academics should have become sceptics, and losing the transcendental light of Plato's ideas, should view the world, now suddenly darkened, in a state of doubtful twilight. The opinions of Plato have probably never had full justice done them, nor is it easy to do it. Commentators, and historians

of speculative opinions, engaging at once on the high questions of what were Plato's tenets concerning the Deity, and the universe, its formation, and its ultimate laws, might lead one to the belief that Plato was chiefly a visionary, and like his pretended followers of the school of Alexandria, was solely intent upon abstractions, and a fantastic theology. Yet Plato, though speculative and poetical, has a keen eye for the every-day world lying around him. Attica and the Athenians formed the foreground of his thoughts; Sparta is embellished, and Persia has its faults concealed by distance; it is only in the empyreum, and blended with the shining æther, that the celestial shapes appear, the immortal ideas of Plato, dwelling in the brightness of the infinite mind.

Though without contemplation truth cannot be reached, yet study and action, according to Plato, are always to be united, otherwise the studious would conduct themselves, not as if they were living among ordinary men, but as if they were already translated to the islands of the blest. Yet with him, philosophy is properly the pursuit of that wisdom which contemplates absolute existence.

With respect to matter, we may remark, that though the ancient philosophers were precluded by the way in which they understood the maxim, "out of nothing, nothing can arise;" from believing in absolute creation, yet that they reduced matter so low in

the scale of existence, that it was possessed rather of possible than of actual being, and was with many solely the capacity of receiving forms. At the same time that matter was so far reduced to the border of nonentity as to consist chiefly of negatives, it was allowed a certain perversity, very useful in an hypothesis which accounted for the origin of evil, deficiency, and decay. Too soft to retain the forms that were impressed upon it, and too stubborn to submit entirely to the laws prescribed to it, the vestiges of heavenly objects might yet be traced in its conformation, but in imperfect and perishable lineaments. The material world, according to Plato, consists of two principles—ideas and matter—and our impressions of outward objects are the produce of both. The soul has ideas within itself, copies of the eternal exemplars that reside in the divine mind, and these it remembers the more it sees of their imperfect copies without. But hence a distinction arises between the world that is perceived by sense, and the world that is discerned by intellect. The senses present us only with imperfect objects, ever varying, because ever diverging, though in various ways and degrees, from the central and eternal types. The intellect possesses the copies of these types, certain and unchanging like the types themselves. As the copies reside in the human mind, so the eternal exemplars dwell in the divine mind.

The first existence is the infinite mind, the second the logos, or intellectual world of ideas ; thirdly, matter with its capability, to a certain extent, of receiving the stamp and impression of those ideas ; and, lastly, the soul of the world, imparted to that world, after it has been fashioned according to the patterns existing in the divine intellect. And as the soul of the world is derived from the infinite mind, so are individual souls in their turn derived from the soul of the world, whether they be the intelligences that guide the stars, or of beings superior to man that occupy the higher regions, or lastly of man himself.

Plato establishes that virtue consists in conformity to the Deity as far as it is in our power. Plato also adopts the fourfold division of virtue into wisdom, fortitude, prudence, or temperance, and justice. These are to be attained by liberation from the senses, and a return to the divine life.

But it is not so much what Plato thought as the manner in which he expressed his thoughts which gives their charm and immortality to his writings. His style is the highest union of eloquence and philosophy. In his works, by the magic of genius, the dead are recalled to life, and the absent are presented to the eyes. Athens not in ruins, but with its walls, and its temples rises before us. We are in the patrimony of Plato, in the academy which he left as an inheritance to philosophy. We are under the shade

of those lofty planes which were esteemed sacred by the Athenians, and before the temple which Plato dedicated to the muses, and where Speusippus placed the figures of the graces, surrounded by the tombs of ancient heroes, and by the monuments of those who perished at Marathon. There are assembled the followers of Plato—the men who were considered, if not demigods, at least the survivors of the golden age ; there the improvements of later philosophy, are blended with the fragments of that more ancient learning, which appear to have descended to posterity like relics from the ruins of a former world. There we hear the anticipation of another continent. Atlantis, which first appears like the country beyond mount Atlas, with its herds of “elephants,” then recedes as an island into the ocean of darkness to which it communicates its name, at last expands into a new world “larger than Lybia and Asia put together,” and finally disappears with its temples and towers beneath the waves, there to rest till Columbus again recalled it from the abyss of darkness and oblivion ; and its renewed inhabitants are again reviving its free and noble institutions.

The genius of Plato, like that of Pythagoras, was too imaginative and too meditative for the temper and spirit of the Greeks ; the school of Pythagoras began immediately to recede from the eternal numbers, and that of Plato from the exemplars in the

divine mind, not with intentional innovation, but thoughts which are foreign to the mind, and above the reach of the faculties, gradually disappear. Aristotle remarks of his fellow disciple Speusippus, that he made less use of ideas than his uncle Plato had done; and the same, of course, may be remarked of Aristotle himself, who seems neither to have admired, nor to have understood the higher flights of his master. Xenocrates, who succeeded Speusippus, appears in several instances to have substituted the phraseology of Pythagoras for that of Plato.

Polemo, that greatest instance of philosophical conversion, who, coming intoxicated one morning, with his festal dress and garland, into the school of Xenocrates, was so struck with the discourse upon temperance, that he drank nothing afterwards but water, changed still more the aspect of Plato's philosophy, and became, without desiring it, the real, though not the nominal, founder of the Stoic sect, by simplifying and contracting the Platonic doctrines. Instead of the refinements and the quaternity of Plato, Polemo simply pronounced the world to be God, and maintained that the chief good was to live according to nature, meaning that better nature either in us or in the universe—the divine nature. Happiness, according to him, consists in self-sufficiency, and can have no existence without virtue. Zeno, the founder of the Stoics, was the scholar of Polemo, and, as was

well perceived by his master, came with the fixed intention of appropriating Polemo's opinions as his own.

The Platonic philosophy was partly sceptic, partly dogmatic, and the latter portion of it being appropriated by the Stoics, nothing remained for the academy, by which to distinguish itself, except insisting and enlarging upon the sceptical portion. Thus Plato was divided into two halves—the academy retained the irony and the disputative logic, but discarded the end for which Socrates and Plato used it—the attainment of religious and moral truth; while the Stoics retained these truths (without the imagination, which augmented their beauty, but diminished their appearance of reality,) fencing them with more positive arguments, and carrying them with more energy into the daily business of life.

Hence the new academy may be considered, if we may use the term, as a relative sect; it rose from opposition to the Stoics, and existed in vigour only while the war was carried on between them. This point of view gives a simple explanation concerning the second, the third, and the fourth academy into which the new academy, probably unnecessarily, has been subdivided, since even Cicero, the most illustrious disciple of the new academy, seems at a loss to state the difference between them. The new academy was armed at all points against the Stoics; when the

Stoics changed their weapons, they necessarily drew on a corresponding change in the weapons of the academy. When Chrysippus added new subtilties to the Stoic logic, Carneades was forced to add new arguments to the scepticism of the academy, and justly remarked, that, if there had been no Chrysippus, there would have been no Carneades. This then is the sole distinction of the third academy, and the fourth academy arose from a contrary cause, a degree of compromise between the Stoics and the Academics, when the causes of their rivalry subsiding, the last Academics departed in some measure from the extreme of scepticism, and partially reverted to the general outlines of their first founder, Plato.

Arcesilaus, the founder of the second academy, and therefore the first academic sceptic, went a step farther than the irony of Socrates, who affirmed that all that he knew was that he knew nothing; even this Arcesilaus affirmed could not be known with certainty. The aim of their philosophy being to maintain the incomprehensibility of all subjects, the Academics had abundance of materials and a sufficient number of assistants; for, as the Grecian schools, like the Grecian republics, were all at war with each other, whatever sect they proposed to attack, they were sure to be joined by a number of auxiliary assailants. Did they wish to disparage sense, the Rationalists would furnish them with innumerable proofs of the

treachery of the senses. Or if reason was to be assailed, those who established their philosophy upon the senses, however ill able to defend their own cause, were well furnished with innumerable weapons against their adversaries the Rationalists. Both the Academics and the Sceptics, however, guarded against applying their arguments to the common affairs of life; in these, probability or custom was all that a philosopher should require—their warfare was not with the senses of mankind, but with the speculative opinions of the dogmatists.

The Sceptics are so nearly allied to the Academics, that the followers of either could not point out any radical distinction between them. Pyrrho of Elis professed himself to be much indebted to Democritus, who though quitting pantheism for the atomic theory, yet retained many of the arguments of the elder Eleatics against the certainty of the senses. The end Pyrrho proposed was undisturbedness of mind; and the means to arrive at it—the restraining our assent, by perpetually balancing opposite arguments, and by a continual consideration of the incomprehensibility of existence. As in two connected volcanoes, when one finds a vent, the other becomes quiet and silent, so while the Academics continued to make the world resound with their arguments, the sect of the Sceptics in Cicero's time became exhausted, and were considered as extinct.

But when the Academics had wearied themselves and every one else with their learned doubtings, and endless disputes, *Ænesidemus* of Crete revived the sceptic philosophy, blamed the new Academy for its want of generalization and philosophic depth, and in order to give a blow at the root of all philosophy, attacked the doctrines of causes and effects. He professed that he had derived the same benefit from the works of *Heraclitus* that his predecessor *Pyrrho* had done from those of *Democritus*.

Sextus, called *Empiricus*, (from being one of the empiric or tentative physicians, who so ably supported the sceptical philosophy, and proved what an intimate alliance it had with medicine,) completed the whole system in his very able work, which yet remains.

The sceptical faculty, according to his view, is that which opposes the conclusions of intellect to the impressions of sense. The great base of scepticism is this, that to every reason, a reason of equal weight may be opposed; and what is gained by this, is imperturbability and freedom from hope and fear; for the Dogmatists, in imagining that certain things are good or bad, are necessarily disturbed either at the absence of the one, or at the presence of the other.

There are ten topics for restraining assent. First, Different animals, being differently organised, must have different impressions. Secondly, Different men,

having bodies of diverse temperaments, must also have different impressions. Thirdly, Difference of the senses from each other, *e. g.* balsam sweet to the smell—bitter to the taste. Fourthly, Difference of the same sense in different circumstances—in health or in illness, &c. Fifth, Difference of the same object from difference of situation. Sixth, From mixture; the mind, when perceiving, mixes its own feelings, and acts, with the object perceived. Seventh, From composition, and the impossibility of exactly resolving compounded objects. Eighth, From relation—since our mind takes notice only of the relation of things, we ought to suspend our opinion of what things are, absolutely, in themselves. Ninth, From frequency and rareness of occurrence altering our opinions,—how differently do we regard stars and comets, from the latter being seldomer seen. Lastly, From custom, which influences all our judgments,* and yet the customs of different nations, and the received opinions of mankind, are everywhere various, contradictory, and opposed, and therefore mutually destructive.

Syllogism, which reasons from universals to individuals, implies a previous induction; but induction is impossible, for it is impossible to go over all individuals. Definition is absurd, if considered as the entrance to knowledge; for he who defines justly, must thoroughly understand the subject to be defined.

Neither can causes be comprehended, for the cause is determined by the effect,—and the effect has already been shewn to be incomprehensible; besides, we must shew the cause of each cause, and that would lead us to infinity. He who affirms motion, has the evidence of his senses,—he who denies it, has that of his reason. In practice the deities are to be worshipped, but the notions of them are to be rejected.

The most illustrious of Plato's disciples was Aristotle,—the philosopher of antiquity who has exerted the widest sway for good and evil over the progress of knowledge. The son of a physician who claimed descent from Æsculapius, born at Stagira, he had the rare good fortune of rebuilding his native city from its ruins, and of perpetuating its name, by associating it with his own. Twenty years the scholar of Plato, and rightly appreciated by his master, who justly named him Mind,—he appeared easily to admit that the claim of relationship was stronger than that of merit, when Plato appointed his nephew to be his successor. Had Aristotle succeeded to the academy, we should probably neither have possessed the stern morality of the Stoics, nor the ingenious sophistry of the new Academics; but the authority of Plato and Aristotle, which the Alexandrian school attempted to unite at a later period, would have been early blended together, and it would have been more diffi-

cult to have distinguished their genius, and discriminated their opinions.

“Matter is merely power,” or matter^{*} is only the capability of being; it is form which gives it energy and actuality, or what Aristotle names “Entelecheia.” Our knowledge has its origin in the senses—our perceptions are the impressions of the forms of external objects upon the senses. Aristotle anticipates Hobbes in defining conceptions to be merely a feebler perception. He had also the merit of pointing out the distinction between memory and reminiscence, or voluntary and active memory; the first common to the brutes, the latter peculiar to mankind. And he had the still greater merit of investigating the train of thought, or what has more lately been called the association of ideas, and assigning as its connecting links proximity in time, or place and custom. He also anticipated, but with less deserved praise, the opinion which makes memory depend on the agitations of the humours about the sensorium.

Truth is the conformity of our thoughts with the nature of things; in order, therefore, to arrive at truth, we must become acquainted with external things by means of induction. Induction, therefore, according to Aristotle’s principles, is the great source of knowledge. Dialectics only arrange the truths we have already acquired. But here there is a great opposition between the principles and the practice of

Aristotle; he has sedulously cultivated dialectics, and neglected the true logic—the *method* of induction.

The reason of this contradiction is found in a peculiarity of Aristotle's philosophy,—which, though it alone sufficiently explains his tenets, yet appears to be neglected by his commentators,—he set aside the principles of Plato, without substituting any certain principles in their stead. He rejected the ideas of Plato as absurd, because they were nothing more than “ eternal objects of sense ;” but what is the form (“ *eidos*”) of Aristotle, but the idea of Plato, mutilated and imperfect? Each take the same view of matter, that it is mere capability. Plato explains whence it derived the forms which we see it possessed of, but whence are the forms of Aristotle? they are the very absurdities that he attributes to his master, “ eternal sensibles ;” whereas the ideas of Plato are eternal intellectuals, which leave only transitory and imperfect copies of themselves, impressed upon this fleeting and changing world.

The same defect attends the deity of Aristotle, when compared with the deity of Plato,—the theory of Plato may be visionary, but it is complete,—no links are wanting to the hypothesis—its only want is the want of reality. The deity of Aristotle is the deity of Plato stripped of the *logos*, or intellectual world,—stripped of his moral attributes,

and reduced to be only the first mover, and the first cause.

The same explanation applies to dialectics and induction. Dialectics are the art of carrying on a dispute,—for dialectica is the art of dialogue,—and a dialogue possessed little interest unless the speakers disagreed. Dialectics were an engrossing pursuit of the Greeks ; the search after truth was less thought of than the victory over an antagonist. This, indeed, was the great fault imputed to the Sophists, but none of their philosophers, not even Socrates himself, was entirely free from sophistry. As sects increased, disputes multiplied likewise,—and their time, their thoughts, and their writings were expended upon endless strifes. The Pythagoreans furnished the ten categories, and the Eleatics abundance of arguments, which Zeno, Euclid, and Stilpo reduced into dialectics : and Aristotle completed the logic, falsely so called, of the Greeks, by perfecting the syllogism. Aristotle had justly remarked, that induction of particulars must precede dialectics, or the inference from universals. This was true according to his metaphysics, which referred the origin of knowledge to the senses. The logic of the Greeks was, therefore, more suitable to the philosophy of Plato, who considered the universal notions inherent in the mind as the basis of knowledge, than to the opinions of Aristotle, who, if he had formed his dialectics according to his own theory,

should have laid the chief stress upon induction, and considered dialectics as a very subordinate branch in the conduct of the understanding. Aristotle did not neglect facts—his principles led him to be most diligent in collecting them; nor did he altogether neglect the method of collecting them, or induction, for which he gave some rules, by Bacon not unjustly termed puerile; but the strength of his mind was turned to the employment and advancement of his organum,—the instrument, not of the discovery of truth, but of obtaining barren victories in the interminable war of words.

From the same cause,—the giving up a portion of Plato's opinions, without providing how the vacancy was to be filled up,—may be traced much of the indistinctness of Aristotle, and most of the disputes of his scholars. According to Aristotle, is the soul of man mortal or immortal? both sides agree that Aristotle held the passive intellect to be dissolved at death, but what becomes of the active intellect, concerning the origin of which Aristotle is nearly silent? If his silence be interpreted according to the doctrines of the church, then the soul is immortal, but if according to the spirit of ancient philosophy, and according to a rule not unsafe, that when Aristotle does not expressly dissent from Plato, he partly agrees with him, then are the Averroists right in judging that the only immortality reserved to man by Aris-

totle, consists in the permanence of that common intelligence of which each individual is only a participant during the brief period of his life.

Having abolished the intellectual world of Plato, and therefore having no receptacle for his forms when separated from matter, Aristotle naturally held the eternal formation of the world, yet he did not maintain this doctrine without admitting an "if," and the possibility of the contrary. Existence, with Aristotle, has three regions; the lower world, where things are both moveable and destructible; the heavens, which are only moveable but not destructible, as having a perpetual motion; and lastly, the Deity, who is immoveable and indestructible.

In morals, the end is happiness; the means, the activity of the soul. In the regulation of this activity, virtue consists; and as this energy may err, either by defect or by excess, virtue constitutes the mean between two opposite extremes.

The politics of Aristotle coincide with his morals, the end of both public and private well-being consisting alike in the union of virtue and happiness. The subject on which the Greeks pre-eminently excelled, and in which they are still in several respects superior to the moderns, is polity. The shocks which they were continually feeling from the neighbourhood of those little volcanoes, the Grecian republics, arrested the attention, and recalled the thoughts which

would otherwise have wandered entirely into an ideal world. Other governments are the complex work of time, the Grecian republics were in part the construction of their legislators; it was therefore easier to trace their origin, and to account for their structure. Being on a smaller scale, their interior machinery was more easily discoverable; and requiring a nicer balance to adjust their movements, they were more subject to interruptions and sudden changes. Hence the Greeks had both stronger motives and greater facilities for studying the art of government. The great defect of the Greek politicians arose from their having only one class of governments to study; they were imperfectly acquainted with the ill-managed empire of the great king; and the barbarians who, to them appeared to divide the rest of the earth amongst them, from their ill-regulated liberty, afforded no models to contrast with the Grecian republics. These republics furnished the only points of comparison, and the only reasons for preference. If there was a single exception, it was the kingdom of Macedon, which still retained the vestiges of the heroic governments of Greece in the three estates of the king, the nobles, and the people.

The republic of Plato has justly incurred both blame and ridicule; but it scarcely deserves the epithet of visionary, which has been frequently applied to it. It was merely the ideal of the republic

of Lycurgus, but in which the principles prevailing at Sparta, were pushed to the utmost extent. The Spartan government itself was but the Doric system pursued to a farther length than in the other Doric states; and Plato has given the theory of the Spartan government, which differs from the practice, by being unfettered by circumstances, and uncontrolled by the general feelings and practical judgment of mankind. Socrates was no friend to the extreme democracy of Athens, and his pupils fully shared in his sentiments. Had they been better acquainted with Sparta, they would better have understood the peculiar evils under which it laboured, and would not have given to it so decided a preference. As it was, they inclined to aristocracy; not to the aristocracy of real life, but of theory and philosophy, the perfect government of the wise and virtuous, where the best men were in the highest station, and where doubtless no ordinary place would have been assigned to themselves.

Whatever objections there may be to the republic of Plato, every praise is due to the practical judgment and perspicacity with which he surveyed and described the revolutions to which republics were incident, the action and reaction of their internal movements, and the changes which spring out of each other.

The industry also of Aristotle deserves equal praise,

for his enumeration of the various forms of republics, extending his view beyond Greece to its most distant colonies, and not suffering the foreign but excellent government of Carthage to escape his notice. Here he casts away the subtilty of dialectics, and employs observation and judgment, unfettered by artificial rules, and with no common success. In morals, too, he has touched with the hand of a master the various forms of mind, and its moral dispositions; his sketches of generosity and magnanimity might have been drawn from his pupil Alexander, before he was corrupted by victory and unbounded power. Theophrastus followed the footsteps of his master in his celebrated characteristics, it may be, with more minute accuracy of observation, but with less of the flowing outline of genius. The magnitude of the mind of Aristotle can alone be estimated from a general survey of his works, which embrace the whole circle of Grecian knowledge and attainment. The extent of his industry and observation is immense. Here there is no want of facts; all that is wanting is the method of observing, and the mode of registering, the skill to separate the false from the true, and that sound judgment, which, excluding verbal subtilties, would, from ascertained facts, deduce only legitimate and solid conclusions. As a poet, his odes are not unworthy of the Grecian muse; as a critic, his remarks are always ingenious, sometimes philo-

sophical; but his taste has been chiefly modelled upon the theatrical exhibitions of Athens, and contracted by considering the drama too much as the supreme rule of poetry, and the point of perfection. His natural history shews that he had ransacked both the land and the sea for information, but which, from the want of discrimination, far more in the pupils than in the master, long furnished the world with fables rather than facts. We have before observed, that Aristotle excelled rather in dialectics than metaphysics; but this deficiency might be turned by a panegyrist to his praise; his good sense rejected the splendid visions of Plato, and if he cast into the shade the ideal world of his master, he at least reflected some additional light upon the real study of the mind.

The obscurity which the anti-ideal philosophy of Aristotle threw over the nature of the soul, and over the nature of the Deity, had a hurtful effect upon several of his followers. Dicæarchus and Aristoxenes became decided materialists with respect to the soul, and Strato of Lampsacus, changed the "first mover" of his master Aristotle, into nature acting spontaneously, from inherent qualities and forces, without the intervention of a higher power.

As the followers of Aristotle derived their name of Peripatetics from the peripaton or walk attached to the temple of the Lycian Appollo, so the Stoics

derived their name from the stoa, or portico, which was adorned by the works of Polygnotus. The age of invention was over, but the two most popular sects had yet to arise,—the Stoics and the Epicureans, who, out of borrowed materials, constructed a system more complete in all its parts, and which bore more directly on life and morals.

Zeno, the founder of the Stoics, was accused of being an inventor of words, rather than of things, and it was suspected that he was still in reality a Platonist. We have before remarked that he agreed generally with Polemo, who had innovated on pure Platonism, or rather, who had drawn down the Platonic dogmas from the Empyreum, and contracted them within the “visible diurnal sphere.”

According to Zeno, philosophy is wisdom, or the perfection of the mind. Philosophy has three subdivisions, Logic, Physiology, and Ethics. Our knowledge arises from perceptions; from these, reason, the ruling faculty, forms our principles. The principles or maxims, which arise from the comparison of our perceptions, are either intentional, or involuntary, (*prolepseis*.) In noticing the latter class of principles, the Stoics made a great advance in the observation of the mind, and anticipated, though obscurely, the excellent remarks of Reid. These notions, which are the conditions of our intelligence, are involved in the exercise of thinking, and form the

koinos logos, or common sense. A perception they called fantasy, from the manifestation of light, because it reveals at once the object and itself, the thing perceived and the act of perceiving. Of perceptions some are strictly sensible; others less so, and which are perceived by sense, only as it were an instrument. The senses are faithful, and their perceptions are free from that incomprehensibility of which the Sceptics complained. The notions and principles founded upon perceptions are generally just, and men commonly agree in them; the difficulty, and the source of disputes, arises from the application of general notions to individuals. The Stoics, like many other Grecian sects, but perhaps beyond them all, laid the greatest stress upon speech, as the instrument of thought. Instead however of profiting by their own doctrine, and reforming language on philosophic principles, as an improved instrument of thinking, they abounded in verbal subtleties; and though they simplified the ten predicaments by reducing them to four divisions,—substance, quality, absoluteness, and relativeness,—they farther perplexed Logic, already over-run with vain distinctions, by the addition of other illusory refinements.

The physiology of the Stoics, who were general borrowers, is taken from Heraclitus. There are two principles, the passive and the active—matter and the Deity, who is the universal fire. They carefully

distinguished the Deity, however, from the nature of common fire. He was rather to be considered as the purest and most liquid æther. He is everlasting, incorruptible, and unbegotten. Though residing chiefly in the outward circumference, he yet pervades the world of grosser matter. Fate and the divine will are the same, and constitute the laws of the universe. Matter is subject to these laws—it rose from, and will again be resolved into the Divine essence, during successive periods of inflammation, (ecpurosis.) The burning of the world is a favourite catastrophe with the Stoics, an abundant topic for eloquence, and theme for philosophy. The genuine Stoic dogma appears to be, that the soul perishes with the body, but some are willing to assign it a longer date, and if it had lived a heroic life, placed it amid the stars, till the general conflagration should re-unite it, with all other finite existence, to the divine essence.

In ethics the Stoics followed the outline of Pothemo, and held that virtue consisted in a life conformable to nature—a phrase which has been ridiculed for its vagueness, but which appears to have been imperfectly apprehended. The conformity to nature is twofold—the conformity to our own nature, which is reason; and conformity to the laws of external nature and to God, who is the reason, or logos of the universe; and these two conformities coincide, for the soul of the wise man, similar in its nature to the

Deity, reflects the image of the divine wisdom. The Stoics exhausted all their distinctions in logic, and left none for morals, except the sole distinction of virtue and vice,—according to them, the only real good and evil. They had formed to themselves the model of an imaginary wise man, who was not only to be above the weaknesses, but also above the wants of humanity. In order to resemble this ideal perfection, all that was required was to extirpate the passions. Having attained to apathy, and guided by reason alone, their wise man resembled the Deity in every thing but the duration of his existence. Nor was this difference of much moment, for as time is not necessary to virtue, so neither is it necessary to happiness, which is inseparably conjoined with virtue.

As both the Stoics and the Epicureans were more distinguished for their mode of life than for the originality of their tenets, and as both sects have been made popular by two distinguished poets,—the Stoics by Lucan, the Epicureans by Lucretius,—a slighter notice of each is sufficient in the present instance.

Epicurus was anxious in all things to represent himself as self-taught, whereas the reverse was the case, being in all things a borrower. His philosophy is that of Democritus, disguised by new terms, and a few alterations and additions, which are by no means improvements. Philosophy, according to Epi-

curus, is the exercise of reason, which, by means of thought, arrives at the end which a wise man proposes to himself, a happy life. A wise man will neither be swayed by authority nor antiquity; for to a philosopher nothing ought to be more venerable and ancient than truth. In arguments and opinions a wise man will adhere to that which is clear, and to that only. The senses are the test of truth. The senses are never false: as in perception there is no judgment, so there can be no falsehood. It is the opinion alone that is deduced from perceptions which can possibly be erroneous. Opinions are true or false, as they are ratified or not by the senses.

As our senses are the criteria of truth and falsehood, so are our feelings the test of good and evil. Pleasure without pain is to be embraced, and pain without pleasure to be shunned. Where, as usually happens, they are mixed, prudence must strike the balance between them. Prudence, therefore, is the chief of the virtues, because an Epicurean philosopher only uses the virtues as means to attain to happiness. There are two kinds of pleasure—that which consists in rest, and that which consists in motion or action. The first alone can properly be considered as happiness, for that which consists in motion, like all motion, must tend to a state of rest.

We have here a distinguished instance of the plagiarism of Epicurus. He borrows his thoughts from

Democritus, but his phraseology from Aristippus. He agreed with Democritus, that the chief end, or summum bonum, to be sought, was not bodily pleasure, but cheerfulness and tranquillity of mind ; yet, to disguise his obligations, and to recruit his ranks from the voluptuaries, he uses the language of Aristippus, and affects to pay his homage to pleasure, whereas tranquillity was the private idol of his sect. In opposition to Aristippus and the Cyrenaics, he maintained that the pleasures of the body are inferior to those of the mind. Bodily pleasures are too nearly allied to pain, being but the satisfactions of the appetites, where the craving is long and the relief short ; but the pleasures of the mind are more lasting and sincere, less subject to change and accident, and, instead of being evanescent, augmenting upon reflexion.

The true Epicureans were nice in their choice of pleasure. Their maxim was never to buy it too dear ; and upon such terms, in this world, they found they could seldom be purchasers. A wise man, according to these severe and philosophic voluptuaries, will abstain even from music and poetry, as far as they are the incentives to passion. The common herd of the Epicureans, however, were far different, and let no flower of the spring pass by them, however in the end they might transfix themselves with thorns, and “ pierce themselves through with many sorrows.”

Hence the reputation of the leaders served merely as a screen for the vices of many of their disciples, while the profligacy of the scholar threw back an obloquy upon the teachers, rather deserved by the doctrines which they taught than by the lives which they led.

Though the senses are to be the test of truth, yet Epicurus builds his worlds upon materials which escape the notice of the senses—atoms. These atoms are also to be innumerable, though the senses take no note of the infinite. They are also to move through an infinite vacuum, which again is no object of the senses; so that Democritus, when he attacked the authority of the senses, acted more consistently than Epicurus did. Though there is neither height nor depth in infinite space, the atoms of Epicurus are possessed of two absurdities,—they move downwards through infinity, and they possess unequal weights, with equal celerities. Notwithstanding all these ridiculous assumptions, Epicurus, perceiving that his theory would not work, added a slight declination, "*clinamen principiorum*," with no other argument for its existence than that it mended an indifferent hypothesis, and enabled him to introduce chance into the universe, and freedom into the mind of man,—"*Fatis avolsa voluntas*." The gods which Democritus allowed to haunt the regions of the air, and who, as shadows only, though gigantic ones, might be considered sufficiently innoxious, yet, as Democritus

confessed, they were troublesome in dreams, Epicurus banished to a Utopia of his own invention,—those quiet inter-mundane spaces of perpetual sunshine and serenity where, undisturbed by storms from without, or cares from within, these deified Epicureans might enjoy in full perfection the “*dolce far niente*” of the Italians.

Such a theory as this were alone sufficient to convince us that the eagle-eyed genius of Greece was descending fast from “its pride of place,” and about to fold its wings for ever. After this the human mind lay fallow and unproductive for ages, exhausted by its previous and abundant harvests of flowers rather than of fruits.

Philosophy was continued in a state of suspended animation, rather than of living energy and original production, under the Romans—in some degree under the Saracens also; we can scarcely add under the schoolmen.

The Romans had no turn for invention or speculation; but seized with a strong hand, and with no feeble judgment, on what was immediately fitted for life and practice. Cicero became an Academic, not from being perplexed with speculative doubts, but because he thought it suitable to his profession as a lawyer to plead on both sides of every question. His joke upon Aristoxenes might be retorted upon himself, when Cicero observed, upon the philosophic mu-

sician calling the soul a harmony: "Hic ab arte sua non recessit." Even in the pursuit of philosophy he ever kept a steady eye on his own profession. While the Republic lasted, the Romans had some variety of choice amidst the diversity of sects; after the establishment of the empire they were chiefly divided into two; if pliant to the existing tyranny, they became Epicureans; if they stiffened themselves against arbitrary power, they encased themselves in the armour of the Stoics. While the rest of the universe was enslaved, the Stoics at least remained free—free during life in the recesses of the mind; but if that last retreat of liberty were violated, ready to procure for themselves by violent hands the liberation of eternity.

The only sect during those times which has some claim to originality is that of the Alexandrian school. The theories of the east and west had been encountering each other, and intermingling along the confines of the Roman dominion in Asia, and had given rise to Gnosticism among the heretical Christians, and to the commencement of the cabbala among the Jews, which in its first origin was not dissimilar from the emanative theory of the east, already mentioned, with its ocean of light, its secondary fountain of radiance, and its successive and concentric circles of being, though afterwards rendered more complicated by a continual accession of fable and personifica-

tion, of mystery, and even of magic. But the aim of the Alexandrian school was far more extensive—to reconcile not only Plato and Aristotle, but the conflicting systems of the east and west, and from the fusion of these different elements to recast a philosophy which should be at once new and ancient, and which was intended to prove a successful rival to Christianity. Better, and certainly more amusing, information is gained respecting the genius of the new sect from Porphyry's life of Plotinus, than from any short abstract of their mystical notions, where the reveries of Plato and Pythagoras were still more attenuated into the abstract notions of the most transcendental ontology, while these chimeras are pretended to be deduced and proved by a very subtle and refined logic.

Plotinus, by Porphyry's account, was so much ashamed of his soul having been entrapped into a body, that he always blushed whenever the subject was alluded to, and never could be brought to say when he was born, who were his parents, and what was his country.' He was indignant at the mention of his picture being taken, and wondered why his friends should wish to perpetuate to posterity the disgrace he had incurred by appearing in the flesh. "A worthy object," he exclaimed, "to contemplate the shadow of a worthless shade," for so he termed his body. However, his friends and scholars were



not to be so defeated, and secretly introduced a painter as one who wished to be instructed in the higher philosophy, and who, instead of attending to the invectives of Plotinus against the body, was anxiously endeavouring to recollect every expression and feature of that body, and was thus enabled to give an accurate likeness of him.

Plotinus was v^{ery} desirous to learn the secrets of the Magi of Persia, and could hit upon no better expedient to discover them, than to join the invading army of Gordian ; but the Magi seem to have had no relish for this ardent and warlike disciple, and when Gordian was slain and the Romans defeated, he returned as wise, but in a much greater hurry than he came.

There is considerable dispute whether the Origen that Porphyry mentions as a fellow disciple of Plotinus, was the Christian or a heathen Origen ; it is possible, but not highly probable, that Ammonius should have had two very eminent disciples of the same name. The chief objection to its being the Christian Origen is the friendly footing on which Plotinus and Origen were together, but it is to be recollected that Origen was but half a Christian, and Plotinus half a pagan, while their master, Ammonius, was a complete mixture of both. Plotinus did not sacrifice to the gods, he hinted that the gods ought rather to have sacrificed to him, as more intimately

united to the Supreme Deity. The enmity of the Alexandrian school against Christianity began with Porphyry, from causes not sufficiently ascertained: Plotinus wrote against the Christian heretics and the Gnostics, but in a slighter manner, and devolved the full refutation of them to his disciple, Porphyry.

With regard to the writings of Plotinus, the titles are by no means tempting to a modern reader: "How from the first proceed the things that are after the first, and concerning the one;" and another, "If all souls are one." Even "a treatise concerning love," were as good a cure for the passion of a rejected suitor as to take the lover's leap from the Leucadian rock; if he survived the reading of the one or the leaping from the other, the remedy would be alike effectual. When he wrote, Porphyry observes, he neither formed the letters perfectly, nor distinguished the syllables, nor attended at all to orthography, so that Porphyry, to whom he bequeathed the correction of his manuscripts, had a legacy which was no sinecure. Though wrapped up in the highest contemplations, and always seeking to unite himself to the Deity, the discernment of Plotinus in smaller matters was considered wonderful; he detected among a number of slaves the thief who had stolen a noble matron's necklace, and he perceived the secret intention which Porphyry had formed of putting himself to death.

When they were celebrating the birth-day of Plato, Porphyry produced a poem upon the sacred marriage, in which there were many things concealed in mystic expressions, and written with a divine enthusiasm, according to Porphyry's own account; the hearers naturally concluded that Porphyry was mad, but Plotinus, who knew when to pay a handsome compliment, called out loudly, "You have shewn yourself at once a poet, a philosopher, and a Hierophant." Apollo was still more flattering towards Plotinus himself, but his compliments were not so well turned; his verses are exceedingly ill written, and shew that Phœbus by this time was in the last stage of dotage.

Plotinus had nearly obtained a ruined town in Campania from the emperor Gallienus, where he intended to retire with his philosophic friends, and to establish the republic of Plato, and had already called his intended town Platonopolis, but courtiers, who in every age of the world have opposed every useful design, envied the philosopher the piece of waste land that was assigned him, and contrived to defeat the emperor's intentions. When Origen once entered his school, Plotinus, covered with blushes, wished to rise from his seat, and Origen desiring him to continue his discourse, he replied, "All desire of speaking is taken away, when the speaker knows that those he is about to address are acquainted with all he has to

say," and then making a very few observations he rose from his seat.

His house at Rome was crowded with children of both sexes who were intrusted to him by their parents, so that it resembled a temple where all found refuge, and though his life was averse from business, yet he was often appointed the arbiter of their differences by the Roman citizens.

He attained to the intuition of the Supreme God in the way recommended in the symposium of Plato, who was manifested to him neither by form nor idea, but existing in a manner above all that is intelligible, to which Porphyry modestly adds : " I also, Porphyry, once approached and was united to the Supreme Deity in the 68th year of my age."

The last of words of Plotinus were, " I am endeavouring to rejoin that which is divine in me to that which is divine in the universe," saying this, he expired, and immediately a serpent issuing out from below his bed, disappeared through a crevice in the wall.

Plotinus is the chief of the later Platonists, who blend the doctrines of Plato with the logic of Aristotle, and unite in some degree the superstition and mystery of the emanative philosophy, then prevalent in Egypt and in the east, with the tenets of the west. They are in substance the same opinions which have prevailed from the earliest times of Chaldea down to

the Pantheists and mystics of later ages, though the whole is conceived by Plotinus with more subtilty of logic than beauty of imagination. What is most remarkable is, that his work has been made a text-book, and has furnished the ground-work for numerous other systems; and many have chosen to draw their notions of Plato from Plotinus rather than from Plato himself, from the mistake of supposing that Plotinus correctly represented the Platonic doctrines.

The aim of the Alexandrians was to attain absolute knowledge by union with the Divine mind, and this was to be reached by what they termed theory, or contemplation. They cited the authority of Plato for their fundamental maxim, that all true knowledge must proceed from the union of the mind and the object; hence intuition in the All-being is necessary for the perfect discernment of truth. Absolute existence is unity—this primitive unity is without qualities, “pure existence without accident.” This unity is pure light continually overflowing. From unity proceeds (*nous*) or mind, which contemplates the unity. From mind emanates the soul of the universe. These three constitute the Triad of Plotinus.

Mind contemplates the unity as the all-possible, and by this act becomes itself the first actual being. What mind thinks, it at the same time creates, for thought alone is true existence. Mind, by always thinking, yet with continual variety of thought, be-

comes the infinite fountain of ^{the} life. The soul of the world, which is the produce and logos of mind, thinks, but more darkly, and through the medium of mind. It also produces, but less perfectly, for instance, it is the origin of human souls.

Virtue consists in simplification, by means of more or less perfect union with the Divine nature.

The absurdities of the Alexandrian school have a degree of interest attached to them, which would not otherwise belong to them, from their original hostility to Christianity, and from their afterwards becoming the source of Christian mysticism,—from their throwing light, such as it is, on the writings of Jacob Behmen and of Schelling, who are obviously indebted to them, though, in the first instance at least, receiving their tenets at second-hand.

It is striking to observe the coincidence between the last being of Aristotle, matter, and the first being of the Alexandrians, the primal Deity. "Matter is capability," according to Aristotle, and the Alexandrian deity is nothing more. The first is the possibility of becoming all forms, and the last is the mere possibility of becoming all existence.

The error of the Alexandrians consisted in mistaking the abstraction of the mind for the reality of existence; their thoughts could go no farther than abstract, or absolute existence—the first step. The second step was to blend their own consciousness

with the abstraction they had formed. The third error was a similar mistake of the subjective for the objective, and the considering their own thoughts as equivalent to actual being. Such are the very mistakes prevalent to this day in Germany, and the still more absurd, and more blasphemous tenets of Fichté and Schelling.

A writer of a more extended account of Speculative Opinions, might point out the curious coincidence between the first being of the Alexandrians and the first being of the Hindoos; trace their exact similarity, and compare the Triads of both, and then enter on the more difficult inquiry from what central point these two similar systems proceeded.

The historian of Metaphysics must confess, when he reaches the Saracens, that his materials fail him,—that few works are preserved of Saracenic philosophy, and that even if these were fully mastered, still his knowledge would be only fragmentary, that the works would require a larger collection to elucidate them, and that the volumes which should supply the chasms, have perished.

There, however, remains this consolation, that what is lost scarcely deserves a regret. The Saracens are only philosophers by courtesy,—the servile scholars of Aristotle, who thought they were following his precepts, when they were often misled by

the interpretations of the Alexandrian school. What, indeed, could be expected but a Babel of error and confusion, when the rhapsodies of the Koran formed the foundation, and the logic of Aristotle reared the superstructure. The more eminent among the Arabian philosophers, aware of the discordancy of the materials with which they were building, flung aside the Koran as the greatest rubbish of the two; but how little could they understand of Aristotle translated from bad Syriac into unfaithful Arabic, and frequently interpreted upon principles which were adverse to his own.

The Scholastics, so called from Dialectics being sedulously cultivated in the schools of Charlemagne, were still less entitled to be esteemed philosophers than even the Saracens. Their chief employment consisted in applying the spurious logic which then prevailed, to theological dogmas, and in deducing inferences from the tenets of St. Austin. An additional gleam of light reached them occasionally from the Greeks in the east, or the Spanish Saracens in the west. Scotus Erigena, in introducing mysticism, broke the drowsy acquiescence in received opinions, and possessed ever after, in the Catholic church, a small interior sect, who could deduce their hostility to the schoolmen from his introduction of the writings of Dionysius, the false Areopagite. On the other hand, Pope Silvester brought some scientific and me-

chanical improvements from his intercourse with the Arabs in Spain.

Abelard, who was accused of forsaking some of the errors of Romish superstition for others which he borrowed from the Gentile writers, excited an interest by his classic style, and his supposed adherence to Ethnic opinions; and his school, freed from the trammels of prevailing authority, exerted a freedom of thought, and soundness of judgment, if we except some errors in religious opinions, which placed them considerably above their contemporaries.

England did not forget her precedence in teaching the nations how to live, and how to think. John of Salisbury first perceived, and forcibly exposed, the futility of the Scholastic system; while Friar Bacon made the first distinguished attempt to renovate the philosophy of nature.

Aquinas is justly considered the chief of the Scholastics, and his works give rather too favourable a picture of what was considered the philosophy of his age. Instead of appealing to reason and to facts, he first perverts a passage of Scripture, and then endeavours to eke out his argument by the misinterpreted authority of Aristotle. Of the various questions proposed, nearly one-half are above, and the other below the human faculties. He descends from the highest mysteries of the Divine nature into questions the most trivial and puerile, and is equally ready, with the

help of the Bible and with Aristotle, to find the exact nature of the Trinity, or to determine whether the angels sing matins and vespers. Still, in the midst of the absurd discussions which occupy the schoolmen, he leaves traces of his native strength of mind. Like eyes long accustomed to the darkness, his view is peculiarly discriminative amid the dimness and shadows of ontology.

His arguments for the unity of the Deity would not lose by a comparison with Dr. Clarke. Aquinas shews well that motion supposes a mover, and effect a cause; and secondary causes, a first cause; that the laws of nature imply a lawgiver, and its order an ordainer. And as no one can give to another that which is not in his own possession, the Deity must possess all perfections in the highest degree; and since His essence is original, and therefore unlimited, he must possess in His own existence the greatest well-being and all-being.

Aquinas's argument for the unity of the Deity, in its native dress, is sufficiently scholastic. God is "purus actus," pure activity, without mixture of passiveness, therefore without form, for form implies a previous passiveness to the assumption of form. But the assumption of form is that which constitutes genera and species, and genera and species give rise to numbers. Therefore the Divine nature not admitting form, the Deity is alone and solitary in his class, and

strictly identical with his own nature. This argument, though highly metaphysical, and confined in its form to the scholastic philosophy, may yet be both simplified and strengthened. Whatever constitutes a being, an individual, is not communicable to another individual, otherwise it would not possess the principle of individuation. The properties which constitute Aquinas a man, are common to the kind—the properties which constitute him an individual, are confined to himself; on the supposition of two gods, each is possessed of absolute being and all perfections; but absolute being and all perfections constitute the Divine nature,—they are therefore identical with it, and by mathematical demonstration are identical with each other. Secondly, number implies difference; but on the supposition of two Deities, they both possess all perfections, therefore there is no difference, and of course no number and no plurality. Thirdly, in the universe all are parts of a whole, co-ordinate and subservient one to another; but things which differ do not assume one order unless under one ordainer, for many are more easily brought into one order by one than by many. One design is the natural result of one mind, but not of many minds, except contingently, that is, as far as they happen to be at one with each other. But since that which is original is absolute and necessarily existent, and nowise contingent, it follows that the

Original Cause which reduced all things under one order should itself be one ; and this first and single cause is God.

But “ the spider has woven her veil of seclusion,” and spread her cobwebs, scarcely more attenuated than the arguments which they cover, over the works of the Scholastics. In vain Leibnitz exhorts us to search in them for hidden treasure, and exclaims, “ there is gold in that mud.” Alas, of all employments, that of the gold-washer is the least remunerative !

The schoolmen long paid the blindest deference to Aristotle ; but at the revival of letters they felt as the Magi would have done at the rise of a double sun, not knowing which luminary to worship. The original and Greek Aristotle was found to be different from the often translated Aristotle they had received from the Moslem. His followers took different sides—a house divided against itself cannot stand—and the authority of the Stagirite began to totter. The school of Plato was also revived, another source of weakness ; but it was said to be discouraged by the Church of Rome, as bearing too great a similarity to the doctrines of that forbidden book—the Bible. Soon all the ancient sects appeared to rise from the dead, and each found a patron, who succeeded, if not in permanently supporting them, at least in distinguishing himself. These were in general sprung from the nurse of modern arts, Italy ; but

their fame was soon overshadowed by two of their countrymen, Cardan and Giordano Bruno.

Cardan may be considered as the first great innovator in philosophy in modern times ; not from possessing any new system, but from his restless and unquiet temper opposing and altering whatever was received. Aristotle and Plotinus still gave the materials of speculative philosophy, though the authority of the former was questioned. The books that Cardan recommends to his sons are few ; and he says if they leave these to read others, they will only get in exchange brass for gold. In poetry, Homer, Virgil, Horace ; in grammar, Priscian ; in rhetoric, Cicero and Quintilian ; in history, Xenophon, Salust, Suetonius, Plutarch ; in mathematics, Euclid, Apollonius, Archimedes, Vitruvius, Ptolemy ; in medicine, which was his own profession, Hippocrates, Galen, Avicenna, Rhasis, Dioscorides, Bellonius, Gesner, and Vesalius.

The three Italians, Cardan, Bruno, and Campanella, who distinguished themselves most in their attempts to form a new philosophy, have many things in common ; the same contempt for established opinions ; a similar tendency to enthusiasm and extravagant fancies ; and a certain degree of madness appearing in them all. Their minds were also much infected by the peculiarities of Aristotle's writings, even while they were struggling to free themselves from his yoke. All of them attempted to supply his

place by the dogmas of the later Platonists, and especially by Plotinus; and Bruno, in some measure, and Campanella, in a greater degree, have joined atomic and sensible tenets to the doctrines of a mystical philosophy.

That the power of imagination was very considerable in Cardan's mind, appeared in his early childhood, when, being desired by his father to remain always in bed till nine o'clock, he saw at the foot of his bed, an airy imagery of all sorts of pageants and persons, towers, houses, animals, horses with riders; flowers and trees on the one side, and on the other, theatres crowded with men of various aspects and dress, bearing instruments of music, appeared all sweeping along before his eyes; and he lay delighted with the procession that was passing before him; and when asked by his relations at what he was gazing so intently, he was afraid to tell, lest he should offend whatever power it was that afforded him the vision.

Above a hundred times in his dreams he was terrified by a red cock that spoke to him with a human voice, and predicted misfortunes, which, however, never happened.

When these sights left him, he received in compensation a faculty of seeing the moon whenever he looked up to the sky; and also the still more wonderful privilege, that in his presence, whatever wounds were inflicted no blood flowed, and no injury was felt, so that he boldly mingled in many quarrels

in the street, and joined in the thickest of the fray, for the sake of preserving the peace. When he went out a-hunting, the hare which had been seized by the hounds was found to have received no injury ; and a man who was surrounded and struck by assassins, owed his life to Cardan coming to the cathedral at Milan at the time.

Cardan was warned by dreams of all things that were to befall him. While he was joyous and cheerful, and sitting, though a mortal, in the seat of the immortals, he beheld himself one night in a pleasant and very fair garden, adorned with flowers, and loaded with fruits of every variety, so that nothing more delightful could be invented by any painter, or even by the poet Pulci, or by imagination herself. In that garden were two doors, one leading into the street, the other into the house to which it was attached. From the house door a girl came out clad in a white garment. While Cardan ran forward to embrace her, the gardener shut the door leading to the street, and locked it. In vain he called after the gardener, and desired him to open the door. He could not prevail upon him ; he remained sorrowing, but still holding the girl by the hand, till he was wakened out of sleep. Shortly after he made an ominous commencement of acquaintance with his future father-in-law, by his neighbour's house taking fire in the night ; and a

few days after beheld his neighbour's daughter passing through the street exactly as he had seen the young woman in his dream. From that time the dream began to be fulfilled. He could neither think of marrying her with any prospect of comfort, on account of his extreme poverty, nor yet give up thoughts of her. But his friends did not see the same difficulty that he did, and strongly advised him to marry the girl, offering to help him forward in the world if it were necessary ; so he married. His marriage he considered bad, but the consequences worse. Two successive miscarriages of sons occurred in the fourth month, so that he despaired of offspring, and suspected witchcraft. These two were, however, the most fortunate of his male progeny. His eldest son, "a good, kind, simple lad," whose only faults till his twenty-third year, were gambling and gluttony, first married a wife without fortune, and, as it is hinted, without reputation, and afterwards had the misfortune, as the father termed it, of being discovered by his own confession, to have administered poison to her in her confinement, while he attended her both as her husband and physician.

The father had been warned by a dream, and the son by a sow, of what was to happen. The son, when he had received a silk gown from his father, on his entering into the medical profession, and was strutting about the streets attended by a servant,

unfortunately disturbed the slumbers of a sow reposing before a butcher's stall, as is the custom with these animals, Cardan informs us, in that part of Italy. The enraged animal overturned the new-made doctor, and had nearly anticipated the executioner, had not the butcher's come to his rescue with their boar spears, and allowed him to escape. Alarmed at the prodigy, the son ran home to his father to consult with him how they were to avert the omen. "Beware of leading a swinish life," said the wise man, little perceiving, as he remarks, that his son was rather threatened with dying a swinish death, which was soon accomplished by the executioner cutting his throat. His father was warned of the danger attending his son, by his bed being violently shaken the night before his son's clandestine marriage, as Cardan supposed, by the guardian demon, which was ever warning him, in humble imitation of Socrates and his genius. When his son was in prison, he was forewarned of his death by the appearance of a bloody sword at the root of the ring finger of his right hand. This sword grew redder and redder till it became like fire; but in the morning succeeding the night on which his son's head was cut off, the little sword had nearly vanished, and the next day it totally disappeared. During the twenty days his son was confined in prison, Cardan, almost continually, while sitting in his library, heard the

voice of his son confessing his crime. Seized with an irresistible frenzy, he rushed down to the court of his house ; and though he well knew what injury he might be doing his son, could not help calling out in the hearing of several persons, Alas ! my son is privy to his wife's death ; he has confessed the crime, and will have his head struck off in consequence. A few minutes after, he met his son-in-law, who told him that every thing had happened exactly as he had forewarned. Cardan, however, had the satisfaction to think that all who had condemned his son to death for poisoning his wife, were overtaken by some signal punishment, either in their own sudden death, or in the loss of some portion of their family.

As he considered his oldest son who was executed, as the honour of the family, so he looked upon the younger son as its disgrace, to whose continual folly and flagitiousness nothing could be added ; “ so that I was forced,” he says, “ to put him more than once into prison, to have him condemned to exile, and to deprive him of his paternal inheritance.” His daughter only gave him uneasiness twice ; when he had to pay down her dowry, and by her making no additions to the noble family into which she had been married. “ I am well aware,” says he, “ that these circumstances may seem quite immaterial to future ages ; but what is there in this mortal life except what is empty, vain, and the shadow of a dream ?”

The recollection of the cruel death of his eldest son poisoned the whole of his life, till one night, as he was lying awake deeply occupied with the thoughts of his misfortunes, an unknown voice called out to him, "put the precious stone you wear about your neck into your mouth." Cardan did so, and from that moment for the space of two years, he thought of the death of his beloved son no more, till at a public dinner, the memory of his loss again flashed upon him, and he again applied the same remedy, and experienced a cure which in no instance ever failed.

The only piece of good fortune Cardan ever met with, proceeded from the only lie, he says, that he ever told. He had boasted that he could cure a consumption; and this was not altogether a lie either, he observes, for he hoped to cure it. Hamilton, archbishop of St. Andrew's, having met with the book in which this boast was contained, and labouring under the symptoms of a consumption himself, enticed Cardan by money and promises first to Lyons, then to Paris, and afterwards to Scotland, and though no cure was effected, dismissed him with a letter of thanks, and commendations at Cardan's own request, to stop the mouths of those who would object against him as a vain boaster. This journey added much to the celebrity of Cardan, for having purchased clothes made in the Scottish fashion, and finding none of the

old clothes dealers in Italy willing to give him any considerable sum for them, he continued to wear them, even in the city of Rome itself, to the great admiration of all the beholders.

Cardan was eat up with superstition and incredulity at the same time. He brought great odium upon himself by calculating our Saviour's nativity, and deducing the course of his life and his miracles from the position of the stars at his birth. He professed to believe in the Deity, and in the immortality of the soul; but thought that respect was shewn to the Deity by speaking and thinking of him as little as possible, and that though the soul was immortal, it was difficult to conjecture in what its immortality consisted. Yet on account of a dream, he frequently paid his court to the Virgin Mary, and to the blessed Martin, from whom he was warned to expect many advantages, his father having told him that whatever he asked from the Virgin on the 1st of April at a particular hour, he would obtain; he tried this receipt, and found it successful, but was doubtful whether to attribute the success altogether to the Virgin, or to some rather magical practices that he was employing at the same time, in order to make assurance doubly sure.

He mentions that he was by disposition passionate, voluptuous, revengeful, obstinate, rough, and imprudent, timid, of a cold heart, and of a warm head,

little addicted to piety, and much to talking—prone by nature to every evil and vice. So silly as to keep those servants that were of no use to him, but rather had disgraced him, and even to suffer the animals that were given him in presents, such as kids, lambs, and rabbits, to run about and defile his whole house.

Though Cardan was considered one of the earliest original thinkers of modern times, his originality consists more in character than in genius. His writings indicate very considerable power, but it is power which leads to no great result. The base of his philosophical system is Aristotle, interpreted by Averroes, and coloured by a mixture of the writings of Plotinus. These are the doctrines upon which he proceeds, not however assenting to them, but carping at them all the way, and slightly modifying them. He is the first of the modern Italian philosophers, and in the general powers of the mind he is perhaps not inferior to the other two, Bruno and Campanella ; but he has not the enthusiasm, nor the imagination of Bruno, nor the occasional dark and poetic imagery with which the unintelligible perplexities and verbal discoveries of Bruno are involved.

The treatises of Bruno are very scarce. Coleridge, who has extracted some of the finest passages, considered himself fortunate in seeing six of them. I have only met with four.

As the insanity of Cardan's mind took the turn of superstition, so Giordano Bruno's did of enthusiasm. The latter breathed nothing but contempt for philosophy, as then taught, and an earnest longing of re-joining the Universal Being, according to the method of the Alexandrian school. Plotinus was the master and guide that Bruno chiefly looked up to. Giordano was, however, much occupied with Lullius's art of memory, which also had some relation to the Jewish cabbala, preferring for the system of classification the descending steps of emanation, in the eastern philosophy, to the categories of Aristotle.

But though later Platonism gives its chief character to the dark and perplexed theory of Bruno, yet he borrows freely on all sides, except from Aristotle, whom he passes by with disdain, and mixes without reluctance, or any sense of incongruity, the atoms of Democritus, to the mystic numbers of Pythagoras. He often pours out words with as little meaning as if his mind were like the complicated circles of his admired "method of Lully," which, without the aid of intelligence, and by their simple revolution, would place words in new combinations, to discover propositions by a merely mechanical process.

At other times his genius breaks out in short flashes, from the dense smoke with which he has surrounded himself, and his verses are not unworthy to be compared to the fragments of the Orphic hymns,

and his guesses appear now and then like anticipations of future discoveries. Sometimes Descartes might be suspected of borrowing from him, and sometimes Leibnitz. But these coincidences are rather to be attributed to the narrowness of the human understanding, which is often on the brink of errors, as well as of truths, though yet from timidity, or weakness, it withdraws itself from the discovery, or the paradox, which are to confer celebrity on much later writers.

Throughout the whole range of being, Bruno beholds nothing but the descent from light to darkness, and the return from darkness to light, unity flowing out into variety, and variety again resolving itself into the one universal existence. As souls, by their reversion from the free action of spirit, and their turning towards matter, lose their spirituality, assume bodies, come within the dominion of nature, and subject themselves to the laws of mortal fate, so, by recovering the true notion of existence, and attending to the "harp of the universal Apollo," they retrace the steps of their descent, and reassume their place in the higher order of being.

That renovation of metaphysics which was unsuccessfully attempted by the great but irregular genius of the Italians, was more successfully accomplished by the eminent powers of two French philosophers, Descartes and Malebranche. Descartes has scarcely had justice done him, even in his own country. Bacon's

ninety-seventh aphorism, in the first book of his *Novum Organum*, seems almost prophetic of the great attempt made (a generation later) by Descartes: "*Nemo adhuc tanta mentis constantia et rigore inventus est, ut decreverit et sibi imposuerit theorias et notiones communes penitus abolere, et intellectum abrasum et æquum ad particularia de integro applicare.*" "*Quod si quis ætate matura, et sensibus integris, et mente repurgata, se ad experientiam et ad particularia de integro applicet, de eo melius sperandum est.*"

Descartes is the first of modern theorists who, casting off the authority of the ancients, and rejecting all preconceived notions, has endeavoured to excogitate, from the workings of his own mind alone, a system of the universe. The ancients, living in a more poetical age of the human mind, and setting out from the fables of antiquity as their point of departure, far excelled Descartes in the richness of their imagination, and in the colours which they have given to their dreams; but Descartes, to use his own expression, the single architect of his own edifice, has given more simplicity and unity to the superstructure he was rearing.

The opinions of men, he observed, were partly borrowed the one from another, without examination, and partly the silent and unobserved growth of their faculties imperfectly exercised; and to avoid

these sources of error, he took all his opinions to task, not with a view, as he has been erroneously described, to rear a system of opinions without the aid of ultimate truths, but simply that he might reconstruct his opinions with the unbiassed attention of the matured powers of his mind.

His own existence he found to be involved even in his doubts concerning it. "I doubt, therefore I think; I think, therefore I am," was not adduced with a view of proving his existence, but to shew that the belief of his existence was implied in every operation of his mind. This opinion, therefore, necessarily remained, when all others were discarded.

Amongst his other notions, he formed the notion of an all perfect, and necessarily existing Being; and he supposed it absurd to question whether that which necessarily existed did actually exist, and thus confounded an hypothetical truth with a question of real and outward existence. This want of distinguishing between what is subjectively, and what is objectively true, has left many very acute men in doubt whether Descartes, by his celebrated argument, had proved the existence of a Deity or not; and the same dispute was maintained among the schoolmen, when Anselm, the real author of the sophism, proposed this pretended proof of the Divine Being. The vicious circle by which he first attempts to prove the existence of a Deity by the exercise of reason, and

then proves our reason adequate for the discovery of the truth, by proving the existence of an all perfect Being, incapable of deceiving us, has been often remarked; but it must be observed in defence of Descartes, that he considered his proof as an axiom whose truth followed as soon as the terms in which it was expressed were understood, rather than a proposition which it required any steps of the reasoning faculty to demonstrate. Another proof of the Divine existence, as if not quite satisfied himself with the first, he drew from the same notion of an all perfect Being, but in a different manner. The effect cannot be superior to the cause; we have a notion of an all perfect Being; this notion we derive not from ourselves; there must therefore be without us an object corresponding to this idea, and that object is God. From the existence of God the reality of our knowledge seemed obviously to follow; for since God can have no intention of deceiving us, in every misapprehension we must deceive ourselves, by the imperfect exercise of our faculties, or by imperfectly attending to the object they present to us. What we darkly and confusedly perceive, may lead to erroneous conclusions, but whatever is clear and distinct must be true, and carries the stamp of Divine veracity along with it. Hence, whatever we clearly and distinctly perceive, if not actual, is at least possible; for if not existing, yet God could give it ex-



istence. Besides these, there are other eternal truths innate in the mind, of which it is impossible to doubt, such as *ex nihilo nihil*.

A substance, properly speaking, is that which exists of itself; there is therefore only one substance, God. Other beings may also be called substances, though in a less strict sense; these depend on God immediately and solely for their existence. "A substance may be recognised from any of its attributes; but there is one chief property of each substance which constitutes its nature and essence, and to which all its other attributes are referred; thus, extension in length, breadth, and depth, constitutes the nature of corporeal substance, and thought constitutes the nature of the substance which thinks."

Extension, with its different modifications, being thus the sole essential attribute of body, the causes of colours and sounds, or the unknown modifications of extension which occasion our sensation, are distinguished as secondary qualities, and the obvious modifications of extension as the primary qualities of bodies. Space has no real existence; it is only extension considered abstractedly, without reference to any individual body; and a vacuum does not denote space in which there is nothing, but only in which there are none of those things which we naturally think should be present there, "*quas in eo esse debere cogitamus*." "Thus, as an urn is intended to contain water, it is

said to be empty when it is filled with air." As there is no vacuum which we can place beyond the range of matter, the world must be considered as unbounded; neither can there be any atoms where there is no separating vacuum, but all matter must be continuous and united. There can be no motion in vacuo; but change of place is merely the changing the relative extension of bodies to each other. Motion and rest are mere modes which God impressed upon matter at the beginning.

As there is no vacuum, motion must be circular and simultaneous; but as nothing in nature is perfect, the vortices of which all movement consists are not perfectly circular, but only tending towards it, and these vortices also suffer new alterations during the lapse of years. Thus the orbits of the planets, according to Descartes, are changeable; "*etiam labentibus sæculis continuo mutari arbitremur.*" Within the larger vortices there are lesser eddies, of which we have an example in the eddies of rivers. But while a plenum determines motion to a circular form, the original law of motion, which has a tendency to move forward in a right line, produces the centrifugal force, since the motion and rest of the universe are regulated by the first great law of nature,—continuance, by which a body in motion ever tends to continue in motion, and a body at rest to remain for ever at rest.

As body consists of extension, and the modifications of extension are divisibility, figurability, and mobility; geometry, which is the science of these properties, is also the true science of matter, and mathematical demonstrations are the only principles of physics which ought to be admitted; and by a few simple and general principles all the various phenomena of nature are to be explained.

It must however be allowed, that since these principles may receive an endless variety of application, at the pleasure of the Divine will, what is the actual application in any particular instance must be taught by experience alone,—an admission which renders all Descartes' theoretical reasoning next to nugatory.

As every theory has two sides, by the one of which it borders on idealism, and by the other on materialism, so Descartes had his ideal disciple in Malebranche, and his material follower in Spinoza; indeed both these latter theories exist in germ in the writings of Descartes himself. Speaking of the cause of our sensations as existing without the mind, he says it admits of doubt and of inquiry whether that outward cause is God, or something distinct from God, "*Queri quidem potest an res illa sit Deus, an quid a Deo diversum;*" and he only takes the opposite side of the question to Malebranche on the ground, that our notion of the material world being clear

and distinct, (which are the two tests of truth), to suppose the material world not to exist, would be to make God a deceiver.

Malebranche, on the other hand, maintaining that our notions of the material world are neither clear nor distinct, adopts the conclusion that it is God and the images contained in God that we directly perceive ; for, as Malebranche asserts, no being can act where it is not, nor can the soul perceive where it is not present ; none can suppose when it thinks of the skies and the stars that it actually visits them, and must therefore contemplate them only by their images. Not only are images and ideas necessary to the human understanding, but also according to Malebranche, to the Divine ; for without plans and models how could God have created the world ? As the Divine mind is infinite, and necessarily present with every finite mind, each of them can contemplate according to its capacity these divine models, and from them form some conception of the material world. “ Demeurons donc dans ce sentiment, que Dieu est le monde intelligible, ou le lieu des esprits, de meme que le monde materiel est le lieu des corps. Que c'est de sa puissance qu'ils reçoivent toutes leurs modifications ; que c'est dans sa sagesse qu'ils trouvent toutes leurs idées, et que c'est par son amour qu'ils sont agités de tous leurs mouvemens réglés.” It is thus that Malebranche makes advance to a sys-

tem of pantheism more spiritual than that of Spinoza, but which yet contains some approximation towards it.

Notwithstanding these portentous errors, Malebranche made considerable steps in the study of the mind. In pursuing his ideal system, he anticipates several of the ingenious remarks of Berkely, though they acquired new force and depth from the latter. Malebranche first perceived that our perceptions were more complex operations than were generally supposed, and involved an act of judgment ; he also pointed out the association of ideas, and was aware of the importance of attending to the laws by which their association is regulated.

In fixing upon clearness and distinctness as the tests of truth, Descartes and Malebranche transferred to their own style a lucid order, not common to metaphysical writers ; and though to this clearness some depth and subtilty of research may have been sacrificed, they have escaped not a few errors which would have lurked undetected by themselves, if their writings had been couched in more technical language, and with a greater air of abstruseness.

As Descartes was upon the verge of the doctrine afterwards held by Malebranche, so he laid the foundation of the opinions subsequently maintained by Spinoza, by defining substance to be that which is self-existent, and that therefore there is only one

substance, strictly speaking, and that is God. "Per substantiam nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam rem quæ ita existit, ut nullâ aliâ re indigeat ad existendum. Et quidem substantia quæ nullâ planè re indiget, unica tantùm potest intelligi, nempe Deus."

From this definition of substance, joined with the pretended mathematical manner of Descartes, of deducing all things from the nature of the self-existent Being, all the doctrines of Spinoza might with facility be proved, and more conclusively, certainly more clearly, than Spinoza has himself done. Many late German authors extol Spinoza as the chief of philosophers, the first great idealist, who has entirely discarded experience; and they are well entitled to do so, since they have borrowed largely from his writings. He is the model of the German supernaturalists in biblical criticism, and of the German pantheists in philosophy. Of himself he entertained no mean opinion; for, as he observed, since he had demonstrated his opinions, it was mere waste of time to examine the opinions of other men, whether they either differed from him or agreed with him. Nothing could disturb the course of his argument, (in opposition to his own finite existence), that every thing is infinite; and he reasoned very justly, that from an infinite cause, acting according to the necessity of its infinite nature, infinite effects must proceed,

and that nothing could be otherwise than as it is ; and all this with as little consciousness that he was demonstrating the absurdity, and not the reality of his principles, as if he had been proving that two and two make four.

Unlike many other pantheists, who, though they have substituted the universe in the place of the true God, have yet bestowed upon it many divine attributes, and whose imaginations have been consequently warmed with the ardours of mystical devotion, and have partaken of that glow of mind which they communicated to all nature, the pantheism of Spinoza is a mere scholastic entity, which neither affects the imagination or the heart, and which serves but as the basis of a visionary ontology, whose impiety alone has saved it from oblivion.

“ In morals Spinoza is an equally objectionable guide as in theology ; indeed he allows of no morality at all ; right and power he considers as synonymous. In the state of nature men have a right to do whatever they have the power to do. He is as slavish in politics as he is immoral in ethics ; and he considers, that when men enter into society, they make an unlimited transference not only of the right to act for themselves, but even to think for themselves, and place it in the hands of their governors.”

To the foregoing quotation from “ the Errors regarding Religion,” where we have treated more

largely of Spinoza's opinions, we may add, that his theory of morals is not his own, but borrowed from Hobbes. The writings of Hobbes became popular in Holland at the very time when Spinoza was first entering upon his speculations. Had there been any doubt with respect to time in the priority of this immoral system, we might safely have ascribed it to Hobbes, knowing that he had "a sufficient reason" for its adoption in his dread of the approaching civil contests of his country; while Spinoza, living under the mild and peaceful protection of Holland, might well have maintained a theory more favourable to that generous toleration of which he reaped the benefit.

Fear at the arrival of the Spanish armada upon the coast of England was the cause of Hobbes's premature birth, and fear became not only his ruling passion in life, but even the principle of his writings. Peace in politics was the end which he supremely aimed at. The state of nature is a state of war. All men are equal by nature; and his argument for this is, that the silliest and weakest may easily kill the wisest and the strongest. By nature all men being equal, have an equal right to all; but a common right to the property of the same things is a contradiction, which, if attempted to be carried into practice, must necessarily produce a state of war. This state of war can only be exchanged for peace

by every man divesting himself of his natural rights, and placing them in the hands of government.

These rights cannot be resumed, for a contract is ever binding. Government must be absolute; for it requires all the force and all the money of the state to be made available against the hostilities to which a state may be exposed.

With respect to the form of government, the only choice lies between monarchy and aristocracy; for what is called "a democracy, is but an aristocracy of orators, interrupted by the temporary monarchy of one orator." Nature favours monarchy, whether we look to a family or to the universe. "One Pater familias." "One God." Monarchy, like all earthly things, has its faults; but then its faults are only multiplied in an aristocracy, in which there are many kings, and therefore many evils, without corresponding advantages.

A house divided against itself, cannot stand, and there must be endless strife if the civil and religious power is separated; therefore the sovereign of the state must also be the head of the church.

Contrary to vulgar moralists, Hobbes says men ought to act against conscience; for private conscience must be subordinate to the public conscience, which resides in the bosom of the sovereign. This may be considered hard, but it will be a hardship of short duration; for all will soon have the same con-

science if attention is paid to a right education at the universities; for men's "minds are as white paper;" and if their teachers please, may have the thirty-nine articles fairly inscribed upon them, or three hundred and ninety-nine articles, if an additional number be judged convenient.

Kings can do no wrong; for whatever they do is by authority originally given them by their subjects. Whatever injury a man therefore receives from them, is done by his own consent, and is therefore no injury, according to the maxim, *volenti non fit injuria*.

The materialism of Hobbes may be considered merely as the handmaid of his politics. For the firm establishment of political servitude, it was necessary to discard both a conscience and a Deity.

He admired Euclid, not for the subject, but the style. He wished to transfer mathematical reasoning to metaphysics, and thought he had succeeded, in the clearness and strict continuity, with which he deduced his conclusions, from the principles of materialism.

Perception, according to him, is merely the apparition produced by motion on the brain. Hence also memory and conception are easily accounted for. When the sense is past, a slight "vibratiuncle," as Hartley calls it, continues, and therefore the image still remains.

Hobbes insisted much upon the train of thought, or association of ideas, and observed, that it was

chiefly regulated by contiguity and causation. In dreams, the vibrations of the brain are interrupted, and consequently the train of ideas also; and "our thoughts appear like stars between the flying clouds." It is impossible to read Hobbes without reflecting how much he has anticipated Locke, and still more Hume; and how little, doubtless for wise reasons, either of them have acknowledged their obligations.

Belief depends upon clearness, hence vivid dreams are believed,—a favourite speculation of Professor Stuart. Experience, causation, and philosophy, are only the remembrance of what antecedents have been followed by what consequences.

By names alone we are capable of science. Though this maxim is the soul of Horne Tooke's diversions of Purley, as far as that work is applied to philosophy, yet Horne Tooke is very naturally anxious rather to appear indebted to Locke than to Hobbes for the discovery.

Hobbes has likewise anticipated Hume with regard to liberty and necessity. The dispute about liberty and necessity may be easily reconciled, for both are consistent with each other. He who does what he wills is free; and yet he is necessitated also, for his will has a cause.

Hobbes ridicules the *summum bonum*; there is no contentment for man but in proceeding. "As to what is called an utmost end, there is no more a way

to it in this world than there is to Utopia." While we live we have desires, and desires suppose a farther end.

With respect to the belief of the Deity, Hobbes's principles, though not his profession, are clear. Whatever we imagine is finite; infinite has no meaning, and is applied to God, only out of respect. Against the charge of atheism, however, he boldly appealed to his regularity in taking the sacrament.

We have now nearly exhausted his speculative principles; his chief ethical or practical principles consisted in the use of beer and tobacco, to promote free-thinking, and the lighting a number of candles, to prevent any interruption in his studies from ghosts.

Locke is most indebted to his own thoughts for the materials of his works; but if indebted to other writers, he is more so to Hobbes than to any one else. His first book against innate ideas is by consent of the best authorities considered the weakest portion of his works,—rambling, equivocal, immoral, (without being intentionally so), and credulous of the foolish stories related by rash and ignorant travellers.

In adopting the opinion of the atomists, which considers the mind as a mere tabula rasa, in opposition to the innate ideas of Plato, and the transcendental philosophers, he appears totally unaware of

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the third and the true system, already indicated, though imperfectly, by the Stoics; those "notions" which spring up in the mind with, and are involved in, the very exercise of our intellectual powers. Locke, after Hobbes, states the mind to be white paper, and the two inlets of knowledge to be sensation and reflection. In sensation, the soul is "merely passive."

Then occurs the confusion, from which Locke never fairly extricated himself, with respect to ideas. "Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, that I call idea;"—"which ideas, if I speak of sometimes as in the things themselves, I would be understood to mean those qualities in the objects which produce them."

Locke, after Descartes and Epicurus, laid great stress upon clearness. Unfortunately the style may be clear, while the thoughts may be indeterminate, and utterly confused. The Epicureans were almost always clear, but in their thoughts, how shallow, perplexed, and contradictory! The same contrast occurs in Locke,—how confused and contradictory are his notions, while his style remains popular and transparent! His notions alone respecting space and time, if notions they may be called, sufficiently exemplify this. A train of thoughts continually passes through the mind—reflection upon this train furnishes us with the idea of succession—and the distance between any parts of that succession is

that which we call duration—hence time, according to Locke, might be defined the distance between two thoughts. As this train has a variable swiftness, we should be possessed of a quick time and a slow time, were we not able to strike the average, and to obtain a medium measure of time in the ordinary swiftness of our ideas.

Endless addition, in Locke's estimation, gives us the clearest idea of infinity. A strange definition of the infinite, that which may continually be added to. Locke evidently mistakes the indefinite for the infinite; that which approximates to the infinite, or, correctly speaking, continually tends towards it, without ever reaching it; he confounds the subjective infinite, that to which the mind of man can assign no term, with the objective infinite, which has no term in itself, by its own nature excluding every limitation.

According to Locke, the mind, from contemplating changes either in itself or in the external world, acquires the idea of power; agreeably to this view, the idea of power would merely be the perception of change; and if the mind were thus constituted, as Locke describes it, the mind would be unable to discriminate between cause and effect.

We remark these blemishes in an author, to whom not only the study of the mind, but what is of more importance, the cause of civil and religious

liberty, is so much indebted, not with any view of detracting from his great merits, but in order to point out that sensation and reflection are inadequate to account for the origin of all our notions.

Locke and his followers object to innate ideas, chiefly on the ground, that all our thoughts may be derived from sensation and reflection. Rejecting Locke's enumeration, a third source must be sought, not in innate ideas, which are absurd, but in what the Stoics named anticipation—Reid, suggestion—or if there were any use in varying terms, implication or involution, since these notions, not derived from sensation and reflection, are involved in our other notions, and implied in the exercise of our faculties; being correctly termed by Kant, if we use his expression with some latitude, the form or condition of the human understanding.

Locke deserves much praise with respect to the thorny and sophistical question of "the freedom of the will;" he points out the absurdity of the phrase—and yet is so inconsistent as frequently to use it—he distinguishes excellently well between will and desire, shews that freedom is acting according to the will, and points out what determines the will—the mind. Yet such is the vagueness of his mode of thinking and reasoning, that he is generally on the point of quitting his hold of the truth at the moment he has grasped it. He evidently perceives

that true liberty consists in the pursuit of true happiness, and has a more obscure conviction that such true liberty can be attained, by the generality of mankind, only through the renewal of their inclinations, or, according to the scriptures, by the renovation of their minds.

The remarks of Locke are judicious with respect to the adaptation of our senses to the world we live in. "If our sense of hearing were but one thousand times quicker than it is, how would a perpetual noise distract us, and we should in the quietest retirement be less able to sleep or meditate than in the middle of a sea-fight." In the same way he points out that if a man had microscopic eyes, "he would be in a quite different world from other people."

Passing over the unfortunate mistakes which have their origin in confining all our knowledge to the two sources of sensation and reflection, such as the opinion, that personal identity consists in consciousness, and the enquiry whether consciousness is transferable. Passing over the credulity of Locke, which made him believe that he had once seen "a creature that was the issue of a cat and a rat," and assert that "jumarts," "from the mixture of a bull and a mare, are so frequent in the world." Passing over the conversation of the parrot and Prince Maurice, and the query in what class naturalists would place the animal which had the man's head and hog's

body, we may advert to his excellent remarks on language, and his equally excellent directions for the conduct of the understanding.

When Locke, however, supposes that most disputes arise from the ambiguity of words, his own writings might have convinced him that the ambiguity of thought is a still more fruitful source of error. In one passage we have the very objectionable assertion, (as well as very unphilosophical,) that matter may think if the Deity pleases; and in another, at no great distance, that, vary matter as you will, give it what figure and movement you please, a sphere in movement approaches no nearer to thought than a cube at rest. At one time, in order to destroy innate ideas, he attacks moral principles; in another part of his writings he goes into the opposite extreme, and says, "I doubt not but if a right method were taken, a great part of morality might be made out with that clearness, that could leave to a considerate man no more reason to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the truth of propositions in mathematics."

In the writings of Locke also we find the germ of very opposite errors. We have first the idealism of Berkeley, "whether there be any thing more than barely that idea in our minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of anything without us which corresponds to that idea, is that

whereof some men think there may be a question made; because men may have such ideas in their minds when no such thing exists, no such object affects their senses."

Then we have the phenomenism of Hume, "Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself that I call idea." An idea can only resemble an idea; there is no ground for concluding that the idea of matter has any existence resembling it without, or the idea of soul any existence resembling it within.

Lastly, we have the materialism of Hartley and Priestley; "Matter may think if God pleases;" then why have recourse to the unnecessary hypothesis of a different and spiritual substance? The object of philosophy must then be, if possible, to deduce thought from the changes of matter.

Berkeley followed hard upon the traces of Locke; if whatever the soul perceives be an idea, then matter can have no existence, for an idea can be nothing but an idea. It is allowed by Locke, that secondary qualities exist in the mind, such as colour,—but primary qualities cannot be conceived without secondary qualities,—for example, extension cannot be imagined without colour; now, if these be inseparable, and one be allowed to exist in the mind, then the other must be allowed to exist in the mind also. But if all natural qualities exist in the mind, what can be thought of matter but that it is a most

clumsy, useless, and unfounded hypothesis—and not only useless, but dangerous; for if there was no matter, there would be no materialists and no atheists.

Ideas can only exist in and depend upon mind. Our other ideas we alter at will, but not the ideas of sense,—they depend on another will, and exist in another mind, namely, the divine. The order in which ideas of sense arise, constitutes the laws of nature. All existence consists of, 1st, Spirits; 2d, Ideas. The first, active indivisible substances,—the second, inert, fleeting, dependent beings. Berkeley flattered himself that he had greatly simplified the doctrine of the resurrection, by the denial of any material bodies; he also asserted that the common people were all idealists like himself, and believed that objects did not exist if they were not perceived; for let there be a dispute about an apple tree in a garden, and all the witnesses will agree that there is none such there, upon the simple ground that they never perceived it.

But Berkeley's great effort is to preserve his ideal world from the irruption of scepticism, as the Dutch must continually labour to preserve their meadows from the irruption of the sea. He perpetually feels himself on the brink of the doctrines of Hume; if the objects of our thoughts are ideas, the soul which we think of must be an idea also. Berkeley strives

hard, but in vain, for a distinction, as the only means of escape ; the soul, according to him, is distinguished from an idea thus : An idea consists in being perceived, the soul consists in perceiving. But this flimsy sophistry yielded at once to the determined scepticism of Hume.

Hume, as far as the outlines of scepticism went, had every thing prepared by Berkeley to his hands. He had only to pass over the assertion of Berkeley, that we think of the soul without the medium of an idea, and the system of scepticism was complete. All our thoughts, according to Hume, may be divided between impressions and ideas, and these differ from each other in the vivacity of their images. Belief is only a more lively image. Hence the reason why we believe in the independent existence of our impressions and not of our ideas. All our thoughts are originally impressions ; those who deny this have an easy method of refuting it, by pointing out any idea not derived from this source. But when we have recourse to this easy method, and ask from which of our senses we can derive the notion of power and causation, Hume has a still easier way of escaping the difficulty, by asserting that power means nothing but uniform priority. Cause and effect, therefore, are merely invariable concomitancy.

When Hume, after Hobbes, asserts that the train of thought depends upon resemblance and con-

tiguity, and to these adds causation, he departs, as has been often remarked, from his own principles, for according to him causation is resolvable into contiguity.

Like Hobbes, he asserts that mankind assent to the doctrine of necessity, because they expect a constant uniformity in human actions; while liberty is easily reconciled with necessity, for it is merely doing as one wills, and belongs to every one who is not a slave or in chains.

Hume has a precious argument for the disbelief of the Deity. "In a word, I much doubt whether it be possible for a cause to be known only by its effect, (as you have all along supposed) or to be of so singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other cause or object that has ever fallen under our observation. It is only when two *species* of objects are found to be constantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other; and were an effect presented which was entirely singular, and could not be comprehended under any one known *species*, I do not see that we could form any conjecture at all concerning its cause." In order, therefore, to believe in God, it is a prerequisite that there should be two gods, the least number that can form a species, and two universes. Nor would this probably be sufficient, unless this double pair of infinities should become the objects of our senses, and

thus be classed among our impressions. But according to Hume's philosophy, there would be little use for a Deity—nothing to create, and nothing to govern. Our impressions present us with nothing but themselves—no world without us, no soul within us—nothing but their own shadowy and deceptive appearances.

If Hume has curtailed the sum of existence, he has added considerably to the list of virtues, holding that utility is the criterion of merit, and that whatever is useful is virtuous. And having given a new apotheosis to wit, cleanliness, and even to vanity, he adds what the French call a "*je ne sçais quoi*" in manner, which, he asserts, "must be considered as a part of ethics, left by Nature to baffle all the pride of philosophy, and make her sensible of her narrow boundaries and slender acquisitions."

We can scarcely conceive a more striking commentary on the words of St. Paul, how sense forsakes those that forsake God—how vain become their imaginations, and how deeply and hopelessly the foolish heart of the atheist is darkened.

Hume, at one moment, seemed on the brink of a better philosophy. In his treatise of Human Nature, speaking of Cause and Effect, he says, "When I consider their relations, I can find none but those of contiguity and succession, which I have already regarded as imperfect and unsatisfactory. Shall the

despair of success make me assert that I am here possessed of an idea which is not preceded by any similar impression? This would be too strong a proof of levity and inconstancy: since the contrary principle has been already so firmly established as to admit of no farther doubt." This pretended proof is merely the assertion of Locke. Thus Hume believed where he ought to have doubted, and hence he doubted where he ought to have believed.

Hartley, adopting in preference the third error of Locke, founds all our ideas on vibration and association, being indebted for the first error to Briggs, and for the second to a Mr. Gay. Vibrations often repeated in the brain produce vibratiuncles—to the first we are indebted for perception, to the second for memory. The doctrine of vibrations is conceived by Hartley to throw great light on that part of the constitution of human nature which he terms "the phenomena of itching," a subject which is treated with mathematical precision, in what he calls his 26th proposition. Reflection is not a second inlet of ideas, for the most complex may be traced to sensation. The pleasures of imagination arise from association. The mind must be mechanical, for it is moved by motives, acting, like other causes, mechanically. Our will being therefore only an effect, and not a cause, God remains the sole cause of all things.

Hartley, with modesty inconsistent with his prin-

ciples, only doubted of, but did not deny, the immateriality of the soul.

His follower Priestley, had no such scruples, but held it inconceivable how an immaterial substance could act upon matter. According to this reasoning, (if by the courtesy of England it may be called reasoning,) not only must the soul be material, but the Deity also.

It is to be regretted that the French, having two such excellent metaphysicians of their own, Descartes and Malebranche, should have become the mistaken and materialist followers of Locke, instead of attempting to correct the errors of their own countrymen, and then to proceed onward in the traces of their genius and discoveries. But in the state of French society at that time, severe thought and genuine philosophy were out of the question; it was necessary for metaphysics to be clear and amusing, and philosophy had to present material images, which every one could readily enter into, instead of reflections, which demand an effort on the part of the reader to understand them.

Condillac professes himself the pupil and the illustrator of Locke; he is praised by his countrymen for having improved his master; he has certainly greatly altered his tenets. Instead of two inlets of knowledge—sensation and reflection—as in the theory of Locke, sensation alone, according to Condillac, furnishes us

with all our ideas, and what were before considered as thoughts proceeding from reflection, are merely sensations "transformed."

As far as Condillac deviates from Locke towards materialism, so much farther do succeeding systems recede in the same downward path, and the mind in these systems appears no longer the mysterious source of thought, but a clumsy piece of mechanism, which, in the hands of every theorist, performs all its operations upon material principles alone. A maxim everywhere prevails in these shallow theories, that nothing really exists but what may be traced to the senses; neither the soul nor the Deity can produce this patent for their existence, and are therefore dismissed as mere chimeras and bugbears which interfere with the dictates of true philosophy, and unnecessarily disturb us in the pursuit of pleasure, or in following the real business of life. Lofty emotions and deep speculations are alike unfitted to a creature, who has so lately arisen from, and must so soon return entirely to the clods from which it sprung; and the only duty which is incumbent on a being, that has no author but necessity, and no end but corruption, is to calculate how much pleasure it may appropriate to itself during its base and perishable existence. The Alexandrian philosophy requested merely a village from the Roman emperor, in which it might exhibit its principles and practice; the French

philosophy had a beautiful and spacious kingdom in which it revelled unfettered and unlimited. "By their fruits ye shall know them." Its history is written in characters of blood and of ineffable horror.

As the French school of metaphysics have shewn a decided tendency to materialism, so the Germans to idealism. Leibnitz's method of philosophy was to proceed from hypothesis to hypothesis. Whenever a theory was likely to be attacked, he immediately strengthened it by the erection of another theory as an outwork. All these theories have a common flaw running through them,—they are subjective and not objective; they pretend to explain the laws of nature, while they are merely logical rules, and have their existence restricted to the mind.

Leibnitz having laid it down as a law that the quantity of the moving force in the world suffers no change, had to proceed a step farther, and assert, that man can exert no energy or force upon matter, but that the volitions of the mind and acts of the body correspond, by the doctrine of the pre-established harmony, and this is illustrated by the supposition of two clocks, whose movements coincide, without influencing each other. We will to move our hand, and our hand is moved, not by us, but by the pre-established plan of the creation.

Another theory which he had to advance, in order to support a weak position, was the identity of indis-

cernibles, transferring the impossibility which the mind has to distinguish between two objects which present no difference to it, not only to the laws of the universe, but to the Divine mind itself.

Hence he is furnished with an argument to abolish space and time. Space has no existence, because it would be composed of parts which have no difference, and therefore are indiscernible, and the same may be applied to duration. Space, therefore, is merely the order of co-existence, and time the order of succession.

Every being, therefore, must be different from every other being, and its principle of difference or individuation must be a thinking principle; for Leibnitz asserted, and assertion with him was equal to proof, that there is no other internal principle but that of thought.

These elementary beings he called monads, in which the principle of thought is variously developed, in some almost latent, in others half disclosed, in some fully expanded.

Some of these are dominant monads, to which other monads may be considered in some sense as subservient,—thus the human soul is a dominant monad, to which are attached a congregation of other monads, which form the human body; each monad performing its own evolutions independently, yet so organized by the Great Architect, as to corres-

pond with the evolutions of the dominant monad,—the soul.

As the principle of contradiction is the base of mathematics, so the principle of sufficient reason is the foundation of physics or natural philosophy. The defect in the theory here, is, that the Deity might be able to assign a sufficient reason where Leibnitz could assign none; nevertheless, without hesitation, he proceeds to transfer his own cogitations to the Divine mind.

The world must be full of monads, because there is no sufficient reason that there should be a vacuum. The Deity is bound by the law of sufficient reason to form the best possible world; and the best possible world is that which is fullest of monads. When young, Leibnitz, like others, held a vacuum and atoms; but how much grander the view which afterwards burst upon him, that every corpuscle should contain within itself an infinity of other corpuscles, and that these infinite monads should all think and enjoy themselves.

The Deity of Leibnitz has the honour of being at the head of all these monads, and is respectfully termed the monad of monads, and all these monads arise as a flash or fulguration from the Divine essence.

Each of these monads is in some degree a mirror of the universe; all are acting spontaneously, for it is

the property of all beings to act, and developing their faculties, for every act gives birth to another act. "The present is the child of the past, and the mother of the future." All these acts are spontaneous, and at the same time subordinate to the order of the best possible universe. Thus liberty is by Leibnitz combined with necessity, through optimism, or what Leibnitz sometimes terms Christian fate.

The opponents of Leibnitz were placed in a similar difficulty to suitors at law, who find that all the distinguished advocates have already been fee'd by their opponents. Leibnitz had laid the whole of nature under the embargo of one or other of his theories. In vain did they attempt to draw arguments from space and time,—they were assured by him that these were no longer in existence. On this side they were outflanked by the battery of sufficient reason; and if they attempted to retreat, they were suddenly surprised and discomfited by the identity of indiscernibles.

It is much to be lamented that so great a genius should have spent his time and his powers in assigning fantastic laws to an imaginary existence. Even these laws, fantastic when unlimited, have a just value, when properly applied and restricted. His mathematical discoveries are universally acknowledged; he gave its first impulse to etymology in Germany; and he did the same service to geology,

by the acute remark that many of the rocks of which the earth's crust is composed resemble the scoriae of mines and furnaces, and thus betray an igneous origin; while other rocks including shells, and having the appearance of marine detritus, must equally be ascribed to an aqueous origin.

The philosophy of Leibnitz was eminently ideal; all the thoughts of the soul, even its perceptions, sprang from the development of its own native energy; and though they corresponded with, were yet uninfluenced by, the external world. The same ideal character is common to the subsequent systems of the Germans. If we look to the French metaphysicians, we should be led to consider the universe as consisting wholly of matter; if we were guided by the German metaphysicians, we should be certain of nothing but the existence of mind.

The German writings resemble the system from which they proceed; they are marked with the activity of the intellect, but they want the reality of objective existence. Thoughts are continually conflicting with thoughts; but like thoughts unrecorded by any external monument, they are wasted in mutual conflict, and, without leaving any permanent trace, pass away.

Kant was evidently deeply imbued with the writings of Leibnitz and his disciple Wolfe. In this state of mind he was struck with the writings of

Hume, which made a deep, but a different impression upon him, from what they would have done upon a disciple of Locke. The scepticism of Hume was empirical, or derived from the senses; the defence which an idealist naturally opposed to it was to be derived from the understanding. Kant's first inquiry, therefore, was, whether, from a survey of the condition and laws of the understanding, (which prior to experience he called the pure reason,) experience itself were possible.

This point of view was new and commanding—it was reversing the metaphor of Aristotle. Aristotle compares sensation or perception to the impression of a seal upon wax. According to Aristotle, it is the outward object that gives the stamp. According to Kant, more wisely, it is the mind. The truth embraces both opinions; but there is more of activity than passiveness—more of mind than matter, in perception.

Kant carried his idealism too far, and left too narrow a basis for the material world. This was the first weak point of his system, where it speedily gave way; but it is a weakness still more manifest in subsequent systems, and which exposes them all to the inroads of scepticism, in the same manner that the idealism of Berkeley, delivered over the philosophy of Locke, to the doubts of Hume.

A second error of Kant's consisted in pushing too

far the consideration that the nature of the mind gives its form to all our thoughts; and therefore asserting that space is the form of sensation, and time the form of our thoughts in general. This is an error not original, but an adaptation of Leibnitz's hypothesis. It is an error, also, which may be brought immediately to the test of facts. If it were not false, all our sensations would be localised; but of five senses, only two—touch and sight—spread their sensations over extension, and each of these over a different extension. It has justly been said by the admirers of Kant, that the whole of his theory hangs together, and that if one link fails, the whole falls to the ground.

His doctrine of space alone furnishes a refutation of his opinions; but even previous to this, the very outset of his inquiry labours under an irretrievable error. The transcendental philosophy involves a fatal absurdity. If we must inquire whether knowledge is possible, before we can ascertain it to be certain, we are entangled in a series of previous inquiries that have no end, for we have stronger ground to inquire whether the possibility is possible, and whether the transcendental philosophy can itself have any existence, than Kant can have for demanding that the transcendental philosophy should stand as a porch, through which alone we can enter the temple of knowledge.

Understand, and make others understand, the operations of the mind, and there is no need to prove that such knowledge is possible ; but Kant, like the German metaphysicians in general, has a horror of experience, and too much resembles the dove, (to which he with less justice compares Plato) which thinks its flight would be swifter beyond the resistance of the lower air, not knowing that that very resistance impels it forward. *

Kant and the other German writers have been accused of intentional obscurity ; if it were so, they have an excuse in that weakness of their countrymen which leads them chiefly to admire what they do not understand. Obscurity and perplexity, however, seem but too natural to the mind of Kant. On the most common subjects, and uttering the tritest observations, his meaning is hard to be spelled, partly because he fails to interest the attention, and partly because, like the scholastics, he reduces every subject to its most abstracted form, till it reaches the verge of nonentity—a failing still more conspicuous in his followers than in himself.

Abstract notions are formed in great measure by means of words, and thus discussions relating to them are chiefly verbal, and if care be not taken, they become entirely so—the sound remains, while the sense is gone—and the dispute continues where the argument is lost. The entities and the quiddities of the

schoolmen would have had no existence but for this abuse of language, and many of the terms of Kant and the transcendentalists may be placed in the same predicament. A plain proof of this is, that it is impossible to translate them into sense. Take away the transcendental term, and the chimera which was attached to it has vanished along with it. A popular account may be given of all the systems of antiquity, even of the darkest of them, that of Heraclitus, but it is impossible to give a popular account either of the scholastics, or of the German transcendentalists,—they have only a verbal existence, they are the abstractions of abstractions.

Hence we have an excuse for Kant's perpetual answer to his opponents, "You have not understood me." An opponent must vary the terms, in order to point out an objection, but when the terms were changed, the tenets, being merely verbal, were changed also. Such a degree of obscurity, though probably not intended, gave Kant an unrivalled authority over the mind of his disciples. They were like those about to be initiated in the ancient mysteries, who, from being long retained in darkness, and poring over vacancy, were easily led to believe that the first figures they beheld, though irradiated only with partial light, were the immortal shapes of the gods beaming with the effulgence of Olympus.

Kant might well have been taught modesty by

the result of his labours,—his aim was to put an end to doubt and division in philosophy; on the contrary, he terminated no dispute, but gave rise to endless new sects, and involved every subject in greater confusion than he found it.

Never having seen the writings of his disciples, and the brief accounts that are usually given of them being evidently imperfect, we must speak rather conjecturally of the theories which might arise, than determine precisely what systems did spring from the transcendental philosophy.

The want of realism, or of a base for the external world, most obviously strikes us in Kant's system, and it is natural to expect that that which leans to idealism in the master, should become wholly ideal in the pupil. Kant's theory would evidently be much simplified by giving up the external world. The philosopher who should thus free himself from matter would only have to deduce the mind's thoughts from its own activity.

Fichté occupies this place, if the accounts of him may be at all believed. His system may be described in two words—egoistic ideality. His first point, like that of the Alexandrians, is existence; his second also, like theirs, is, conscious existence, or mind, which form what he terms, the ego; the third, is, the consciousness of the limitation of that existence, which gives rise to the notion of objectivity, or, the

non-ego. The difference between Fichté and the Alexandrians is, that his views are subjective and theirs objective. His are the changes of the finite, theirs of the infinite mind.

Schelling approached a step nearer to the Alexandrians,—as Fichté's theory may be designated egoistic idealism, so Schelling's, ideal pantheism. It appears to differ, if we may be guided by very brief and obscure accounts, from ordinary pantheism, by that strong leaning which all the German systems have shewn to blend the workings of their own minds with their conceptions of external nature. It appears to form the passage or transition between Fichté and the Alexandrians.

As in consciousness, the mind is both the perceiver and the perceived, and forms a duality which terminates in unity, so in the universe, the universal mind contemplates the universal nature, and this duality forms the absolute, or the Deity. Thus the only true philosophy is the knowledge of identity, which traces every thing up to the absolute, who is neither spirit nor nature, neither subject nor object, knowledge nor existence, for in his fulness all these modifications of being are terminated, these being the opposite poles of existence, which are blended together at the centre.

Every being is a revelation of the absolute Being, but incomplete, since He can only be fully disclosed

in All-Being. Existence forms a Trinity in Unity, because it possesses two poles or extremes of being, with an intermediate state that blends both and constitutes them one whole.

This, however, is only a notional pantheism, and labours under the same defect as the other German systems. The arguments of Hume are still applicable to it; nothing can resemble an idea but an idea; with ideas it commences, and with ideas it must end. The ideas of Kant and the transcendentalists are indeed derived from a source different from that of Locke, still they are ideas, for the mere calling them representations will not repel the arguments that may be brought against them.

The proofs against transcendentalism are therefore abundant. It is capable of attack on all sides, and incapable of defence. The criticism of the pure reason, or the enquiry whether experience is possible, is absurd, for it admits enquiry upon enquiry without end. The forms of Kant are false, for they are contrary to fact. The representation of the transcendentalist, like other ideal systems, is every where open to scepticism. Kant, with respect to Hume, has merely changed his ground, but not defended his position. This, it is said, has been attempted to be shewn by the new *Ænesidemus*, (Schultze). How far he has succeeded we are unable to say, not having even seen a sufficient abstract of his work.

Had the doctrine of the pure reason been established in other respects, it fails in two great points, by the confession of its admirers—in establishing the reality of the material world, and in the proof of the Divine existence. The sources of our knowledge, according to Kant, consist merely of experience, and of the laws of thought which are previous to experience; from neither of which the notion of the Deity can be derived. All that remains is to make the Deity a moral hypothesis, in order to solve a difficulty and to fill up a blank. He descends, like a *Deus ex Machina* upon the ancient theatre, to produce a catastrophe which the unskilfulness of the poet could not effect without supernatural aid. Virtue, according to Kant, is worthy of happiness; but in this world it does not necessarily find it; therefore, we must invent the moral hypothesis of immortality; and therefore, to confer this happiness, the existence of the Deity must also be begged, as another moral postulate to complete the system.

Both Fichté and Schelling seem duly sensible of the weakness of this proceeding, and deduce the Deity—the one from the activity of thought, the other from the abstract notion of existence. “In tomorrow’s lecture I am going to create God,” Fichté said, with unnecessary blasphemy, since it was sufficiently profane and more intelligible, to point out how, in a system quite ideal and subjective, (and

therefore where every thing was confined to the mind itself) the notion of a Deity sprang up from the necessary development of thought.

According to Schelling, the Deity is under the necessity of revealing himself in nature, or in the production of all beings. We conjecture that he adds to this the necessity of revealing himself by an ascending scale of being. By this we may explain the assertion which has been attributed to Schelling, that there are three æras of existence, that of chaos, which is past; that of nature, which is present; that of the Deity, which is yet to come. By this we must understand three revelations of the Deity, who, being under the necessity of producing all being, produces the lowest first, and then crowns and completes the whole with the full manifestation of himself.

The Germans have reproached the English with not studying transcendental philosophy—would that it were worth studying. Europe owes much to Germany; its freedom, such as it is; and we are the more indebted to her, since the Germans, in bestowing freedom upon other countries, have kept so small a reserve for themselves. We are indebted to them for the reformation; and here they have shewn equal disinterestedness, for, with a few exceptions, they have forsaken that truth which they once proclaimed to others; and for what mis-shapen idols have they forsaken the living God!

The Germans reproach the English for not understanding the philosophy of Kant ; do they understand it themselves? Not in the judgment of Kant, for they have altered it, and every alteration, with him, was a mark of ignorance and error ; not in the judgment of Fichté, Schelling, and the many other heresiarchs who have perverted the followers of Kant, for each of these restrict the understanding of transcendental philosophy to their own narrow sect ; not in the judgment of *Ænesidemus*, who proves, or attempts to prove, the transcendental philosophy a total failure, which they, without understanding it, and without agreeing about it, still ignorantly worship.

The English do not understand Kant, who probably did not understand himself. The Germans incur a graver reproach ; they do not understand those English writers, of whose works and opinions they profess to give an account ; if they read the works at all, they are evidently unable to comprehend their spirit. Well might Dugald Stuart see with amazement an account of the opinions attributed to him in the work of Buhle—opinions which he never held, and to which he had constantly been opposed. Nor is this injustice confined to the writings of Stuart, or to the criticisms of Buhle, but appears to be common to those in Germany who have treated of English philosophy, since the mind began, in this country, to be studied on the inductive principles of

Bacon—principles of which the German transcendentalists have yet to learn the value.

The rapid succession of theories proceed in narrower circles. The ancients took the full sweep of existence, as presented to the unfettered flight of imagination. In more recent systems, facts mingle with fancy, and there is an approximation to the sobriety of truth, except in the instance of the later Germans, who have entirely broke loose from experience, and escaped into a world of shadows and chimeras.

In some respects, the first theories are superior to the last,—the ancient sometimes possess a juster outline, if the recent are more exact in the details. The Pythagoreans entertained sublimer and wiser notions of the universe than the later Greeks. Imagination is more early developed than reason; and the conjecture of genius was superior to argument, guided by a defective logic, and unsupported by sufficient facts. First arose the shadow of a true philosophy,—Pythagoras, concluding that the universe was based on the principles of number and geometry, not only gave an impulse to the mathematical school of Greece, but pointed out an organum, or instrument, far superior to that of Aristotle.

What Pythagoras did for mathematics, Plato accomplished for the fine arts. His ideal world, though but a vision of its inventor, has subsequently found a

local habitation, and has peopled the world with images of beauty, not only in ancient Greece, but in modern Italy, where the Platonic theory presided over the designs of a long line of genius, from Michael Angelo and Raphael, down to Guido. The same doctrine has descended to Sir Joshua Reynolds, who, however, has ill exchanged the Platonic ideas, and perfect exemplars, for the more prosaic theory of central forms. The original theory taught the artist to seek a type of perfect beauty in his own mind, by exalting his imagination, and by leading him to believe that he was drawing down from heaven, that which observation and taste had previously selected from the earth. The mitigated theory of central forms would rather destroy individuality, without introducing that heavenly beauty, and more than earthly character, which has sainted with an halo of immortality, the works of elder time.

What the works of Aristotle and the Stoics lost in imagination, they gained in facts,—there is considerable discrimination in both respecting the workings of the mind. The Stoics (especially Chrysippus, notwithstanding his verbal subtilties,) have nearly given a true outline of the origin of our ideas.

There is a great gulph between former philosophers and Bacon, who properly belongs to a later age, and a more advanced period of society, than we have yet arrived at. Bacon stands apart from former

or later writers on the mind. It was not his object to study the origin of our ideas, but to state the measure of our powers. He drew his estimate of the mind, not from reflection, but observation. He compared the fruitless efforts of the genius of Greece with the continual advances of art. "In arts mechanical, the first deviser comes shortest, and time addeth and perfecteth; but in sciences the first author goeth farthest, and time loseth, and corrupteth." The method of excogitation and theory had been tried by innumerable men of genius, and had failed; the method of practice and observation had been tried by men who had no pretension to genius, and had succeeded. How much more would the former have accomplished, had they followed the method of the latter. Some, however, will "doubt rather than object," whether the method of Bacon be equally applicable to the mind as to external nature; but most unwisely. The rules of Bacon apply not so much to the subjects of study, as to the instrument,—to the mind itself; and where the instrument remains the same, the rules in a great degree continue the same also,—for they are founded upon the estimate of its powers, and their due application. "As the common logic, which proceeds by syllogism, is applied not only to natural philosophy, but to all sciences, so our logic, which proceeds by induction, embraces all likewise."

Descartes, notwithstanding his rash conclusions and erroneous theories, made a great advance, when he had pointed out reflection as the source of our knowledge of the mind, in distinction from observation, by which we become acquainted with external nature; and thus, so clearly separated that which thinks, from that which is extended—mind from matter. Malebranche too, as ingenious as he was fantastical, has added several excellent observations to those of his master.

As much as Descartes is before the ancients, so much is Locke in advance of Descartes, and though amidst many and dangerous errors, we cannot help perceiving a great approximation to the truth.

Berkeley, though he wasted his powers in attacks upon the independent existence of matter, gave the first model of the analysis of our mental operations in his theory of vision, as we shall subsequently have occasion to notice.

In the works of Reid there are admirable specimens of inductive enquiry applied to the mind. Reid appeared to be fitted by his peculiar cast of intellect to be a mental philosopher. Our effort and aim in the study of the mind, is to retard the current of our thought—this Reid did naturally,—it cost him no effort to be patient and profound. The most unfortunate part of his work is the title page, which has misled many of his opponents, (some of whom seem

to have looked no farther,) and still more unfortunately has misled himself. "The principles of common sense" perplex his reasoning and paralyse his powers. Sometimes he speaks as if the philosophy of the mind were to be determined by the common sense of the multitude, and as if questions of the greatest intricacy were immediately to be decided by a jury impannelled from the street. At other times, and this is with him the better and more constant import of the term, he understands, by common sense, "the common principles" of the Stoics—those principles which are the growth of the exercise of our faculties, which are common to all men—which cannot be contradicted without total scepticism and practical absurdity, and which lie at the root of all reasoning.

Another oversight has been committed by Reid. These principles of "common sense" may be certain without being ultimate principles; to make them ultimate principles, as Reid does, is to revert to the absurdity of innate ideas, and to suppose thoughts previous to thinking. Their certainty is by no means diminished by their being resolved into simpler elements.

It perhaps must also be acknowledged, that, in some cases, Reid has not made sufficient allowance for the use of the word *idea* in other authors, nor adequately discriminated the varying shades of meaning attached to it, how far it was metaphorical, or to

what extent it imposed upon the writer's own mind. This, however, would form but a slight deduction from the triumph which Reid actually achieved, by detecting the many errors which lurked under a term so vaguely used, and which led to such dangerous moral consequences. His comments upon former writers are less valuable for their learning and acquaintance with the spirit of former systems, than for the sound and unbiassed judgment which they every where manifest. Nothing can be stronger than the contrast betwixt the former metaphysics, which served only to perplex the understanding and impair the moral principles, and the new philosophy of the mind, which listens only with more devout attention to the voice of nature and of God.

The slowness with which Reid proceeded in his inquiries and published his works, is evident from their dates. They were intended as an antidote to the scepticism of Hume. Hume's most profound work, his *Treatise on Human Nature*, was published in 1739. Reid's first work, his *Inquiry*, did not appear till 1764, when he was fifty-four years of age, and his *Essays* were not published till he was seventy-five and seventy-eight. It is true, that Hume's original work was never much attended to, and his opinions only became current from being promulgated in a disguised and popular form. The dates of Reid's *Essays* lead us to expect what we actually find, somewhat of the diminished vigour and increased prolixity of ad-

vanced age. Still, notwithstanding a mixture of alloy, they contain a great mass of original thought and profound reflection.

It is needless to insist upon his opinions here, as they are sufficiently set forth in the ensuing part of the work. Few writers, if any, have been so favoured as Reid, with such a scholar and so judicious a supporter as Professor Stuart. If a popular manner, and a polished style, could have made abstruse thinking an amusing occupation, the thoughts of Reid, and his philosophy, remodelled by Stuart, would have become as widely diffused as the English language. It might also have been hoped that a mind so well trained as Stuart's, and so well regulated, besides making known the merits of another, would have added new discoveries of his own; but the changes from Reid's opinions are few, and these apparently not for the better. The connecting belief with imagination, was a return to the tenets of Hume and Hobbes. In changing what has been called the conceptualism of Reid for nominalism, he pushed a useful truth to an unnecessary as well as erroneous extreme. Words are the chief instrument of thought, is a truth to which all will agree; that they are the sole instrument of thought is erroneous, for the previous exercise of thought is implied in their application and discrimination.

How admirably Stuart could discourse from his

own proper fund of thought, is seen in his remarks upon the acceleration in the train of our ideas from practice and habit. It is much to be regretted, that other passages, which are chiefly to be admired, are generally reflections upon the thoughts of others, rather than the original meditations of his own well-balanced mind; and it is often a disappointment to the learner, who thinks he has secured an incomparable guide along the steep and dizzy path that leads to mental truth, to find that all that guide proposes is a peripatetic ramble over a tessellated pavement of quotations.

The great barrier to the progress of the Inductive Philosophy of the mind consists in the painful mental effort which it demands on the part of the learner. Still more applicable to Mental Philosophy, than even to mathematics, is the ancient saying, that there is no royal road to it. The mathematical student may possess himself of results without the power of mind or effort of invention that led to them; but the mental student must bring his mind into the same position as the mental discoverer, and, with a painful effort of attention, reflect also upon the operations of his own mind, or he will make no proficiency in the study he is pursuing. It is not therefore surprising, that the study of mind has retrograded, and that teachers have become popular in proportion as they have substituted images for reflections. We intend

to animadvert in a note upon some of the numerous errors of the late ingenious and amiable Dr. Brown. [A] Here we shall only advert to his ingenious criticisms and able remarks on other writers, which indeed shew how much easier it is to detect the faults of others than our own; and acknowledge his many beautiful observations on practical morals, which prove how much better fitted he was for amplifying and ornamenting received notions, than for acting as a pioneer where there was no trodden path before him.

The interest respecting the mind has ceased—the theories are nearly forgotten which promised to disclose the nature of existence, and which chiefly kept up that interest, by the false hopes which they excited. Next to imposing theories, dangerous errors principally attracted attention. They have passed away likewise, or if they exist, are no longer dangerous, because they no longer draw any notice or excite any interest. Severe and solitary thought is nearly extinct also. What is every where required is present amusement, or immediate utility. Germany forms an exception,—there the energy exists but entirely misapplied. Yet we need not doubt, that, sooner or later, there will be a revival of the philosophy of the mind, if not in the old, at least in the new world; the efforts of so many generations, and of so much genius, will not be entirely fruitless,

and every discovery, with respect to the mind, will amply repay the toil of the inquirer. Neither the errors nor the truths, relating to the mind, are confined to the mind itself. The mind is the universal organum of all sciences, the instrument by which all discoveries must be made ; and, therefore, whatever relates to it, is unrivalled in its importance, and unlimited in its application. As far as speculation is concerned, the greatest of errors and the most mischievous, was the ideal theory, which undermined the base of all knowledge ; and the greatest of discoveries, because the parent of genuine philosophy, was that which forms the foundation of Bacon's induction—his estimate of the human mind.

THE
PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND:

PART II.

INVESTIGATION BY INDUCTION.

IN the following pages we have chiefly animadverted on writers whose talents we admire, and to whose opinions we generally assent. Where we disagree with any writer, a few remarks may be sufficient to detect the fallacy of his principles. On the other hand, where an author approximates to the truth, our very admiration of him leads us to point out what we conceive to be his few remaining blemishes. On this ground the opinions of many esteemed to be erroneous, or at least defective, are passed over with the less notice; and passages of Reid and Stuart, on account of their very excellence, are the more care-

fully scrutinized. In the following pages, novelty has been less sought after, than that central point of view, which reconciles conflicting opinions ; and changes those who deem themselves mutually opposed, into fellow-labourers, co-operating, though unconsciously, in the establishment of the same ultimate principles.

SECTION FIRST.

PERCEPTION.

THE Philosophy of the Mind, in its utmost perfection, would consist in the history of all its thoughts as they rose, first simple, then with the various combinations into which they enter ; and, lastly, in the enumeration of the ultimate laws which regulate all their changes. But, it is necessary to repeat, that of all subjects, we are least acquainted with our own minds. Our thoughts naturally flow outwards, and diffuse themselves over the external world. The elements of thought can never be said to exist uncombined ; but, like the elements of matter, have so strong a tendency to unite, that it has not yet been in the power of man to exhibit them in a separate form.

The true science of mind is but in its infancy, nor is there any hope of its rapid advancement. It is with the combinations, and not with the elements of

thought, that we have to do in the ordinary business of life ; and it is owing chiefly, if not altogether, to dangerous or conflicting theories respecting the mind, that we have ever recourse to the painful effort of turning the attention inwards, in order, amidst the darkness that gathers round the secret springs of existence, to discern the objects which are there invisible, till the eye is gradually accustomed to the surrounding dimness. The internal world is a labyrinth in which we can only proceed slowly, by the thread of inductive investigation ; the thoughts soon become confused by the intricacy of the way ; and one inquirer must succeed another, each bringing a fresh eye, and availing himself of the slight progress of his predecessors, before the mind of man shall become known to itself ; and the recesses of that mysterious existence be discovered to us, which is ever present, and yet ever shaded from the view.

The origin of our knowledge, like every other subject respecting the mind, has been a fruitful source of endless disputes. Notwithstanding the number of sects, the theorists of the mind may be classed under two great subdivisions, according as their theories were chiefly drawn from the opposite world of matter or of spirit. The first considered our ideas to be only the slender images of things received into the mind through the inlet of the senses ; the other conceived that the soul of man possessed within itself,

though folded up till fitting occasion should expand them, faint copies or reflections of those models which existed from eternity in the Divine mind, and corresponding to which, as their pattern, the external world was fashioned.

Amid all disputes, we have at least the consolation of knowing, that the truth must lie somewhere between the contending parties, especially in a controversy about the mind, where both sets of disputants must have some knowledge, however imperfect, of the subject of controversy. Yet, it is not by halving the difference that we arrive at the truth. The truth stands apart from both opinions, but, when known, explains and reconciles both.

Those who contended that the mind derives its ideas from the impressions on the senses, are now generally, and justly, allowed to be so far right, that unless the mind were awakened from without, for anything we know to the contrary, it must remain in a perpetual slumber. The mind, to act, must first be acted upon,—it must be passive before it can be active,—it must receive impressions from without, before it can originate thoughts from within. It cannot will any one of its own operations without a previous knowledge of itself and its powers. It cannot possess thoughts previous to thinking.

On the other hand, they who confined knowledge to the senses were still more widely mistaken. The

impressions on the bodily organs are only the occasions of thought. There is no resemblance between any possible movements of the nerves, or the changes in external nature, and the thoughts which these changes excite in the mind.

The most remarkable part of the mental process consists in the arbitrary interval which occurs between the act of perception and the objects perceived. It is not the changes of the brain,—it is not the changes in the nerves, which the mind attends to,—it overlooks what is passing in the body with which it is connected, and its attention is immediately directed, by the arbitrary, but wise disposal of Providence, not to the proximate causes, but to the ultimate phenomena. When we look through a telescope, and receive into the eye the light of a distant star, we perceive not, we think not, of the impression of light upon the retina, of the irritability of the nerves, or of the impression made upon the brain, but our attention is directed to another world moving along the immense, though distant path, which the hand of the All-wise has traced.

This of itself is a refutation of materialism or atheism. The whole of the process is evidently not the result of blind matter or resistless destiny,—not even what we would naturally expect from the usual laws by which the Deity governs the world. It is one of those apparent anomalies that mark more

strongly the Divine contrivance, while they appear to depart from the ordinary course of His proceedings, and which may be called the miracles of nature; not, like the miracles of religion, rare and temporary, but ever constant and recurring; and while they arrest the attention by their deviation from the more common mode of procedure, they shew that they deviate only to reach more fully and speedily the end proposed.

“Except ye become as little children, ye cannot enter the kingdom of heaven;” and except we become as little children, as Reid justly observes, we cannot enter the regions of true philosophy. One of the greatest and the most difficult portions of mental philosophy, is to recall the thoughts of childhood, and again to receive our first impressions, and to think over our earliest thoughts.

A child is a metaphysician without knowing it; and the philosopher may envy, but in vain, the first gleams of thought in the countenance of infancy, while he seeks to unlearn, for a moment, that long train of acquired thought which the child is already weaving together, in a band, which, like the thread of the Fatal Sisters, may be abruptly cut, but which can never again be untwined.*

* “My thread is small, my thread is fine;
But he must be
A stronger than thee,
Who can break this thread of mine!”

SOUTHEY'S THALAEA.

But if we cannot revert to childhood, and the infant growth of the faculties, we try to place ourselves, like Adam in Paradise, with mature, but yet unexercised faculties, awakening, for the first time, to surrounding objects. The king of nature, and yet unconscious of his dignity, receiving the first tribute of his dominions, in the incense of nature's flowers.

Metaphysicians have often chosen to present a rose to their newly awakened image of humanity, as if, in the language of the Italian poet, their thoughts were all roses, though, had they awakened it to life by the thorn, instead of the flower, it would be more in accordance with the painful and fruitless difficulties that were about to follow. Though many have attempted to analyse what takes place in the sentient mind at the approach of the rose, Reid alone has succeeded in distinguishing the train of thought, which is consequent upon any single impression on the organ of the senses. Former writers, under the vague and variable terms of ideas and impressions, had confused many things that were dissimilar, and in stating several facts under one denomination, had included a reference to some erroneous theory. Reid separated the passive sensation from the act of perception, and distinguished both from the object perceived.

“Suppose a person who never had this sense (smelling) before, to receive it all at once, and to

smell a rose; can he perceive any similitude or agreement between the smell and the rose, or indeed between it or any other object whatsoever? Certainly he cannot. He finds himself affected in a new way, —he knows not why, or from what cause. Like a man that feels some pain or pleasure formerly unknown to him, he is conscious that he is not the cause of it himself; but cannot, from the nature of the thing, determine whether it is caused by body or spirit, by something near, or by something at a distance. It has no similitude to anything else, so as to admit of a comparison; and therefore he can conclude nothing from it, unless, perhaps, that there must be some unknown cause for it."

There is, however, no perhaps in the case, nor is the mind left to deliberate what it is to conclude. With the rapidity of lightning, or what is still greater, with the rapidity of thought, an "unknown cause," according to Reid's own excellent term, is immediately *suggested*, and the sensation is instantaneously thrown out upon that unknown cause, with a force and a tenacity which no after efforts can entirely disengage.

Stuart has justly observed, that a man who had only the senses of smell and of taste would have less difficulty in becoming a metaphysician, because his thoughts would not have the complexity which they acquire, by being united to the wide and various

world which hearing, touch, and sight, discloses to us. The remark would be still stronger, were it restricted to the case of one who had only received a single intimation of an external world.

It does not seem to have been sufficiently observed, (perhaps Condillac may be deemed an exception,) that though an impression from the senses is necessary to rouse the dormant faculties of the mind, yet that one single impression would afford matter for endless thought. By the approach of the rose, the mind is conscious of the sensation of odour, and at the same time becomes acquainted with its own act of perception, and is carried beyond itself to the unknown cause that has excited that sensation. We cannot, in strict speaking, say that it has become acquainted with the external world, because in external, is involved the notion of extension, and extension is only acquired by the inlet of two of the senses; but by the smell of the rose we become acquainted with an existence which is separate from, and independent of our own.

To shew how little the state of our mental process in perception has been analysed, we have no word, either in common or in recent philosophic language, that expresses that existence, before extension is yet attributed to it. We must revert to scholastic language, and borrow the term *objective*, as contradistinguished from what is subjective, or in the mind

itself. As soon as we smell the rose, our thoughts are carried at once to objective and subjective existence,—the sensation refers us to the unknown extrinsic cause, and the act of perception suggests to us the existence of a mind which perceives. We not only begin to discover the relation between what is objective and what is subjective, but between what is active and what is passive. In the sensation, the mind is felt to be acted upon; in the perception, we are conscious that we ourselves are acting. In the superfusion of the sensation over the unknown cause, we have an example, according to the noble lines of Young, of the plastic power of the senses, which

“Half create the wondrous world they see.”

* * *

“Like Milton’s Eve, when gazing on the lake,
Man makes the matchless image man admires.”

And in the tenacity with which the sensation is united to its cause, we have an example of that inveterate union between matter and mind which can only be dissolved at death; when the soul shall discover that it is its own sun; that it was itself, not the material sun, that had been shedding light on all surrounding objects, and that it was not this lower world which is grown dark to it, but that it has withdrawn the splendours which it once diffused over outward existence, and is about to rise and to illuminate another sphere of being.

From that single impression upon the senses, almost all the other powers of the mind might be unfolded, and many of its notions acquired. We should know nothing of extension, or of the brilliant appearances of colours, and the rays of light, which come to us, as messengers from distant worlds; or of sounds, which, through the medium of a material vehicle, keep up a still more wonderful intercourse with other minds; but by the memory of that one sensation, we should acquire, as we shall afterwards consider, the notion of succession, and of time, swelling out into infinite duration; and of number receptive of continual additions; of identity and of difference; and of the soul, which remains the same, while its thoughts are perpetually changing and multiplying, from its inherent and restless activity, when once roused to action, even though the external world, except in one single instance, were excluded from its view.

Smell, taste, and hearing, not suggesting extension, but merely an unknown cause foreign to the mind, as the origin of their peculiar sensations, a person who had only these three senses, would form no conception of the material world, such as it is conceived by us; instead of defining matter as that which is extended, or which occupies space, he would define it merely as that which occasions sensations. He would be freed from the material images which have

so often perplexed metaphysicians, though he would have the same difficulty of dissolving the bond which so firmly unites our sensations with the occult qualities which produce them.

But sight and touch introduce us into a new world, acquainting us not only with the secondary, but with the primary qualities of matter, and instead of merely indicating obscure changes in bodies, occasionally affecting our senses, furnish the materials by which the soul, with its plastic power, builds a solid and enduring fabric.

By the organ of sight, we have the sensation of colour, but this sensation has not only reference to an unknown cause, like the three former senses, but suggests, at the same time, the perception of superficial extension; and as an odour is for ever super-fused over the hidden quality which produces it, so colour is spread over extension, and cannot be conceived as existing apart from it. Reid observes, "however difficult it may be to attend to this fugitive sensation, to stop its rapid progress, and to disjoin it from the external quality, in whose shadow it is apt immediately to hide itself; this is what a philosopher, with pains and practice, must attain." All his pains and practice, however, will only enable him to reason as if he could disjoin them; to conceive the sensations of touch and hardness separate from the extension to which they are united, is beyond the

reach of philosophy to attain. So much stronger is the mind to build than to pull down, so much stronger (we must use a new term for an unnoticed power,) is construction than abstraction.

The distinction between visible and tangible magnitude was first pointed out by Bishop Berkeley, and was one of the few great steps which the philosophy of mind, yet in its extreme infancy, has ever gained. It was the first accurate analysis of any of our senses or powers; and the light which it threw upon the faculty of sight was not its only value, for it illustrates in a remarkable instance the general tendency of the mind to combine and modify the information it may obtain, from whatsoever inlet; as we shall shew when we come to speak more particularly of that great plastic power of the mind to which we have, as above, given the name of construction.

The only truly inductive work upon the senses is Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind, and in that he is more indebted to Bishop Berkeley's remarks on vision, than to all other metaphysical works besides. He resumes the train of his predecessor's thoughts, frees them from the errors and exaggerations to which the ingenious, but rather fantastic mind of Berkeley was ever liable, completes them on the subject of vision, and extends them to the other senses.

When visible magnitude is perceived for the first time, long after tangible magnitude, the effect is

accurately described in the experience of those who have thus gained their sight. "The young man," as Reid observes, "couched by Chelselden, thought at first that every thing he saw touched the eye, and learned only by experience to judge of the distance of visible objects." He could not even have thought that every thing he saw touched his eye, unless he had been previously acquainted with tangible magnitude. Distance is not acquired by the eye, but by the touch.

As this doctrine respecting visible figure has been considered, if not unfounded, at least indifferently proved, by the late ingenious Dr. Brown, it may be proper to quote his words: "The immediate perception of visible figure has been assumed as indisputable, rather than attempted to be proved, as before the time of Berkeley, the immediate visual perception of distance, and of the three dimensions of matter, was supposed, in like manner, to be without any need of proof; and it is, therefore, impossible to refer to arguments upon the subject. I presume, however, that the reasons which have led to this belief, of the immediate perception of a figure termed visible, as distinguished from that tangible figure, which we learn to see, are the following two, the only reasons which I can even imagine, that it is absolutely impossible, in our present sensations of sight, to separate colour from extension, and that there are, in fact, a certain breadth and

length of the retina on which the light falls." It is striking, that a third argument should have escaped Dr. Brown's notice, especially as it had been used by Reid, not, indeed, as an argument, but as an illustration. The true theory of vision is clearly deduced from painting; a picture of Raphael is only a coloured board. How is it, that, looking upon it, we behold depth and figure, passion and beauty? It is that we have learned to interpret the shadings of colour when in infancy, when we were combining sight and touch, visible magnitude with tangible; interpreting the information of our eyes, by the experiments we were making with our hands. But even this consideration is needless, for Berkeley had satisfactorily shewn, what, indeed, is sufficiently obvious upon consideration, that the rays of light, falling on the eye, indicate extension, but not depth or distance, except indirectly, by the faintness of colouring.

Reid has excellently well described what would be the philosophy of those who should have their eyesight without the sense of touch: "Colour, extension, and figure, are conceived to be the essential properties of body. A very considerable sect maintains, that colour is the essence of body. If there had been no colours, say they, there had been no perception nor sensation. Colour is all that we perceive or can conceive, that is peculiar to body. If we should suppose a body to be annihilated, colour is the only thing in

it that can be annihilated ; for its place, and consequently the figure and extension of that place, must remain, and cannot be imagined not to exist. It is to be observed, that every Idomenian firmly believes, that two or more bodies may exist in the same place. For this they have the testimony of sense, and they can no more doubt of it, than they can doubt whether they have any perception at all. They often see two bodies meet, and coincide in the same place, and separate again, without having undergone any change in their sensible qualities by this penetration. When two bodies meet, and occupy the same place, commonly one only appears in that place, and the other disappears. That which continues to appear is said to overcome, the other to be overcome."

The consideration of sight separate from touch, and the point of view in which Reid has so well placed it, not only points out the limits of one sense when not supplied by another, and thus shews us how much we gain by uniting the narrow inlets of our knowledge, and combining together what are so scanty in themselves, yet are suddenly enlarged by their mutual junction ; but such views as that of Reid warn us of the danger we are in of falling into mistakes, by trusting too much to our unaided faculties, and building a system of philosophy on too narrow a foundation. Sight and touch existing separately would give us scanty or uncertain information, but the moment they are united together, we perceive

how easily their separate notices coincide and augment in value. How the narrow sphere that was within the reach of our hands, expands as the tablet that "touched the eye," recedes into depth and distance; and we no longer see what we actually do see, but the intimations of sight become the fugitive signs which at once direct the view to a newly discovered world, which we have neither seen nor touched, but which we perceive from the joint indications of two very different senses.

In touch, we are so engrossed with the material world, that the sensations which are peculiar to that sense are often entirely overlooked, and many of them pass without a name, "hid under the shadow," as Reid admirably expresses it, "of those external qualities," and of that material world, which they instantaneously suggest. It is touch that gives its solidity and reality to the material world. In what we touch, we trust that we cannot be deceived. Smell, taste, and hearing, give us but shadowy and dark intimations. Sight affords us brilliant visions, but which, unless we touch them, and feel ourselves in the midst of them, would seem like a vision about to pass away. Seeing is but half believing, but what we touch and handle seems to admit of no farther argument. We deem that we have as strong, and certainly a more palpable proof of its existence, than even of our own.

Through the eyes we obtain an acquaintance with

superficial dimension, but by the touch we become acquainted with extension, in length, breadth, and depth ; in short, with space, that remains unaltered by the change or the destruction of body, and which we cannot even conceive removed or destroyed ; immutable as eternal. On this wonderful difference, and yet correspondence, of sight and touch, Bishop Berkeley founded a demonstration, not only of the existence of the Deity, but of a perpetual revelation, though a natural one, that He makes to mankind.

In Berkeley's Minute Philosopher, the infidel is offered proof of the existence of the Deity equal to that which can be adduced for the existence of any individual of the human race, by the objector himself. Certainly the intelligence of the Deity is manifested by a greater variety, and more numerous tokens of visible design than could be brought for the existence of any rational individual, or even for the existence of the whole race of mankind, whose derivative wisdom has not left such traces of its existence in all the monuments and ruins yet remaining, as we discover of the vestiges of divine wisdom in every creature that surrounds us. The infidel, however, contending that our chief argument for the existence of other rational creatures besides ourselves, is our communication with them by speech,—“it is my hearing you talk, that, in strict and philosophical truth, is to me the best argument for your being.” Berkeley, in the character of Alciphron, answers, “what if it should

appear that God really speaks to man?" "Euph. Look, Alciphron, do you not see the castle upon yonder hill? Alc. I do.—Euph. Is it not at a great distance from you? Alc. It is.—Euph. Tell me, Alciphron, is not distance a line turned end-wise to the eye? Alc. Doubtless.—Euph. And can a line in that situation project more than one single point on the bottom of the eye? Alc. It cannot.—Euph. Therefore the appearance of a long and of a short distance, is of the same magnitude, or rather of no magnitude at all, being in all cases one single point? Alc. It seems so.—Euph. Should it not follow from hence, that distance is not immediately perceived by the eye? Alc. It should.—Euph. Must it not then be perceived by the mediation of some other thing? Alc. It must.—Euph. To discover what this is, let us examine what alteration there may be in the appearance of the same object placed at different distances from the eye. Now, I find by experience, that when an object is removed still farther and farther off, in a direct line from the eye, its visible appearance still grows lesser and fainter, and this change of appearance being proportional and universal, seems to me to be that by which we apprehend the various degrees of distance. Alc. I have nothing to object to this.—Euph. But littleness or faintness, in their own nature, seem to have no necessary connection with greater length of distance. Alc. I admit this to be true.—Euph. Will it not follow then, that they could

never suggest it but from experience? Alc. It will.—Euph. That is to say, we perceive distance not immediately, but by mediation of a sign which hath no likeness to it, or necessary connection with it, but only suggests it from repeated experience, as words do things.” “Upon the whole, it seems the proper objects of sight are light and colours, with their several shades and degrees, all which being infinitely diversified and combined, do form a language wonderfully adapted to suggest and exhibit to us the distances, figures, situations, dimensions, and various qualities of tangible objects, not by similitude, nor yet by inference of necessary connection, but by the arbitrary imposition of Providence, just as words suggest the things signified by them.” And to the objection, “Will any man say he hath spent time, or been at pains to learn this language of vision?” Berkeley adds, “No wonder we cannot assign a time beyond our remotest memory. If we have been all practising this language ever since our first entrance into the world. If the author of nature constantly speaks to the eyes of all mankind, even in their earliest infancy, whenever the eyes are open in the light, whether alone or in company; it doth not seem to me at all strange, that men should not be aware they had ever learned a language begun so early, and practised so constantly, as this of vision.” “Something there is of divine and admirable in this language addressed

to our eyes, that may well awaken the mind and deserve its utmost attention ; it is learned with so little pains, it expresseth the differences of things so clearly and aptly, it instructs with such facility and dispatch, by one glance of the eye conveying a greater variety of advices, and a more distinct knowledge of things, than could be got by a discourse of several hours ; and while it informs, it amuses and entertains the mind, with such singular pleasure and delight ; it is of such excellent use in giving a stability and permanency to human discourse, in recording sounds, and bestowing life on dead languages, enabling us to converse with men of remote ages and countries, and it answers so apposite to the uses and necessities of mankind, informing us more distinctly of those objects whose nearness and magnitude qualify them to be of greatest detriment or benefit to our bodies, and less exactly in proportion as their littleness or distance make them of less concern to us."

Again, he adds, "Let us suppose a nation of men blind from their infancy, among whom a stranger arrives, the only man who can see in all the country ; let us suppose this stranger travelling with some of the natives, and that one while he foretells to them that, in case they walk straightforward, in half an hour they shall meet men or cattle, or come to a house ; that if they turn to the right, and proceed, they shall in a few minutes be in danger of falling

down a precipice ; that, shaping their course to the left, they will in such a time arrive at a river, a wood, or a mountain. What think ye ? Must they not be infinitely surprised that one who had never been in their country before, should know it so much better than themselves ? And would not those predictions seem to them as unaccountable and incredible as prophecy to a minute philosopher ?”

From the foregoing account of sensation we see that the three first senses, smell, taste, and hearing, do not localise their intimations of the external world ; they carry the thoughts no farther than objective existence ; but sight makes us acquainted with superficial extension, while touch reveals to us what may be denominated solidity, or the impenetrability of matter, and space, in its three dimensions of length, breadth, and depth.

In all theories regarding perception, there is certainly much that is repugnant to the notions that we generally and naturally form respecting the world without us, and the growth and origin of our own knowledge ; but this repugnancy naturally results from the constitution of our minds. There is as great a difference between the seeds of thought and their perfect development, as between the oak and the acorn. The mind is ever thinking, and new thoughts not only add to our stock of knowledge, but in some measure alter its appearance. Construc-

tion, or the plastic power of the mind, not only brings together all the fresh materials we are continually receiving, but is changing their place or their form, in order to assimilate them together, and shape them into a perfect whole. In the ordinary course of thought, the change, though great, being so gradual, is scarcely attended to, and produces no wonder; but in metaphysics we endeavour to compare our full formed opinions with the infancy of thought, and are struck with an incredulous astonishment that the full stream should proceed from so scanty a fountain. We are inclined to reject a representation which, without the softenings of distance and time, gives to one individual, characters at once so extreme, if not so opposite; as the critic rejects with contempt the Spanish play, where the hero is at nurse in the first act, and appears with moustaches in the last :

“ Un Rimeur, sans peril, de là les Pirenées
Sur le scene en un jour renferme des années.
Là souvent le heros d'un spectacle grossier,
Enfant au premier acte, est barbon au dernier.”

The examination of any part of the mental faculties, if carried on with the accuracy with which Berkeley began, and Reid finished, their inquiry into vision, affords us a test by which to try the various theories of the mind. Reid has included all the ac-

counts of perception prior to his time, in the ideal hypothesis, though, in doing so, he has brought a more sweeping accusation against them than the truth will warrant. We cannot afford space to enter into many particulars, but shall remark on the opposing statements of Reid and Dr. Brown in a note.

[B] It may briefly be observed, that the ancients were Idealists, but of very different schools. Nothing can less resemble the eternal models of Pythagoras and Plato than the slender images of the Atomic theories, from Leucippus to Epicurus. The ideal theory of perception, held by Aristotle, by the Stoics, &c., forms a varying mean between these. More recent theories of perception are faint copies of the earlier ones, mixed with the new views of the moderns, who may be divided, like the ancients, into two schools, according to their leaning either to mind or to matter. With the former, perceptions are considered as modifications of the soul; with the latter, as bodily impressions. Whatever remarks apply merely to the ideal theory, are certainly scarcely applicable to some of these, where the theory of perceiving solely by means of ideas was nearly worn out, if not altogether cast aside. Reid did not pay sufficient attention to these exceptions, if they can altogether be deemed so, in writers who, if not in their own practice, yet by tacit assent, seem in a certain measure to admit the ideal theory; but the censures of

Reid affect them on higher grounds, as well as reach Brown himself : they have none of them sufficiently distinguished between sensation,—the act of perception,—and the object of perception. All of them, at least leave out one element, and by that omission give rise to erroneous conclusions, and even to total scepticism; provided the legitimate conclusions, from their imperfect statements, were pushed to the full length.

We can also try Kant, and the new German school, by the same test. They, far from bearing out Dr. Brown in his remarks, that the ideal theory was in itself dying a natural death from old age, have given new force to it, in their new system of ideas or representations. Instead of detecting any fallacy in ideas themselves, the Germans, in general, shew no distrust of their existence, and it is not to ideas that Kant objects, when reviewing the English school of ideal philosophy, and its termination in Hume; but to the account which they give of the formation of ideas. The English are empirical idealists, deducing ideas through the senses. Kant, on the other hand, properly points out the mistake of innate ideas, but contends for the truth of the third origin of ideas, as neither prior to thought, nor yet the mere result of experience, but connate with the mind itself, and the forms and the conditions under which it necessarily thinks and perceives. Now, we can bring, not this theory, which is just, but its peculiar exaggerations to the trial, by test-

ing them with what we have already observed concerning perception, and the relation in which each of the five senses stand with respect to the external world. Kant, in accordance with transcendentalism, considers space as the form of outward sensation, or as, in plainer language than he uses, the condition under which we perceive external objects. If this were the case, all our sensations would be localised in the same manner as colour is spread over extension. On the contrary, of five senses, two only have reference to extension; and each of these to a different extension; so that we see this general law, laid down by Kant, is not only completely imaginary, but contrary to facts. But this law being part and parcel of the whole system, independent of other arguments against it, the futility of his theory is proved by the laws of perception alone.

It may be as well to subjoin the imaginary law of Kant, in the Latin translation, which was inspected by himself:—"Spatium nihil est aliud, quam forma omnium visorum sensuum externorum, h. e. lex singularis, et quam aiunt, subjectiva sensus, qua sola esse visio externa potest."

Nothing, perhaps, exhibits so well the extreme difficulty, and the consequent slowness, of all inquiries respecting the mind, as to consider that Berkeley, and still more Reid, are the principal writers who have thrown any distinct and steady light upon the

real process of perception. Our senses are that part of the structure of the mind, which alone seems to have any similarity to physical sciences, in deriving any assistance from voluntary and projected experiments; yet the anatomist has been dissecting, the metaphysician disputing, and nature affording experiments of her own, in the case of persons deprived of some of their senses; still, for the little we know, we are more indebted to materialists, atheists, and sceptics, than to any of these. Nothing but the most urgent motive can overcome our disinclination to look into our own minds; and when we do turn our eyes inwards, we feel only the painfulness of the effort, and for a time discover nothing but darkness. Higher objects and interests must be entwined with the study of our own powers, before we think it of sufficient importance to fix our attention steadily inwards upon ourselves. Berkeley was goaded forwards, both to his errors and to his discoveries, by the increase of materialism and infidelity in his day; and nothing but the successful scepticism of Hume, which threatened to overturn the entire edifice of knowledge, would have impelled Reid, at a rather late period of life, to give up his former opinions, to examine anew the foundations on which our belief rests, and to fix an inquiry into the mind upon the solid basis of induction.

Inquiries into the mind, we must therefore expect

to proceed slowly, nor should we almost wish it otherwise, if the only stimulant to so painful and ill-requited a pursuit, be the prevalence of some dangerous error. At present, in this country, the Philosophy of Mind seems dying a natural death, and it is sufficient that errors be metaphysical, to prevent them from being dangerous. If more interest existed with respect to mental philosophy, it might be well to point out the subjects connected with perception that are not sufficiently analysed. Though the view of perception maintained by Berkeley and Reid rests upon grounds not likely to be easily shaken, it is not yet perfectly reconciled with the rapidity with which what is called acquired perception is gained by the inferior animals, nor even in all respects with the phenomena of somnambulism, or magnetic sleep.

Another subject of less importance, is the enumeration and classification of our sensations. Reid judiciously observes, "It would seem that a number of sensations, or indeed of any other individual things, which are perfectly simple and uncompounded, are incapable of being reduced into genera and species; because individuals which belong to a species, must have something peculiar to each, by which they are distinguished, and something common to the whole species. And the same may be said of species which belong to one genus. And whether this does not

imply some kind of composition, we shall leave to metaphysicians to determine." The metaphysicians would have an easy task in this, amidst their more perplexing inquiries. It is obvious, that all the sensations with which we are acquainted must at least have two elements, one of agreement and one of difference, in order to be classed. Analogy also would lead us to conclude, that the simplest sensations with which we are acquainted are not elements, which may never be discovered, but, (which both in matter and mind are of more importance in use than elements,) elementary combinations. As in matter, so in mind, a very few elements, too minute to be detected by our observation, enter into a certain number of primary unions,—these unions are to us instead of elements, and it is from their combinations that we date the origin of the products that are most useful to us, whether in thought or in action.

We have said, that the writings of Reid and Berkeley not only illustrate the operations of sight and touch, but, by pointing out the origin of acquired perceptions, open to us a view of the manner in which the rills of knowledge, entering at the several narrow inlets of sense, are united into one general current, and proceed in a common and augmented stream. It is proved, by looking at objects singly, with each of our eyes, that the effect of seeing with both eyes, is to augment the clearness and intensity of

vision. Similar to this is the result of union, when two senses are combined together. Acquired vision, which unites the notices of two senses, gives a like augmentation to the objects and the act of perception; adding the certainty of touch to the brilliancy of sight; filling and occupying the mind with the capacity of the derivative and the acquired sense, more than if we had brought the two separate organs to act upon them individually with distinct and uncombined notices. The union of sight and touch is not a solitary instance of combination between the senses. What sight is to the touch, smell is to the taste. The first in each case perceives vaguely and widely at a distance, what the other concentrates and certifies when near. And in tasting, we are not confined to the taste alone, but the taste in general is blended with the odour, a sort of dim anticipation in the lower senses, of that which results from union in the higher, in the instance of that sixth and noblest sense,—acquired vision.

It has not been remarked sufficiently, to what an extent the union of the senses bearing on the same object augments the vividness of perception. With respect to imagination, indeed, it has been observed, that the odour of the rose deepens the richness of its colour; the same holds true with regard to perception. A piece of scarlet cloth of the same intensity of colour, would never, even to our

eyes, have the glow of the rose in the midst of her fragrance. We make the observation, partly to point out the utility of what may be called blended perceptions, but still more to indicate the similarity that runs throughout the structure and the action of the mind.

The same laws regulate our matter-of-fact and every-day sensations, which govern our poetical sensibilities ; and the verses of Delisle, which paraphrase Akenside, and so beautifully describe the effects of imagination, have also a literal truth when restricted to the objects of sense :

“ Le frais gazon des eaux m’embellit leur murmure,
Leur murmure a son tour m’embellit la verdure,
L’odorat sert le gout et l’oeil sert l’odorat ;
L’haleine de la rose ajoute à son éclat,” &c.

Even in the operation of the senses, the plastic power of the mind is discovered ; not one of the notices we receive remains exactly the same as when we originally obtained it. The mind throws its own magic colouring over each, and instead of possessing merely five distinct sources of information, which, were it not for the uniting faculty of the mind, would have remained like so many slits letting in only a narrow and far separated gleam of distant day, it converges all into one continuous light, without interval or difference, and looks abroad upon nature,

as if the body were all eye and all ear, and intelligent in every member.

It is obvious, however, that the world which we behold, is far from being altogether the same as the world without us; in nature, the atoms of matter, it may be, are performing their mystic dance, like suns and planets in miniature, possessing their own revolutions, and finishing their prescribed changes in their appointed times; but neither they nor the heavenly bodies move in any other light than that which the soul lends to them. Each atom fills its appointed space,—each collection of atoms, which we denominate a world, moves along its appointed path; but as the mind of the Creator alone gives unity to their scattered particles, so the mind of the beholder gives continuity and colour, and sheds over them the still sunnier hues of borrowed sensation and life.

Is there, then, no external world? far from it. The Deity has implanted in us a belief of its existence, which we cannot overcome; and in our perceptions of the primary qualities of matter, has given us glimpses of external nature which we cannot reasonably mistake, distinct and opposite as it is in its properties from those of consciousness and thought. So we are taught by God, and so we believe, and if we acted differently, we should soon be convinced of our folly. Still, however, we must distinguish the living and complete map of the world we carry within

us, a world made up partly of matter and partly of mind, from the dark and broken outlines, which is all that we can trace of the world that lies without us, and which would exist whether it were perceived by the mind or not.

The errors of great geniuses are nearly akin to truth ; the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz, by which he supposed that matter and mind, though proceeding in entire independence of each other, neither acting, nor acted upon, yet executed their movements simultaneously, like two perfect pieces of clock-work, might here be shewn to have some similitude to the truth. Innumerable processes are going on without us, throughout the whole of nature. Thoughts that we cannot number are fleeting, combining, and again partially resolving, in our own minds. The elements in both cases are dissimilar, and yet the results perfectly coincide. That the mind, with such narrow inlets of sense, should make such wide discoveries of nature, is of itself a proof of Divine contrivance and skill ; but that proof is greatly augmented, when the world within us still corresponds with the world without us, and the little creation of the mind, when guided by true philosophy, coincides, though in miniature, with the vast creation of God.

Truly God made man in his own image, capable of following the Divine foot-prints, and responding, even

now, in the weakness of his faculties, and what is worse, in the frequent perversion of his powers, to those purposes and plans of the Godhead which embrace all worlds, and all events, and stretch from eternity to eternity. It is thus that the mind of man, when preserved by the spirit of God from error, and with a natural inspiration, with which the Almighty giveth him understanding, returns an infinitely small, but just reflection of that wisdom which created all things; as the astronomical clock, in its little circle of movements, is still true to the mighty revolutions of the heavens.

So deeply imprinted is the seal of Divine wisdom upon creation, that we can trace design where our ignorance prevents us from any other discovery. The science of mind is yet in its infancy, and even now it is full of the instances of Divine contrivance. The structure of the eye has long been one of the strongholds of natural theology. The faculty of sight itself affords a strong proof, though the argument be less sensible, than that which is drawn from the structure of its material organ. "If we shall suppose," says Reid, "an order of beings endued with every human faculty but that of sight, how incredible would it appear to such beings, accustomed only to the slow intimations of touch, that by the addition of an organ consisting of a ball and socket of an inch diameter, they might be able in an instant of time, without changing their place, to perceive the disposition of a whole army,

or the order of a battle, the figure of a magnificent palace, or all the variety of a landscape? If a man were by feeling, to find out the figure of the Peak of Teneriffe, or even of St. Peter's Church at Rome, it would be the work of a life-time. It would appear still more incredible to such beings as we have supposed, if they were informed of the discoveries which may be made by this little organ in things far beyond the reach of any other sense: That by means of it we can find our way in the pathless ocean,—that we can traverse the globe of the earth, determine its figure and dimensions, and delineate every region of it;—yea, that we can measure the planetary orbs, and make discoveries in the sphere of the fixed stars. Would it not appear still more astonishing to such beings, if they should be farther informed, that by means of this same organ, we can perceive the tempers and dispositions, the passions and affections of our fellow-creatures, even when they want most to conceal them? That when the tongue is taught most artfully to lie and dissemble, the hypocrisy should appear in the countenance to a discerning eye? And that by this organ we can often perceive what is straight and what is crooked, in the mind as well as in the body? How many mysterious things must a blind man believe if he will give credit to the relation of those that see? Surely he needs as strong a faith as is required of a good Christian."

Even in what may be considered the inferior senses, the marks of design are very evident. Reid observes, "There is a manifest appearance of design in placing the organ of smell in the inside of that canal through which the air is continually passing in inspiration and expiration ;" and, again, when writing of taste, he adds, "it is with manifest propriety that the organ of this sense guards the entrance of the alimentary canal as that of smell the entrance of the canal for respiration." But whether we look to particulars or to generals, to the whole structure, or to the minute organization, the corporeal formation, or the mental powers, every where we perceive the hand of the divine artist. The erect form of man, and his countenance raised towards the heavens, bespeak, at least, what ought to be his character, his authority, and his destiny. The same erect position subserves the purposes of his intellectual nature, "*Prospectationes fiunt a turribus altis*," says Bacon, when he proposed a lofty tower of discovery upon the vantage ground of the first philosophy ; nature has given man such an intellectual elevation in the position of his brain, that lofty sensorium which takes in the surrounding horizon, through the ministry of the senses, both near at hand and from afar.

While the taste gives us notices of all that relates to the support of our animal life, the smell brings these notices from a farther distance, and refines and

exalts what merely relates to the preservation of the body, and unites it by imperceptible gradations with the imagination and the higher faculties of the soul. Even these lower senses, not only prove the existence of the Deity, but his benevolence also ; and not only his benevolence, but his infinite liberality, for these notices all relate to the preservation of our being, and they are accompanied with delight above and beyond their immediate ends, to so great a degree, that, amid the incense of flowers, we are apt to forget the original design, and attend only to the superadded enjoyment, in the profuseness of which, the first intention seems almost to be lost. As taste and smell open up a communication between the material world, and those properties in it which most concern our bodily wants ; so hearing affords us the means of communicating between mind and mind, through the intervention of matter ; and sounds are so associated with thought, that, even when disconnected with mind, they become significant of expression. And even when the cries of all animated beings cease, in the deepest solitude or most deserted wilderness, we still hear the voice of nature in the murmurs of woods, and in the flow of waters, or amid the warfare of the elements.

From the touch we obtain a perception of the material world so vivid, that, amid the many metaphysical tendencies to idealism, with which those

are surrounded who reflect much on the operation of their minds, the touch alone dissipates these illusions, and by its ever present and unyielding forms, inclines us rather to lean to the side of materialism than spirituality. And the hands which contain in them the perfection of touch, contain also in their outward and visible structure such proofs of the divinity, that the philosophy of even Pagan antiquity, on beholding them, could never cease from wonder and praise. "*Quam vero aptas,*" says Cicero, "*quamque multarum artium ministras manus natura homini dedit!*" while the fingers act as the human feelers, giving us at once the most impressive notices of external nature, and the most sure; highly adding to the certainty of man's knowledge, they become to him not only an organ of intelligence, but of power; the instrument of instruments by which he shapes the whole of nature to his use, or subdues it to his commands. While the eyes, at once a natural microscope, and telescope, are placed upon a moveable watch-tower, where they can at once inspect the minute, and comprehend the distant; observe the changes that are passing around us, and yet take a survey of the spacious heavens.

The proofs of a Deity, therefore, from perception alone, are very numerous. We may class them under four heads.

They arise, first, from the arbitrary nature of per-

ception—our perceptions are limited, and limited by intelligent choice,—our senses perceive only what it is useful that they should be informed of, and not what they would necessarily, or even naturally attend to. According to the theory of materialism, it is the changes of the brain of which we are sensible; on the contrary, the immediate act of perception knows nothing of the brain, nor of the nerves. It overleaps all these in the chain of changes, and has its attention at once fixed upon the objects which it is useful for it to know.

Another series of proofs arises from the adaptation of the senses to their proper objects. It is evident, that if the unaided eye had the power of the microscope, or of the telescope, in either case, it would have been less fitted, if not altogether useless, for the actual purposes of life.

A third series of proofs arises from the adaptation of the senses to each other. To take the same illustration: had the eye been similar to the microscope, we should have been in a considerable degree deprived of the largest source of information, acquired vision. The sight would no longer have corresponded to the touch. Berkeley excellently remarks. "A microscope brings us as it were into a new world; it presents us with a new scene of visible objects, quite different from what we behold with the naked eye. But herein consists the most remarkable dif-

ference, to wit, that whereas the objects perceived by the eye alone, have a certain connection with tangible objects whereby we are taught to foresee what will ensue upon the approach or application of distant objects to the parts of our own body, which much conduceth to its preservation; there is not the like connection between things tangible, and those visible objects that are perceived by help of a fine microscope."

A fourth series of proofs arises, as we have shewn, from the adaptation of the general structure of the mind to the senses by which their scattered notices are united, harmonized, and in their varied information, reduced, with the other notions which we acquire through other channels, into one corresponding whole.

While there are so many more obvious proofs of design, and so ably insisted upon in the admirable work of Paley, it is needless to dwell upon those which may appear to partake somewhat of the obscurity of the subject. But it is our highest wisdom, and should be our chief delight, to trace the operation of the Deity in every work of his hands; not to rest the argument upon inferences, which, however demonstrable, are remote from ordinary observation, and foreign to the usual habits of thought; but having the argument already placed on an undoubted basis, and in a demonstrative, though popular form, to point out occasionally, though briefly,

the immense accessions which these arguments might receive, if every field of knowledge were laid under its due contribution.

It is, however, not only the existence of the Deity, but the second great tenet of natural religion, which begins to be apparent in the structure of our powers of perception. As it is obvious, by the current of thought setting outwards, that the mind is intended for action rather than contemplation ; and when contemplative, that it is more readily adapted for external observation than for inward reflection ; so it is equally becoming manifest, that the outward world, though our present scene of trial, and the theatre, in which for a short time, we must act our parts, is only the temporary stage of our early being, and that its decorations are given to it by the mind itself. And as we would judge from seeing the tent of a wandering Arab pitched for a night, with no other fixture than the pole struck into the sands, that it would probably be removed at day-break to fresher wells and greener verdure ; so we may conclude, that the mind, which garnishes the naked extension of matter and its varying movements, with the continuity which thought alone gives, and with the colouring and vividness of its own sensations, will shortly withdraw the shifting imagery which it spreads over the world, and will transfer the colouring from its present perishable canvass to more durable materials.

SECTION SECOND.

MEMORY AND SUGGESTION.

It already appears from the examination of Perception, that the origin of thought is not single, as the materialists or the idealists have maintained; the one deducing it solely from matter—the other from the innate energy of mind, and its simple activity. Neither is it only twofold, from sensation and reflection, as Locke endeavoured to establish, but to those two we must also add a third source—suggestion. Though, perhaps, it would still more correctly express the manner in which these thoughts are sometimes originated, to say that they are implied, rather than suggested, in those acts of the mind which reveal them to us. The different operations of our minds are so complicated, and so blended into each other, that it is difficult to use terms regarding them which are free from objections.

We must also attend to that which is distinguishable and that which is divisible. These, in mental

philosophy, are by no means synonymous. From being unable to analyse the combinations of thought into their last elements, many acts which are complex must still be considered as simple, and remain undistinguished by separate terms, while that which is really inseparable, as, for example, consciousness and thought, it is expedient to distinguish, (as shall afterwards be shewn,) by a separate consideration. It is necessary to notice this, owing to the mistakes of some late metaphysicians.

None of our powers are exerted singly, not even perception. Memory blends with perception, and what may be called, in a wide sense, imagination, with both. Yet we may fairly divide the intellectual powers, first, into perception, as distinguished by a reference to present objects of thought ; and, secondly, into memory, while we indicate, at the same time, the origin of those notions of suggestion, several of which are implied in memory ; and the rest of which may be joined with it, as in their origin and their formation, they have very strong points of mutual resemblance. In the third place, we may naturally treat of the train of thoughts, and of the faculties which modify them ; and, fourthly, of the mental powers which change notions into propositions ; and which, by judgment and reasoning, give to our knowledge its crowning intellectual character.

If man, according to the supposition of Hobbes,

had only one perception, he would be rather stupified than intelligent. If—changing the supposition—a number of various sensations passed rapidly through the mind, without his having the power of recalling any by memory, he would still gaze at a vain shew, though his prospect would be gayer and more diversified than before. This, it is evident, would be an existence even below that of the brutes, an ever-fleeting present, without reference to the past or to the future, like a thunder torrent amid the wilderness of sands, that, without leaving any traces of vegetation, had no other existence but the quick and crowded passage of its waves. Memory is even essential to perception itself, at least to those complex perceptions with which we are most familiar. Tangible and visible magnitudes are discerned by repeated acts, and memory is implied in their being united together, and becoming a whole. Memory, in its largest and most undisputed sense, frees us from the narrow boundary of present objects; and as the eye unites the different portions of the landscape, so memory collects the scattered passages of former existence, and fills up the foreground of the present, with the wide expanse of the past, however diminishing in dimness and distance.

Memory not only restores to us what we formerly knew, but is itself a great inlet of new thoughts. The first act of remembrance is our first intimation

of time, for time is implied necessarily in every act of memory, and thus we owe our knowledge of the power of destruction and change to that faculty, which is ever resisting their influence. Even in the defects and limitations of memory, the hand of the beneficent Creator is manifest. There was more depth in the answer of Themistocles than he was aware of, when asked, if he chose to be instructed in an art of memory, he answered, that he preferred to learn the art of forgetfulness. The art of memory is the art of forgetfulness, and in that we are taught by nature herself. Experience is of the utmost value, but it is only when the chaff is sifted out of it. All our former perceptions crowding back together on the mind, would produce there an inextricable chaos, but a gradual darkness steals over the objects to which we cease to direct our attention, and the fading light of the past is concentrated upon the circumstances upon which we habitually reflect, or in which we continue to take an abiding interest; and even when all seems lost to the view, amid a number of newer and intervening prospects, a sudden gleam, like the evening radiance upon the highest Alps, will suddenly restore, in all their distinctness, each faded outline upon the distant horizon.

In the structure of the organs of sensation, we perceived abundance of evidence for the existence and benevolence of the Deity, and, at the same time,

some foreshadows of the immortality of the soul ; as we proceed, the outlines of natural religion grow more defined. In memory, and in the sudden resuscitations of past existence, we have not only an argument for immortality, but for an immortality of retribution. The great remembrancer of the past is guilt. Time, instead of diminishing remorse in many instances, only augments it, by separating the guilty action from the temptations which induced its committal. It is not when the crime is committed, as Rousseau observes, that all its attendant circumstances appear most distinct to the criminal, but when the hurried glow of evil passions has subsided, and the temptation has been unmasked, and shews all its folly, as well as turpitude, then the crime itself appears in all its distinctness, and the memory of it grows not dimmer, but more vigorous, with the lapse of years.

By the gradual decay of memory, the aged are withdrawn from the world they live in. Their senses becoming blunt, and their impressions of these blunted perceptions gradually decaying, they are weaning from this present scene, and their only view is a retrospect of their past life, previous to the final review of it, in that day of judgment of all the deeds done in the body, which shall take place when the great book of memory and of the past is opened to the assembled world.

Memory, in disclosing the past, necessarily gives rise to the expectation of the future. The present is felt to be a moveable point between two great periods of duration, and the experience which we have acquired from the events of the past, owing to our belief in the continuity of the laws of nature, becomes prophetic of that futurity which is approaching. The mind of man might have been so constructed, for any thing that appears to the contrary, as to have looked to the future as well as to the past. We suppose, indeed, that we understand the mechanism of memory, and that the traces on the brain, and the gradually fading copies of past impressions, account for the gradual decay of memory, and the veil that is slowly let down upon the past.

Locke, who would have banished images, as Plato poets, by his philosophic laws, becomes himself imaginative and metaphorical, when he speaks of the images in the brain. "Ideas in the mind quickly fade, and often vanish quite out of the understanding, leaving no more footsteps or remaining characters of themselves, than shadows do flying over fields of corn ; and the mind is as void of them as if they had never been there." "The memory of some, it is true, is very tenacious, even to a miracle ; but yet there seems to be a constant decay, even of those which are struck deepest, and in minds the most retentive : so that if they be not sometimes renewed

by repeated acts of the senses, or reflection on those kind of objects, which at first occasioned them, the print wears out, and at last there remains nothing to be seen. Thus the ideas, as well as the children of our youth, often die before us, and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching, where, though the brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery moulders away. The pictures drawn in our mind are laid in fading colours, and if not sometimes refreshed, vanish and disappear. How much the constitution of our bodies, and the make of our animal spirits are concerned in this, and whether the temper of the brain makes this difference, that in some it retains the characters drawn on it like marble, in others like free-stone, and in others little better than sand, I shall not here inquire, though it may seem probable, that the constitution of the body does sometimes influence the memory, since we oftentimes find a disease quite strip the mind of all its ideas, and the flames of a fever, in a few days, calcine all those images to dust and confusion, which seem to be as lasting as if graved in marble."

These images are excellent, if taken only as figures; but when they pass for facts, as they often do, they deceive the mind, by the appearance of rendering intelligible that which is beyond our utmost comprehension. The pictures and images of memory are so

natural figures, that we can scarcely speak of remembrance without using them ; and the closeness of the analogy appears to lift the veil in part from the mental process. But it is like the pictured veil which was spread over Isis at Saïs,—the pictures and the images, while they fill the eye and amuse the fancy, contrive to conceal more entirely that which is placed behind them. We imagine that we understand how memory takes place, and that prescience, where a similar process could not be carried on, is impossible ; and yet there are instances where the mind of man seems, according to the old opinion, to have something more prophetic than what may be accounted for by natural foresight, beholding the reflection of futurity in the past, and gaining that gradual acquaintance with the ways of God and of nature by which “ old experience doth attain to something like prophetic strain.”

We may again quote Rousseau, while the book is open before us, for few have lived over their past years with such intense vividness of recollection and enjoyment : “ Le son des cloches qui m’a toujours singulièrement affecté, le chant des oiseaux, la beauté du jour, la douceur du paysage, les maisons eparses et champêtres dans lesquelles je plaçois en idée notre commune demeure, tout cela me frappoit tellement d’une impression vive, tendre, triste, et touchante, que je me vis comme en extase transporté dans cet



heureux temps, et dans cet heureux séjour, où mon cœur, possédant toute la félicité qui pouvoit lui plaire, la goutoit dans des ravissements inexprimables."

"Je ne me souviens pas de m'être élané jamais dans l'avenir avec plus de force et d'illusion que je fis alors ; et, ce qui m'a frappé le plus dans le souvenir, de cette rêverie quand elle s'est réalisée, c'est d'avoir retrouvé des objets tels exactement que je les avois imaginés." The utility of attending to these pretensions to second-sight, is not to suggest the probability, or even possibility, of a new faculty, but we derive this advantage from recording apparent exceptions, that the rules originally laid down are generally too narrow, and when we widen them, to admit the exceptions, we bring them more nearly to approach the standard of truth.

Every thing shews, that man is under a state of probation and trial ; the great law for such a condition of being is expressed in Scripture, "Whosoever hath, unto him shall be given, and whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken even that which he hath." We cannot continue to have and to enjoy, unless we use, and by using we have more abundantly. No faculty more obviously depends than memory upon exercise for its improvement.

There is, indeed, every diversity of degree in the original power, according to the diversity of talents with which the great task-master intrusts those whom

he places under a state of temporary trial ; but to the original diversity of power succeeds an acquired diversity in the kind of memory, which is still more striking.

How powerful, and how retentive is the memory in individuals, in whom it is supposed to be weakest,—in acquired vision, or in the acquisition of the mother tongue. The method of nature, and continual reiteration, have overcome obstacles which would otherwise be thought insurmountable. There are no dunces in this school,—every one learns to use his eyes ; every one, where there is no natural impediment, acquires his native tongue ; here there appears neither difficulty of apprehension, nor yet of retention, and yet how much must be learned, how much must be remembered ! Where the faculty is weakest, its weakness is much the effect of disuse ; whatever we attend to, we commit to memory ; whatever we are much interested in, we retain in memory ; whatever we continually reiterate, is indelibly engraved on the mind.

In extreme old age, the memory, indeed, invariably fails ; but then the day is far spent, and the time of trial is drawing to its close. In earlier life, the memory not only improves, but adapts itself, and takes the turn and colour of our prevailing thoughts and pursuits, and treasures up either words, or facts, or principles, according as the attention is directed to

outward events or inward reflections, to the sayings and writings of others, or to the results of solitary meditation. In this we see another proof of the entireness of the mind's action, and of the mind's responsibility; formed of separate faculties, and furnished with innumerable thoughts, all these are so attracted together as to gravitate to a common centre, and even to tend to complete a perfect system. In this, as in all other cases, we may perceive, what has too little been dwelt^{ed} upon,—the plastic power of the mind.

We proceed to consider more particularly the third great inlet of thought, which, according to the term of Reid, is denominated Suggestion. It is from being ignorant of this great source of knowledge that so many mistakes have arisen. Locke, confining all ideas to those of sensation and reflection, and not being able to find an entrance there for space, duration, power, &c., substituted inadequate representations instead of them, where the concomitant circumstances that attend them, take the place of the principal. Thus, extension with him, disappears, and in its place we find only resistance. If we inquire what is time, he must be driven, as his ultimate answer, to affirm that it is the succession of ideas; and if it is inquired what is power, and what are causes, it must be replied, on his principles, the changes of our ideas; for of these alone are we directly

conscious. Hence the Essay of Locke on the Human Understanding being constructed on too narrow a basis, and endeavouring to forge all our information from too scanty materials, labours under all the evils of imperfect induction, undermines those notions which are entwined with all our knowledge; and though in the hands of Locke it was never pursued to its legitimate conclusions, yet when strictly reasoned on by Hume, opened a door to total scepticism.

For these are the principles on which Hume's scepticism is built—all our ideas are acknowledged to be derived from sensation and consciousness. Sensation itself resolves into consciousness, therefore we have no other knowledge than the impressions of which we are conscious. The legitimate conclusion is, that we cannot go beyond our ideas, and that in the different changes of these we must seek for memory and belief; for space and time; for power and for causation; for the human soul, and for the Godhead itself.

The very simple consideration which overturns this and all other similar systems, is found in their own method of reasoning. The proof that all our knowledge proceeds from sensation and reflection is, the being able to refer all our knowledge to these two sources. Time, space, and causation, are a sufficient refutation of this imperfect induction. Had the mind been constructed as Locke, Hume, or Dr.

Brown conceive, it could have obtained no notion of power, time, or of space. They themselves have so far bewildered their own minds with sophistry, that they no longer distinguish between power, and constant priority; but every one else must be able to distinguish between energy and mere precedency in time. Truth, however, is the best refutation of error, and attending to the process of the mind, we shall see most clearly the mistakes and the omissions of those who have neglected to notice the third source of mental discovery.

The insufficiency of sensation and reflection, when considered as the only two inlets of knowledge, is capable of a double demonstration; the first and more obvious arises from the errors into which those have fallen, who, from Locke down to Hume, have endeavoured to trace all our knowledge to these sources alone. The second proof, but more difficult, because requiring patient reflection, is to examine in what manner the notions of space, time, and power enter the mind. Locke, in endeavouring to trace power to sensation and reflection, could discern no other origin for it than the change of our ideas; but power is not change, it is the cause of change. Why is every change referred to a cause? Neither sensation nor reflection can explain this. Others more generally have endeavoured to resolve causation into the association of ideas,—this is equivalent to resolving the

whole into a part; cause and effect are doubtless associated together, but the mere joining two ideas, however often that junction may be repeated, will never produce a third idea—the idea of power. Much of the difficulty has arisen from not attending to the difference of our notions when in their origin and in their full growth. All the laws of the mind, and all the forms of thought, expand with the enlargement of the intellect itself; in seeking to trace their origin, we shall not find them the same when first rising in the mind, as when they are fully matured and blended with the rest of our notions.

Looking for the origin of the notion of time, for example, we should find nothing exactly the same in the first increments of our thoughts. All our notions expand with the growth of the mind itself, and are receiving continual accessions, as the mind is ever building up the edifice of knowledge. Our notion of eternity bears small resemblance to the first hint of time which we receive as the interval between a present thought and a former remembrance. Yet the manner in which we obtain our notion of time is that which would be least objected to, even by those who make the entrances of knowledge too narrow and few. Time is so necessarily implied in memory, that it might be considered merely as a deduction from that faculty, not requiring any additional inlet into the mind. It therefore forms the proper subject to be-

gin with, and from the origin of time gradually to trace the rise of other notions which are farther removed from the exercise of the mental faculties in which they originate.

Without memory we could have no notion of time—we should live in the present alone ; but as soon as we remember, we have a conception of time and of the past. This diminutive portion of duration, the interval between two thoughts, is the unit which gradually, by addition, grows into minutes, and hours, and ages, until it is stretched out into a period of ages beyond ages, even to eternity itself. The mind itself is our first chronometer, and while both the train of thought which is passing within us is neither accelerated or retarded, and while our attention is kept up in an equable degree to that which is passing in our own minds, we form a pretty correct estimate of the passage also of time.

But every passion, and every great change of thought, and every absorbing interest, distracts our attention, and disturbs our reckoning. We hasten to transfer the measure of time from the succession of thoughts to the succession of events, and substitute for the kindling and disappearing of trains of imagery within us, the rising and the setting of the great luminaries of the heavens. These at once remind us of our mortality and our immortality. God gave them to us “ for signs, and for seasons, and for

days, and for years ;” and while they measure out the brief portions of the ephemeral life of man, they carry us, by their revolutions through the heavens, into those deep and distant tracts of time, when the corruptible body shall long have mouldered into dust, but when the soul shall be only commencing her career of immortality.

Extension is not necessarily implied in our sensations of touch and colour, as duration is in memory, but yet it is so customarily conjoined with them as never by any metaphysical acuteness to be separated. Not only does colour suggest extended matter ; but extension still more intimately implies the existence of space. In the suggestion of extension and space, we have one of the clearest instances of the relative nature of our knowledge. All that we know of extension is its relation to space ;—all that is suggested to us of space has relation to extension. They are two unknown quantities—we know nothing of their absolute, only their relative value. Space and extension, in the first intimation we receive of them, differ as much from the full formed conception of absolute space, and of matter invested with all its properties, real or supposed, as the first interval of time which is suggested to us, differs from our conception of “ round eternity.” Matter and space, it has always been remarked, present peculiar difficulties. One obvious reason of this is the inadequacy

of our notions respecting them. Strip matter of the colouring and continuity which our minds lend to it, and what remains to it but impenetrability ; in other words, it only fills a portion of space, and precludes every other particle of matter from existing in the space which it occupies. All that is intimated to us of space in our original conception of it, is, that it is the place of matter—that unknown expanse in which matter is extended.

Another source of error is, that we build a higher edifice than our narrow foundations will admit. By the plastic power of the mind, we change that which was relative into that which is absolute,—we augment place into space—the receptacle of individual body into that vast ocean without bounds, in which the globes of matter sail, not few indeed, but far between. In doing so, we are borne out by that bent of our faculties, which their Author has given them; but we must bear in mind, that this bent is not a strictly logical, but partly an imaginative process, and intended to extend our thoughts beyond the bounds of what we see of the universe, and to enlarge our notions of its invisible Author. But we pervert this tendency of our thoughts when we draw out these shapings of the mind into subtle sophistries and air-built arguments. We have no data to reason upon; we have only some slender original intimations of relative

existence, enlarged from their minute origin, and swelling out into immensity, by the construction of the mind, which finds no barrier to the continued repetition of its own acts, and which is able to add space to space, without obstacle and without end.

It is a common mistake to say that space is infinite. All that we can affirm is, that it is indefinite. It has a subjective infinity; it is infinite as far as our minds can discover; we can augment it without end, and divide it without end; every division and augmentation leaves our mind as free to repeat the act as it was before. A still greater mistake is to maintain the infinite divisibility of matter, though this doctrine is laid down as a certainty, not only by mathematicians and natural philosophers, who are seldom great metaphysicians, but what is more striking, even by a profound and cautious thinker like Reid himself. He says, "We carry on the division and subdivision in our thought far beyond the reach of our senses, and we can find no end to it: nay, I think we plainly discern that there can be no limit beyond which the division cannot be carried. For if there be any limit to this division, one of the two things must necessarily happen,—either we have come by division to a body which is extended, but has no parts, and is absolutely indivisible; or this body is divisible, but as soon as it is divided it becomes no body. Both these positions seem to me absurd, and

one or other is the necessary consequence of supposing a limit to the divisibility of matter."

In all the pretended demonstrations of the infinite divisibility of matter, it is amusing to observe the double confusion between matter and space, and between subjective and objective division,—between a division carried on in thought and a real division of the particles of matter. We prove that there is no limit to the division of space in our thoughts, and thus most absurdly leap to the conclusion that the atoms of matter may be sliced to infinity. Far from matter being infinitely divisible, it is more than doubtful whether matter be divisible at all. All the changes that take place in nature leave the elementary atoms the same. There is separation, but no division. One atom is not divided into two, but by a superior attraction the force is overcome which holds many of these atoms together in an aggregate body.

It is not only the infinitely little, but the infinitely great of space, which perplexes the soberest and the soundest thinkers. "Sir Isaac Newton," Reid observes, "thought that the Deity, by existing everywhere, and at all times, constitutes time and space, immensity and eternity. This probably suggested to his great friend, Dr. Clarke, what he calls the argument *a priori* for the existence of an immense and eternal Being." In justice to Dr. Clarke, it must be

remarked, that both Reid and Stuart have confounded a portion, and not an essential portion, of his argument, with the whole. Take away Clarke's reveries about space and time, and the argument will suffer no blank, but will gain by the omission.

"These," Reid continues, "are the speculations of men of superior genius. But whether they be as solid as they are sublime, or whether they be the wanderings of imagination, in a region beyond the limits of the human understanding, I am unable to determine." The origin of all these difficulties consists in our notions of space and time being partly drawn from that which exists without us, and independently of our perceiving it; and partly from their being the formation of our own minds; a blending of that which is objective and that which is subjective, which is not confined to this instance, but which runs through the whole texture of our thoughts. Neither space nor time have the characters of absolute infinity; they are limited, modified, and made up of parts. Time indeed has a relation to all events; but space is only connected with matter, and not with mind. None of our mental operations have any relation to extension. The omnipresence of the Deity is very different from what we imagine to be infinite space, and which is indeed indefinite, being subjectively infinite, or infinite as far as we can conceive. But while space is only present to matter,

God is present to every thought,—a presence not limited and bounded, like the dimensions of space, but a presence, one, infinite, and indivisible,—determining and constituting all existence but its own being, which, from its nature, is necessarily absolute and undetermined.

It is the same with time. Reid has greatly mistaken the notion of the Divine and Eternal existence, when he observes, “The schoolmen made eternity to be a *nuncs stans*, that is, a moment of time that stands still. This was to put a spoke into the wheel of time, and might give satisfaction to those who are to be satisfied by words without meaning. But I can as easily believe a circle to be a square, as time to stand still.”

The question, however, is not about time standing still, but about the eternity of the Self Existent. We easily and naturally ascribe to God duration without end, because we can add ages to ages in our own thoughts, without approaching to any term. With more difficulty we ascribe sempiternity, duration without beginning as well as without end, to Him who must always have been, in order that any thing might be. Our reason is convinced, though our imagination finds more difficulty; because, in heaping ages upon ages, to form the notions of a future eternity, it moves in its natural order; but not having the same habit of counting backwards, it attempts

to begin at the beginning of past eternity, and thence involves itself in an obvious absurdity. This is the reason why so many have thought that they could frame a notion of the immortality of the soul, but not of that past eternity which preceded the creation of the world. There is also another reason for this difficulty, which has also a reference to the mistake of Reid. The lapse of time is connected with finite existence. Creation and time take their birth together. The Divine duration is of a higher order, and neither admits of increase or diminution. When we ascribe sempiternity to the Deity, we still ascribe too little. To Him nothing is past and nothing is future. All ages are as present with Him as the moment in which we live. It is therefore with strict propriety and true philosophy, that not only the schoolmen, but the ancient sages, like Plato, and the modern divines, like Watts, have described him in words similar to the latter :

“ He fills His everlasting Now,
And sees our ages waste.”

In the philosophy of the mind, when we attain the true point of view, we obtain also that central point, where diverging opinions may again be most easily re-united. In tracing the origin of our notion of time, from its being originally evolved in the exercise of memory, and appearing only as the interval

between two successive thoughts ; we behold it gradually augmented by the working of the mind itself, till it swells into eternity ; while place, which is a mere co-relative to extension, expands, in like manner, into boundless space. In thus connecting the seminal origin, with the mature development of our notions, we unite the varying shades of opinion that have prevailed among our own less imaginative sects, with the higher notions of transcendental philosophy ; whether considering time or space as the fleeting image of a more real existence, or, with the Germans, as the form under which we perceive what is passing within us and without us. Most of these varying views are necessarily mistaken ; but the mistake originates in a partial view of the actual process of the mind.

The final cause of the mind thus extending its notions of space and time, is evidently to lead it to the belief of an infinite and eternal existence. Space and time in all their amplitude, are no longer realities, but imaginations. They swell from defined existences into boundless shadows ; but they become the shadows of an infinite substance. They are the passage from what is seen, to that which is unseen ; they shew, that all we can discover by the senses, is but the threshold of that magnificent temple of nature where the Divine Presence manifests itself, but to which it cannot be confined. Existing beyond it

the same as in it, with an infinitude of Being to which all created existence makes no additions, nor the endless lapse of ages add aught, or take away.

Connected with our notion of space is the idea of motion, which Stuart strangely supposes to be prior to that of space. But our only idea of motion is a change of place. It is true, we may acquire our first conception of space in consequence of moving, for instance, by the movement of our hands; but till we frame an idea of extension, all that we perceive in muscular movement is the connexion of will and action—the energy of the mind over the body—the effect of which energy we then term movement, when by touch we have acquired the notion of space. Motion being merely change of place, is not the source of any new idea. We become acquainted, indeed, by movement, with moving forces; but this is merely a particular application of the more general law of cause and effect.

Here it may be proper to point out the origin of our notion of number. We cannot exert an act of memory without the notion of identity being suggested to the mind. He who now remembers is the same as he who formerly perceived. Difference is necessarily implied in the notion of sameness and identity; and perhaps it is not sufficiently attended to, that it is not number, but only difference, that we should be acquainted with, were it not for the

exercise of a faculty not yet mentioned, generalization, or the power of classing objects into genera and species. Had we within our ken only one object of each kind, we should be acquainted with difference, but not with number. Each would stand single, having no other being with which it could be paired, unless we were to enumerate them by their common bond of existence, and could thus number them, by joining them together by that alone in which they were agreed.

When we come to natural theology, it may be necessary to shew the difficulties under which the proof for the unity of the Deity labours. Here, however, we have a very short, if not a very simple argument. The Deity stands alone. He is One, in the sense in which unity excludes numbers. Beings that can be classed are evidently created; they have been constituted both so far to differ and so far to agree. Absolute existence can neither have these points of coincidence nor variance. It is as necessarily solitary as it is necessarily existing. "*Nec viget quicquid, simile aut secundum.*" Thus the Jewish and the Christian revelation alone present an object of worship coincident with the highest reason, while the pagans worshipped many deities, and the philosophers acknowledged, without worshipping, that which was one in name, but manifold in reality, the universe. "Hear, O Israel! the Lord thy God is one

Jehovah !" corresponds with the declaration of Christ, " I and the Father are One."

The last source of suggestive ideas that remains to be examined, is the manner in which we obtain the notion of causation. And upon no subject is there a greater variety of opinions—the ancients overrating, and the moderns understating, the exact import of what passes in the mind whenever a change is referred to a cause. If all the varieties of error were noted down, and the arguments upon each side stated and weighed, a notice of this subject might easily swell into a treatise, as the work of Dr. Brown has done. The simplest method is to state, without reference to others, the procedure of the mind, and then to revert to what has misled the generality of metaphysicians upon the subject.

Every change suggests the notion of a cause. To revert to the first instance mentioned in perception. The smell of the rose immediately suggests something outward, which is the cause of that sensation. Here, then, there are not two phenomena to which the theory of Hume and Dr. Brown could apply, (that causation is merely invariable priority), because the mind knows of no change but that which has taken place in itself, and yet, with undoubting certainty, it refers that change to something independent of its own existence as the cause of it.

Every change, therefore, whether accompanied or

unaccompanied by a previous event, suggests the idea of a cause, and from this inlet we have our first notion of power—of energy in the cause sufficient to produce the effects we experience, and of a capacity in the body changed to be thus acted upon. Shut out this inlet, and there remains no other entrance for our notions of cause, and power, and force. All the attempts that are made to supply the omission of this, are only accomplished by substituting concomitant circumstances for the principal process.

Thus, when invariable priority is said to be the same as our notion of power, the mistake is as great as that of confusing space and time, and can only be occasioned by withdrawing the attention from the notion of power, which is essential to causalty, and directing it to the circumstantial of invariable priority.

Stuart supposes that our notions of power are entirely drawn from the mind, and that the causation which we ascribe to inanimate matter is merely a reflection of our own mental experience when we will, and the will is immediately followed by the act. But the instance of the rose, above referred to, is decisive of the contrary; there the power to produce the sensation is ascribed, not to mind, but to matter.

It is true that our first hints of causation, like the first intimation of time and space, are dim and minute. It is the mind which enlarges them, and

chiefly by referring to the laws of causation in general, those processes which take place in our mental operations; for the power we ascribe to material agents is much less vivid, than that which we ascribe to the energy of mind. Had Stuart asserted that we derive our notion of power and causation chiefly from the mind, the observation would have needed no qualification. As the mind lends its colouring to all its perception and all its knowledge, and transfers both its sensations and emotions to material objects, so it transfers its unity and identity to ever changing collections of material atoms, and ascribes the energy which properly belongs to its own spiritual nature to matter, which can only act by being first acted upon.

Hence we have the origin of the various values and significations assigned to causation. The mind at first personified causes. Wherever there is motion there is soul, is laid down by the first philosopher of Greece, Thales, as a received axiom, prior to philosophy itself.

The personification of causes was elder than philosophy. It was the origin of mythology; for what is paganism but the personification of the powers of nature? When all these powers were traced by philosophy to one power, and when those souls, as Thales described them, which actuated the subordinate portions of the universe, were reabsorbed into

the soul of the world, then secondary causes lost their importance when the first Great Cause began chiefly to be considered. Still even then, in the philosophy of Pythagoras and of Plato, they only lost half their divinity—they were still personified and partially deified, while they were considered as integrant parts of the Divine Spirit, the furniture of the Divine understanding, the models according to which he shaped the world, and of which the forms which we behold are only transitory and imperfect copies.

But it was the fate of causes to be continually sinking in importance. The high, heavenly, and immortal ideas of Plato, became the forms of Aristotle, of which it was doubted whether they could have any existence apart from the matter with which they were conjoined. The forms of Aristotle gradually died away along with the influence of his philosophy, and all that remained to causes, of what they had borrowed from the mind and imagination, was the energy with which they were believed to operate, and the necessary link with which (it was supposed to be obvious to every understanding that) effects were bound to their causes.

Berkeley brought them down still lower, and saw in causation less the operation of power than the intimations of signs; and reduced causes, from being the deities of the ancient world, to be merely omens and forewarnings of that which is about to follow.

It is, perhaps, best to refer to a note [C] the imperfect induction by which so many metaphysical writers have, in the case of causation, as in that of time, space, identity, and duration, overlooked the third source of our knowledge—suggestion; and simply to state both the process of the mind and the errors which have originated from it. Could we, like Adam first awakening into life, behold all nature at rest, with the exception of one body in motion, we should attribute that movement to a cause or moving force; and seeing every thing else at rest, should attribute that force to the moving body itself. We should act upon the maxim of Thales—wherever there is motion there is soul; in this case there are no two ideas to associate—no constant conjunction—no invariable priority; but when our thoughts are once awakened, and our desires active, the changes that take place in our own minds are so much more intimate and vivid, and the way in which the will acts upon our mental and our bodily frame so continual, and so ever-present with us, that our notions of causation are in the end chiefly drawn from our mental phenomena. Hence the too great stress that is laid upon causation by elder philosophy, and hence those notions of causes into which metaphor and imagination so largely enter. At last, according to the usual process, in revenge for having believed too much, we are inclined to believe too little. Partial and im-

perfect induction, in the ordinary course of things, succeeds to rash theory and extravagant assumption. The sources of thought are examined, and examined imperfectly—old errors are found to have no basis, and are discarded, and the misfortune is, that the whole truth is not discovered, and it accordingly shares the same fate with error—it is rejected along with it.

Locke assigns sensation and reflection as the only origin of our ideas. Why? Simply on the ground that he imagined he could trace all our ideas to these two inlets. Here was imperfect induction. Hume reverses this reasoning, and discards causation, because it could not be derived from sensation and reflection. Here was rash assumption. The true conclusion is, that causation, not being derived from sensation and reflection, there must be some third inlet by which we receive information, even upon Locke's own principles of reasoning.

It is obvious that causation has been the subject of much mistake and of many errors; it is a principle which is evidently of ruling force in the mind—it is the moving spring that sets our thoughts in action, and which, if neglected, is in either way the cause of many hurtful departures from the truth. If it has done much evil, it is also the source of all knowledge—if it led to a false religion, and thence to imaginary philosophy, it is the basis on which

both religion and philosophy are founded. Hence the importance of strictly tracing its origin and its growth, since the denial of this principle is in a great measure the stronghold of the scepticism of Hume; as the exaggeration of it was the origin of superstition and of hypothesis. On the other hand, the legitimate process by which the mind ascends from the original intimation, of every change being referred to a cause, leads first to the heights of philosophy and then to the sublimities of religion. That golden chain of causes and effects unites the earth and the heavens, and connects the least change which is occurring around us, with that Eternal Power and Godhead, to which our thoughts are gradually led by this principle, when according to it, we judge, in the language of the Apostle, "that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear."

After pointing out a third source of our knowledge, it seems necessary to shew that a fourth origin, on which Reid insists much, and in which Stuart and Turgot partially agree with him, is imaginary. Dr. Reid maintains that our belief in the continuance of the laws of nature, "is an original principle of our constitution, which does not admit of any explanation, and which, therefore, is to be ranked among those general and ultimate facts, beyond which philosophy is unable to proceed." This is Stuart's state-

ment of Reid's doctrine, and in this he also agrees; while in another volume, Stuart considers that Turgot's resolving "our belief of the existence of the material world into our belief of the continuance of the laws of nature," was an improvement upon the views of Reid. We may also note here a very strange observation of Mr. Stuart's,—“It has always appeared to me that something of this sort was necessary to complete Dr. Reid's speculations on the Berkeleian controversy; for although he has shewn our notions concerning the primary qualities of bodies to be connected, by an original law of our constitution, with the sensations which they excite in our minds, he has taken no notice of the grounds of our belief, that these qualities have an existence independent of our perceptions.”

Had such an assertion been met with in the works of an anonymous writer, we might have concluded that he had never seen Reid's *Inquiry on Perception*. Reid sufficiently shews that every perception is attended with the belief of existence independent of the mind; indeed so vivid is this belief, that it forms the chief difficulty with regard to perception. All our sensations being thrown outwards, and indissolubly connected, not only with the primary qualities of matter, but also with its secondary qualities—the unknown, but firmly believed in, causes of our sensations.

Now, the independence, or objectiveness of the material world, can rest upon no stronger ground than this—that imperious belief which is in-wrought by the hand of nature throughout the whole structure of our frame. But the question, we have more immediately in view, is not concerning the independence of the material world alone, but the permanence of its existence, and the uniformity of its course. That Reid, Stuart, and Turgot, have, in this case, been mistaken, in proposing such an original law of thought, as a belief in the continuance of the laws of nature, will easily appear. That can never be an original proposition which consists of slowly acquired terms. Had we an innate idea of nature, of laws, or of permanence, then we might have such an ultimate and instinctive principle; but since the notion of nature is very gradually acquired, and since the term laws is metaphorical, the absurdity of our forming a conclusion, while we are yet unfurnished with the premises, will be abundantly apparent. Should it be said, that this law of thought remains dormant till we become acquainted with the meaning of nature, and of laws, though this supposition is sufficiently absurd of itself, it may be farther observed, that our belief of this permanence of the laws of nature, is certain and uniform; but no certain conclusion can be attached to variable terms, such as the very complex and fluctuating notions of nature and her laws.

Unless we had within us a model of what nature is, and what her laws are, and also whether continuance is to be understood in an absolute, or qualified sense, it would be impossible to arrive with any certainty at the conclusion, which is thus made the foundation of our belief, and of reasoning. The truth is, here is a confusion between acquiescence and belief. To acquiesce in the regularity of nature, is one of our earliest habits, but to believe in the permanence of the laws of nature, is one of the ripest acts of the understanding. The process from childhood does not seem to be well understood,—the child receives all things, according to the philosophic expression of Wordsworth, in “a wise passiveness.” It has no doubts, and therefore can have no belief. The permanence of the laws of nature mould the thoughts of the child to their own continual recurrence ; what is still more, the structure of his own frame corresponds and fits in with the laws of external nature. Not only are all his thoughts moulded, for example, to the succession of day and night, but the structure both of his body and his mind fit him for the alternate change of light and darkness, of activity and of repose. The moment that any doubt should occur to him,—which can only be after his reason is exercised, and his thoughts have taken a free range,—that moment they would be repelled by a principle already familiar to him, not indeed in words, but implied in

our earliest reasonings, the principle to which Leibnitz has given the name of sufficient reason. This is not an original principle itself, but is merely the logical form of that original principle which we have already pointed out, that every change refers to a cause. Where no adequate cause has operated, no change can have taken place. The course of nature must continue till the power which gave it that course, changes its direction. There can therefore be no reasonable doubt as to the permanency of the laws of nature, except in those cases where the interposition of God can be reasonably expected. Thus, then, we need not multiply original principles without necessity, but may rest our belief in the continuance of the laws of nature upon that fundamental belief, that every event has a cause.

The instinctive principles of belief laid down by Reid and Stuart, would, in general, be found open to the same objections; they are merely innate ideas in a disguised form. As the terms of which these original propositions are composed, imply many previous exercises of thought, they involve in themselves an absurdity, they imply thinking previous to thought. To take an example,—belief in testimony is considered an original principle of nature operating in children. Is it possible to believe, that children have already framed a complex notion equivalent to what is implied in the term testimony, not to mention the

error in which they would be involved by a general and instinctive rule which is yet so liable to exceptions? The process of nature is much wiser and simpler,—children acquiesce in testimony,—they receive what is told them simply and passively. At first they pass no sentence upon its truth or falsehood, and it is only from being deceived that they begin to distrust. But it is here as in the case with the laws of nature ; the exceptions in general are too rare to disturb that “ wise passiveness ” of which the poet speaks. When they begin to reason, it will be time enough for them to separate the false information that they may have received from the true. In both cases, they perceive that a sufficient reason is required for departure—from uniformity, on the part of nature—from truth, on the side of testimony. But to believe in what is said to us, requires no new principle—words excite thoughts, thoughts pass through the mind unchallenged and unexamined, the thoughts of others excite the same emotions in us ; our own mind responds to another mind, like the strings of instruments in unison, and it is sufficient that men naturally speak the truth, and, indeed, necessarily do so, where they are neither deceived, nor have any inclination to deceive, to render the sympathetic acquiescence we give to testimony available for every useful purpose, without any peculiar instinct or ori-

ginal principle, appropriated to that specific act of the mind.

These, however, as well as the other principles laid down by Reid and Stuart, if not original, may at least be called fundamental ; nor does our method of acquiring them much signify, except in a treatise upon the mind. The continuance of the laws of nature is the foundation both of action and of philosophy ; while even with this we should act to little purpose unless we joined to it belief in testimony, that natural faith, which has the same relation to this life which Scriptural faith, or belief in the divine testimony, has with respect to the world to come.

SECTION THIRD.

THE TRAIN OF THOUGHT AND THE MENTAL
FACULTIES.

THE law of continuity which pervades nature, is exemplified in the mind by the continued series of thoughts.

An equal difficulty would seem to occur, whether the train of thought were interrupted, or went on without a break. If it ceased, it might be supposed, that the mind would return to its former dormant state; it could not voluntarily begin again to think without some present object of thought. On the other hand, if the train of thought was continuous, then its activity, determined to a particular train, would appear to preclude its freedom and volition, the movements of the mind perpetuating their own impulse, and superseding any new force impressed upon their direction. But the law which the succession of thought observes, obviates every difficulty; and while the activity of the mind is continuous,

free scope is given for its self-regulating power, so to govern all the movements of the mind as to enable reason, though it cannot stop the action of the mind, yet gradually to fashion it, and to hold it under due control.

The wisdom of the Creator is manifest in the structure by which the mind retains all the former thoughts, which it may afterwards require, in an order that is ever variable, yet ever constant, and that ever adapts itself to the wants of the mind. No magazine, in which all the productions of art were stored ; no museum, with all the diversified productions of nature, are in any degree to be compared to the repository of the mind itself, in which are stored, not only the various objects of external nature, but the endless combinations which the mind forms out of the intimations of the senses ; and these, not only sorted and arranged in their distinct compartments, but these compartments changing their places, and while they offer themselves spontaneously, assuming a new order, as well as enlarging their contents, according to the need, the disposition, and the pursuits of the mind, which treasures up its acquisitions within their ample and ever enlarging receptacles.

The association of ideas depends upon three particulars, first, similitude or contrast ; secondly, contiguity in time and place ; and, thirdly, upon causation ;

the third forming the basis of philosophy—the second of history—and the first of those more free and pleasing alliances which occur in common life, in wit, in eloquence, in poetry; and which, indeed, furnish materials for philosophy itself, by furnishing that which constitutes classification, and the distribution of genera and species, all which are founded on similitude and difference. But, as Reid remarks, any relation may form the bond of association, so that every specific enumeration, however useful it may be, falls short of wide reality. The thoughts, we have most occasion for, are those which interest us most strongly, or for which we have most frequent use; and so admirably is the law of association fitted, by the framer of the mind, to our needs, that these are exactly the conditions upon which the order of thought proceeds. Strength of association depending either upon strong emotion, or continual reiteration.

The benevolence of our Divine Author is equally conspicuous in that which is voluntary, and that which is involuntary, in the succession of our thoughts. We cannot arrest the current of thinking; ideas fleet over the mind while the pulse continues to beat, but if we cannot arrest the torrent, we can retard it, and at length succeed in giving it a different channel. Thoughts are ever presenting themselves to the mind, whether we will or not; but, in general,

they do not so deeply affect us, but that we can choose what degree of attention we will give to each. We cannot diminish the crowd, but we can select from among them whichever we choose to place on the foreground, and by that selection, give rise to a new train of images, and thus, though the thoroughfare of the mind is always crowded, we can make room for a new assemblage of attendants.

It is a painful effort, and contrary to the bent of our minds, but by severe attention and reflection, we can greatly retard the usual rapidity of our thoughts ; and, on the other hand, by withdrawing our attention from any chain of ideas, we continually accelerate the fleetness of their passage, and their rapid evanescence, till they leave no trace in the memory—till we are only sensible that they must have been present to the mind, by the new turn which our thoughts have taken, and by the conclusions at which we have arrived.

The moral and probationary state of man is strongly exemplified by the law which the association of ideas obey. These associations, which at first are obedient to the conditions of thought imposed upon mankind in general, begin more and more to take the hue of personal character,—they are marked with the singularity and impress of each peculiar individual,—they are moulded to suit professional habits of thought, and they are regulated by virtue, or

disturbed by uncontrolled passion. The raw materials are furnished to every mind, but each constructs his own edifice,—a hovel or a palace. Association has been compared to gravitation; each is the binding principle in the separate worlds of matter and of mind. The resemblance is striking, but still more so is the difference,—the force of gravitation is uniform, that of association ever varying. At first a natural law, at last it is almost transformed into a moral principle; as the man is, such is the train of his thoughts. To read at once the history and the destiny of an individual, we need only behold the acquired association of his ideas. He needs no other oracle than the manner in which the images of his mind are grouped together; and in the characters which are engraven on his mental tablet, he carries within him the hand-writing of his doom.

In enumerating the different powers of the mind, the great difficulty is to lay down the criterion by which to establish them as distinct faculties. The writers of the mind speak currently of the difference of these powers, but neither definitely ascertain their number, nor fix their boundaries. With respect to perception and memory the case is clear,—they are determined by the past or present objects by which they have been exercised; but the operations of the mind upon its own thoughts melt into such insensible gradations, that we rather distinguish the differ-

ent shades of its action, than are able to divide its operations by any certain rule.

Consciousness we may consider the first power of the mind. It has been frequently objected, since the mind cannot think without consciousness, that Reid, by using this term, has made an imaginary division, serving rather to perplex than to be of any use. But though we cannot divide consciousness from thought, we may distinguish it; and the objectors have not sufficiently attended to the difference between dividing and distinguishing.

In the mind there are many things divisible which we cannot distinguish separately,—so entirely has that which is complex become simple to our apprehension—instances of which we observed in the case of our sensations, which, though never analysed, must obviously consist of several elements, because they are capable of being classified. Again, we are capable of distinguishing what cannot be divided, as in the case of consciousness and thought.

The only question which remains is, whether this distinction is useful; and to question whether it is so, shews small acquaintance with the difficulties of our mental phenomena. Our consciousness is wonderfully adapted to our needs, and varies in its laws exceedingly from what we might previously have expected. We are conscious without being conscious; unless attention is mixed with consciousness,

the train of thought passes through the mind without leaving a trace behind. We are thus at the same time entirely forgetful, and intimately conscious of that multitude of thoughts, which appear and disappear, when they are not arrested, with a greater rapidity than that of the glances of lightning. If the distinction implied in the term consciousness had not been made, this peculiarity might have escaped Reid and Stuart, as much as it has done the writers who objected to them for using the term, and who thought consciousness undeserving of separate consideration. The finest observations of Stuart upon the mind, had he been of the same opinion, would never have been conceived or written—his remarks upon the continued acceleration of thought, when not attended to and reflected upon, and his very philosophical explanation of the power of habit.

Those thoughts of which we are merely conscious, without attending to them, we do not remember,—it requires attention as well as consciousness, or that state of the mind which is properly denominated reflexion, to engrave our past thoughts on the memory. The design of providence in this is well expressed by Stuart, “The great use of attention and memory is to enable us to treasure up the results of our experience and reflexion, for the future regulation of our conduct, and it would have answered no purpose for the author of our nature to have extended their pro-

vince to those intervals of time which we have no occasion to estimate in the common business of life. All the intellectual processes I have mentioned are subservient to some particular end, either of perception or of action ; and it would have been perfectly superfluous, if, after this end were gained, the steps which were instrumental in bringing it about were all treasured up in the memory ; such a constitution of our nature would have had no other effect but to store the mind with a variety of useless particulars." Hence those instantaneous judgments on subjects on which we are accustomed to reflect, and the equally wonderful expertness attained in operations which are continually performed. Upon this principle depend the arts of life, and much of the structure of society,—for it is upon this principle that the division of labour proceeds, and that political economy is founded.

Equal objections have been made to the stress which Reid and Stuart have laid upon conception—as a distinct power of the mind—and perhaps with more reason. "Conception," says Stuart, "is often confounded with other powers ; when a painter makes a picture of a friend who is absent or dead, he is commonly said to paint from memory,—and the expression is sufficiently correct for common conversation,—but in an analysis of the mind there is ground for a distinction. The power of conception enables him to make the features of his friend an object of

thought, so as to copy the resemblance ; the power of memory recognises these features as a former object of perception." We should be apt to consider the expression, to paint from memory, sufficiently correct for philosophy itself. Mr. Stuart adds, " Every act of memory includes an idea of the past, —conception implies no idea of time whatever." Now, it is in the painter's power either to transfer to the canvas features in the same state in which he beheld them, or to paint them without reference to any individual recollection ; in the first case, he certainly paints from memory, and in no inconsiderable degree from recollection, in the latter case too ; these niceties, however, are but verbal trifling, and such affected precision of terms would throw no light upon the structure of the mind, and give no additional strength or security to our reasonings concerning our mental operations.

A more important mistake of Mr. Stuart, consists in his attributing belief to every act of conception. He very strangely asserts, " when a painter conceives the face and figure of an absent friend, in order to draw his picture, he believes for the moment that his friend is before him." If it were so, we could only conclude, according to Dryden's line,

" Sure ' painting ' is to madness near allied ;"

but few painters will be inclined to subscribe to such

a confession. His argument for so startling an assumption is as follows : “ It is a common, I believe I may say a universal, doctrine among logicians, that conception (or imagination, which is often used as synonymous with it,) is attended with no belief of the existence of its object.” “ It is with great diffidence that I presume to call in question a principle which has been so generally received, yet there are several circumstances which lead me to doubt of it. If it were a specifical distinction between perception and imagination, that the former is always attended with belief, and the latter with none ; then, the more lively our imagination were of any object, and the more completely that object occupied the attention, the less would we be apt to believe its existence ; for it is reasonable to think, that when any of our powers is employed separately from the rest, and there is nothing to withdraw the attention from it, the laws which regulate its operation will be most obvious to our observation, and will be most completely discriminated from those which are characteristic of the other powers of the mind,—so very different, however, is the fact, that it is matter of common remark, that when imagination is very lively, we are apt to ascribe to its objects a real existence, as in the case of dreaming or of madness, and we may add, in the case of those who, in spite of their own general belief of the absurdity of the vulgar stories of ap-

paritions, dare not trust themselves alone with their own imaginations in the dark. That imagination is in these instances attended with belief, we have all the evidence that the nature of the thing admits of; for we feel and act in the same manner as we should do, if we believed that the objects of our attention were real; which is the only proof that metaphysicians produce, or can produce, of the belief which accompanies perception."

We have quoted this at length, as it starts difficulties which do not seem as yet sufficiently solved, and which, at all events, lead us to consider some of the more complicated movements of the mind. The first fallacy appears to be, the supposition that any of our powers can be employed separately from the rest. Imagination must always awaken emotion. We might, however, imagine golden palaces, and enchanted gardens without end, without even a momentary belief in their existence, as long as our sanity continued. But, when imagination stirs up deep feeling, the emotion is real, though the object be imaginary. The effect cannot be doubted, though we may mistake the cause.

In what way a train of emotions becomes attended with belief, is well marked in the case of Rousseau, as quoted by Stuart himself from Madame de Staël. "A word, a gesture, furnished him with matter of profound meditation: He connected the

most trifling circumstances like so many mathematical propositions, and conceived his conclusions to be supported by the evidence of demonstration." His imaginations were based upon some fact, though a fact misinterpreted, and the morbid excess of his feelings, prevented his judgment from dissipating the illusion. Had those imaginations passed through his mind without awakening emotion—or had there not been some fact, however insignificant, from which they started, to proceed upon—these imaginations would have been no more attended with belief, than the summer clouds, even if they had assumed that shape, would, for an instant, have been mistaken for castles in the air.

It is absurd to suppose, that nature has given a peculiar organization to the mind, in order that it may believe for a moment, what it must disbelieve ever afterwards. But trains of imagination are so far believed, as they possess a subjective reality, and as they are attended with deep and powerful emotions, which are sufficiently real to cause extreme happiness or misery to a creature constituted like man.

With respect to dreams, in addition to what we have stated of trains of imagination, they are often connected with peculiar states of the body, as Reid, after he had received an injury on the head, dreamt that he was scalped by the American Indians.

Such dreams have a double reality—they have the subjective reality of emotion, and the objective reality from bodily sensations. Our believing in them, is, therefore, no argument for believing in the existence of those trains of thought which are pure imaginations. It may be added too, that as soon as the dreamer questions whether what is passing in his mind be a dream or not, he decides in the affirmative, and the illusion is at an end.

In all these cases, whatever reality is attributed to the imaginary shapings of the mind, is an instinctive apprehension, not a rational conclusion of our reasoning powers, which alone, philosophically speaking, is to be termed belief; for the moment that, in these cases, we begin to reason, we cease to believe. The same may be said of madness as of dreams—the illusions of insanity, consisting both in the over vehemence of the emotions of the mind, and in the morbid sensitiveness of the body, disordering the understanding by false perceptions.

With respect to what are called apparitions, there is a third source of our belief in their reality. It is not only imagination, in many instances, but perception also, which is concerned in their appearance. Many may, with philosophic truth, along with Coleridge, affirm, that they have frequently beheld apparitions; since, according to Wolfe's very just maxim, "into every act of perception, imagination flows."

We are said to perceive, both what we perceive and what we imagine; not only the smell, the colour, and the figure, which are distinct and separate perceptions, but that complex body which is shaped out of all these perceptions by the mind and the imagination.

Apparitions appear most in dim and doubtful light—they are actual shadows, or outlines, which the mind fills up according to its fancy, and accommodates their shape to its fears, or its preconceptions. But, as in perception, one outward reality gives an outward and real excitement to the sensations of the mind, and to the shapings of the imagination: so, in apparitions, the mind attributes outwardness and reality, both to the little which it actually perceives, and to the filling up which the imagination bestows.

From all these considerations, we may safely conclude, that mere imagination is not attended with belief; but, that both in appearances and in opinions, the mind can give its credence to many figments, when they are attended by one reality. Many fallacies may lurk behind a single fact; as Mahomet, under the shadow of one great truth,—“there is no God but God,”—contrived to shelter and to introduce an infinity of error.

Conception passes, by insensible gradations, into imagination. Conception being that power by which

we can represent to ourselves our former thoughts, without reference to time and circumstance; and imagination being that power, by which we not only recall our thoughts, but modify and combine them, and reproduce them with a vividness and distinction, that scarcely belonged to them when we received them in their first freshness immediately from the senses. The dividing the soul into various faculties, and giving names to every power, real or supposed; though it is attended with its conveniences, and though, without this, we should neither be able to speak nor to dispute concerning metaphysics, yet is apt to give us a false view of the mode of operation of the mind. In perception, for example, all the powers of the mind are exercised; the impressions come to us single, and in succession; but, by the aid of memory, we gather them together, and, by the aid of imagination, we blend them into a whole. We also unite an analysis with our synthesis; for, while we collect every perception together, respecting each external object, and at the same time individualize it, we carry on a degree of abstraction, which separates the less important from the characteristic qualities of the object, and by the power of generalization, and by the medium of language, assigns it to that class of beings to which we suppose it naturally to belong.

Imagination, in its widest sense, would include the

constructive faculty ; or, if we prefer the term, the plastic power of the mind. But, in general, it is best to restrict imagination to the voluntary energies that the soul exerts, in building new edifices out of the materials with which it is already furnished ; and to employ some other term, such as that of construction, to denote the involuntary, spontaneous, and incessant activity, with which the mind is reducing into shape, and arranging according to a method of its own, the information which it is ever receiving, from whatever source it may be derived.

By this latter faculty of construction, all men are “makers” and poets ; colouring and animating the world without them—rearing up piles of ideas upon ideas, and disposing and varying the ever shifting scenery of their thoughts. But, as all have the same faculty, and perform the same work unconsciously, no merit or distinction is attached to that which is the silent growth of the mind, which awakens no emotions, and of which only the absence would be remarkable. It is, therefore, to voluntary construction, or imagination, that the attention is chiefly directed, which, setting out from the acquisitions obtained by the secret plastic power of the soul, proceeds to new creations, lays the foundations of the fine arts, enters upon the career of philosophic discovery, and brings us to the verge of the invisible world ; and all the while, is as different in its degree in different

men, as involuntary imagination is every where uniform.

The design of the Creator in endowing us with this faculty is finely sketched out by Bacon, if we apply to it, what he has said of its daughter Poetry, and which we may, with no less justice, transfer to Imagination itself. "The use of this feigned history hath been to give some shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man, in those points wherein the nature of things doth deny it, the world being in proportion inferior to the soul. By reason whereof, there is agreeable to the spirit of man a more ample greatness, a more exact goodness, and a more absolute variety than can be found in the nature of things. Therefore, because the acts or events of true history have not that magnitude which satisfieth the mind of man, Poesy feigneth acts and events greater and more heroical; because true history propoundeth successes and issues of actions not so agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice, therefore Poesy feigns them more just in retribution, and more according to revealed Providence; because true history representeth actions and events more ordinary, and less interchanged, therefore Poesy endueth them with more rareness, and more unexpected and alternative variations; so as it appeareth that Poesy serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality, and delectation. And therefore

it was even thought to have some participation of divineness, because it doth raise and erect the mind, by submitting the shews of things to the desires of the mind ; whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of things. And we see by these insinuations and incongruities, that man's nature and pleasure join also with the agreement and consort it hath with music. It hath had access and estimation in rude times and barbarous regions, when other learning stood excluded." It is thus that imagination has been the great civilizer of mankind. It has reflected indeed earthly events and human passions, but always with less grossness than their reality, and with more heavenly hues. Thus the ideal has always gone side by side with the real,—softening, amending, exalting ; throwing a veil over what it could not change, and keeping alive ceaseless aspirations, if it often fell short of attainments. But if it was well for each generation to be attracted to a higher vantage ground than that upon which it stood, posterity are often deceived, on the other hand, in mistaking the aim for the attainment, and the aspirations of poetry for the progressions of history. Sismondi has given an excellent instance of this when he points out the confusion between chivalry and feudalism,—the last the actual condition of the middle ages ; the former, that state which existed in

imagination, in poetry, and in the loftier aspirations of the mind, but whose brilliant territories are chiefly beyond the confines of our nether world.

Imagination is eminently fitted to the nature of man as a progressive being. He requires its wings to lift him up from where he is grovelling upon the earth. Its domain forms the boundary between sense and faith, and we must first pass through its portal, before we can gain even a distant view of the regions of endless hope and immortality. All the improvements that have ever been effected in the world, necessarily had first their place in imagination. It is the nursery in which heavenly fruits must be acclimated, before they can be transplanted to our daily world. Every discovery of science has had its first gleam there, before it settled into a steady radiance, and became fixed as one of the lights of heaven. The world of imagination has a double horizon. It affords an ever-widening prospect of progress and improvement upon earth, while, in its loftier expanse, it discloses to us the worlds upon worlds on high, infinite in number, and endless in duration; where the individual soul shall attain that perfection above, which the short-lived generations of mortals below are ever pursuing, and ever slowly approaching, but which they can never attain.

In most writers who enumerate the powers of the mind, there is, perhaps, a want of simplicity, and an

undue retaining of scholastic and unnecessary distinctions. But the greatest oversight of all, (and with regard to this there is no exception,) is the nearly entire omission of the constructive process of the mind, and the consequent difficulties that arise respecting abstraction. Now, it is construction that is the remarkable process—abstraction is merely a partial untying of that knot which the mind has complicated for itself. All our perceptions and sensations, all our notions of suggestion, and the reflections of our own thoughts, enter the mind singly; and if abstraction could arrive at that limit, which, however, it can scarcely ever hope to reach, of restoring them to their primitive simplicity, and unmixed individuality, all that it would effect would be merely to reach the point from which the mind originally set out. If there were no faculty, like construction, which united, there would be no need of abstraction to disunite. It is the not perceiving this which has raised so many unprofitable disputes concerning the formation of general ideas; and the differences of the absurd sects of the Nominalists, Realists, and Conceptualists; and all the varieties of opinion relative to general terms, and the formation of universal ideas. But all this points out the process of construction as the more remarkable and important, whose work is at once so silent and so effectual, that the mind builds up for itself in the period of infancy

what many generations of metaphysicians cannot unbuild; and gives, by the tenacity of its composition, that firmness to the fabric of the mind which the cement of the ancients conferred upon their works; so that, after so many centuries of dilapidation, it is more difficult to pull down the Roman walls than it was to rear them up.

Abstraction, were it necessary, might be discriminated into three shades of mental operation: analysis, by which we resolve a complex thought into its component parts; simple abstraction, when, without proceeding so far as analysis, we abstract the attention from a portion of the complex idea, by leaving that portion in the shade; and generalization, where, besides abstraction, we classify objects by assimilating and collecting together all that agree in a certain number of qualities.

The reason for remarking upon this distinction is the degree of vagueness among metaphysical writers, amounting, in some cases, to a difference of opinion, and this upon a subject where it is not worth while to dispute. "Had we never," says Stuart, "seen but one rose, we might have been able to attend to its colour, without thinking of its other properties. This has led some philosophers to suppose, that another faculty besides abstraction, to which they have given the name of generalization, is necessary to account for the formation of genera and species; and they

have endeavoured to shew, that although generalization without abstraction is impossible, yet that we might have been so formed as to be able to abstract, without being capable of generalizing. The grounds of this opinion it is not necessary for me to examine for any of the purposes which I have at present in view."

This is a specimen of the manner in which Stuart often waives the discussion of a question which is already decided. Thus, in the instance which he himself has here given: if we had seen but one rose we are capable of abstraction, but in order to generalize we must have seen at least two; therefore generalization is something more than abstraction, if we adhere to a strict use of the term.

A degree of artificial importance is given to similar difficulties by the use of the term faculty, when, if the term power were used, the question would be easily decided. And this is obviously all that we know of the powers and faculties of the mind,—that the mind has such and such powers over its thoughts.

The power which the mind possesses over its own complex ideas may be exemplified and discriminated in the instance of the rose. If we *analyse* our perceptions of the rose, we reduce them to their original component parts, and separate the notices we derive from sight, from smell, and from touch; and distin-

guish the notices of acquired vision from those of original sight. If we merely *abstract*, we attend to one quality rather than to another—to the smell rather than to the colour, or to the colour and not to the smell; but if we *generalize*, we must attend, not to one individual only, but to a number of roses—abstract our attention from the circumstances in which they differ, and direct it to those in which they agree, and group them as a common family under a general name.

Stuart observes, “It was a maxim of Turgot’s, that some of our most abstract and general notions are among the earliest which we form. What meaning he annexed to this maxim we are not informed.” If the constructive process of the mind were sufficiently attended to, both the meaning and the proof of this assertion might be sufficiently obvious. What are called abstract ideas, are merely the simple and original ideas of our childhood, and our original perceptions, which we are endeavouring to regain in their simplicity, by endeavouring to abstract our attention from those complicated adjuncts which the plastic power of the mind is ever uniting with them. Thus Turgot, whose views of the mind were far beyond his age and country, considered it with a penetrating, if not a steady light. “Nos premières idées sont très générales, puisque ne voyant d’abord qu’un

petit nombre de qualités, notre idée renferme tous les êtres auxquels ces qualités sont communes.”

Hence children form genera with more facility than species, being sooner struck with resemblances than differences. We have observed an intelligent infant immediately class two of a kind, but with considerable pains marking out the difference between them. His eyes were turning again from one object to the other, and that which was strange to him at first, appearing still stranger upon reflection.

Hume, we believe, for we cannot now revert to the passage, has questioned why the notions formed by the mind are not innumerable ; as it appeared to him that there were no decided limits to the action of the mind in producing them. But the explanation of this difficulty is obvious. Individual objects are innumerable ; that is, the mind cannot number them, and it is to avoid the consequent confusion occasioned by their numbers, that, by the bounty of the Author of our frame, we thus escape, by generalizing, even in earliest childhood, from the inextricable maze in which we should otherwise wander ; and, instead of having so many individuals crowding on our recollection, are able at once to reduce them under a single head and class. The very purpose, therefore, for which we generalize, prevents either genera or general notions from becoming excessively numerous ; for

general notions are limited, first, from utility, secondly, from subjectivity, and thirdly, from objectivity. We do not form many more general notions than we actually want, either for the purposes of life, or for the real or imaginary requirements of our reasoning faculties. If we did, the very disusing them is sufficient to make us forget them; like other superfluous furniture of the mind, they would be withdrawn from us by the laws of memory, which are also the laws of oblivion. But, secondly, the number of the general notions which we form is dependent upon the structure of the mind itself. The number and nature of our thoughts bear a strict accordance to our mental frame; and the same hand that gave that frame its mechanism and its motion, determined beforehand the limits and the nature of its produce. But the general notions of the mind, are determined, not only subjectively but objectively; and here we have a striking proof of design—these determinations coincide—the thoughts within us, fit in to the events and to the existences without us. The mind classifies; and nature is classified too. The understanding proceeds by genera and species, and in nature every thing is created and continued “after its kind.” The ideas of Plato, and the essences of the schoolmen, however visionary in their origin, are yet the shadows of the truth. The whole universe has its plan, and each

of its portions its peculiar type, which continue permanent, while the atoms of matter are changing; and maintain stability in the midst of succession, and uniformity in the midst of variety. Nature, as Bacon observes, ascends "like a pyramid" from multitude to unity—from species to tribes—from tribes to kingdoms—and special rules expand into general laws—and all laws into the primal and eternal law, the will of the All-Wise and the All-Good.

Stuart erroneously observes, "that genera and species are mere arbitrary creations, which the human mind forms." If they were arbitrary, and had no correspondence in the reality of things, instead of assisting our understanding, they would only lead it more widely astray from the truth. Strange, indeed, would it be, that, while we are admiring the order which classification gives to the notions of the mind, we should be forced to attribute more harmony to the thoughts of the human mind, than to the works of the divine mind. But it is far otherwise. God has created man in his own image, and human thought travels in the vestiges of the divine understanding; and as the sphere of Archimedes was supposed to represent the movements of the heavens, so, even the ancient heathens wisely discerned that the mind of man reproduced, within its own compendious circle, however darkly and imperfectly, the thoughts and the designs of the Ruler of the universe.

We now naturally arrive at the disputes of the nominalists and the realists. As, according to the expression of Bacon, no subject can be rightly viewed from a plain, but to be contemplated in all its bearings, must be seen from higher ground, instead of reverting to any of the arguments on opposite sides, it is better to point out, in a few words, the origin and the history of the dispute.

The first great theory respecting the rise and mode of our knowledge, was that of Plato and Pythagoras—not originating with them, but derived from the ancient seats of civilization, the early inhabited countries of the East. According to this theory, the forms and exemplars of all the varieties of existences existed in the divine mind from eternity. External nature was but an outward copy and transcript of these—imperfect, because the characters were engraved upon materials ill calculated to receive or to retain a perfect impression; but which the mind, deciphering gradually, remounted to the fountain of intelligence, those original ideas which filled the divine mind. Here there was no room for dispute, because all true knowledge consisted of universals—the individuals of which our senses took cognizance, being shadowy, changeable, and fleeting, and therefore the subjects, not of knowledge, but only of opinion. Aristotle, in whom the discursive intellect more predominated than the imaginative, instead of

assigning a celestial abode to ideas, as the everlasting inhabitants of the divine understanding, immured them from eternity in matter, from which they could not be separated in reality, but only be distinguished by the mind. The Stoics, advancing a step farther, assigned the ideas of the human understanding neither to the Deity nor to the universe, but confined them to the mind of man alone.

It deserves to be remarked here, that Porphyry, in reviewing the theories of antiquity, entirely omits all reference to the Atomic school, though so considerable both in numbers and acuteness, but which was involved in still deeper difficulties about universals, by considering ideas as slender films or images proceeding from individual bodies. These modified theories of ideas necessarily suggested objections, from which the original theory of Plato and Pythagoras was free, having at least completeness, though scarcely possessed of credibility. But there seems no reason to suppose, that the hypothesis of explaining these difficulties away, by ascribing universality to names only, had been invented previous to the time of Roscelinus and Abelard. This was the dispute which flourished most in the dark ages, being exactly fitted to the understandings and to the information of the schoolmen; and as both parties were in the wrong, each had ample opportunities of triumphing over their opponents.

But it is matter of regret to see a discussion founded so entirely upon misconception, and an erroneous theory of the processes of thought, continued down to the present day, and writers, who partake in no degree in these errors, classed according to the terms of these disputes, which, if not obsolete, at least ought to be so. Three classes are proposed, realists, nominalists, conceptualists, in which all are to be included—the realists, or those who believe in universal ideas, (though the only strict realists are of the Platonic school)—conceptualists, who ascribe universal ideas, more or less, to abstraction—and nominalists, who think that all notions are particular, and that there are no universals but names. But as names imply classification, classes at least must exist before general names, and classification implies abstraction, so that the true nominalists, as well as realists, are but few, and most of those who are so termed, should in strictness be ranked with the conceptualists. On the other hand, the theory of the conceptualists implies the existence of ideas, and, therefore, is an incorrect term, when applied to those who reject the hypothesis of ideas. On this account, it is the more to be wondered at, that Stuart should be inclined to include both Locke and Reid as conceptualists. Locke, it is evident by the quotations which Stuart himself makes, had no well defined ideas upon the subject; he was neither a realist nor

a nominalist, and for no better reason he must be styled a conceptualist. "May I take the liberty of adding," Stuart continues, "Dr. Reid's own opinion seems to me to coincide nearly with that of the conceptualists." Now, the whole dispute and theory proceeded upon the hypothesis of ideas, and in what manner particular ideas could at once be singular and universal. Discarding ideas, Reid might well be absolved from all those terms which originated in disputes respecting them. From the largeness of the description which Mr. Stuart gives of conceptualism, not only Reid, but many who never heard of the term, might be included under it. Stuart forms a creed for them under the two following propositions: "First, that we have no reason to believe the existence of any essences or universal ideas corresponding to general terms; and, secondly, that the mind has the power of reasoning concerning genera, or classes of individuals, without the mediation of language."

Mr. Stuart ranks himself with the nominalists, or those who deny that we can reason concerning genera without the medium of language. But this is a strange and obvious, though frequent error; we must reason concerning genera before language is formed, and in order that language may be formed; we cannot name that which we cannot think of; classes must be formed previous to general appella-

tions ; we must determine whether an individual belongs to the class, before we can determine whether the common name of the class can be rightly applied to it.

The great mistake of Mr. Stuart, and the nominalists, consists in considering language as necessary to a train of thought, whereas it is thought that is necessary to language. Without thought we could have no classification ; without classification, no general terms. The modifying one single word (and this might be applied to many discussions and endless disputes) would have set every thing right. If, instead of affirming that we think *solely* by means of language, it had been affirmed that we think *chiefly* by means of language, there would have been no dissentients, and the doctrine and its inferences would have been the more correctly limited. As it is, Mr. Stuart lays far too definite a stress on language as the instrument of thought. If the doctrine of the nominalists were true, the maxim of Condillac would be true likewise, "L'art de raisonner se réduit à une langue bien faite." But though there is much truth in this, there is much more truth in the converse. If to speak well is to reason well, it is still more just, that to think right is to speak right. He, who had the most felicitous choice of words, of all writers, Horace, justly affirms,

"Scribendi rectè, sapere est et principium et fons."

Thoughts and words act, and re-act upon one another, but variously in various minds; master-thoughts govern words, while words rule over the common understanding. Mr. Stuart himself is an instance, in whose writings great pains have been taken with the terms and phrases, but where the result is not proportionable to the preparation; and where, perhaps from the over care and caution of the writer, the reader is better furnished with phrases, than with thoughts. While Bacon, on the other hand, who, advisedly and with the intention not to recede from use and antiquity, is often very censurable in his terms, leaves a well-defined and luminous tract of thought behind, in the mind of the reader. Words are but hints, and the best selected phrases and sentences must both be limited, and filled up by the reader. A strong hint is more likely to be taken than a delicate one; and forcible words, rather than nicely selected ones, convey most clearly an author's meaning.

The subject of language would require a treatise to itself; but it is so little advanced, and requires so much preliminary investigation, that a good treatise, is not to be expected for some time to come. The subject would naturally branch out into three divisions: The origin of language; the laws which regulate language as an instrument of thought; and, lastly, those laws which regulate it as the medium of ima-

gination. With respect to the origin and philosophy of language, very little has been done, and still less with respect to the other two topics.

Horne Tooke, whom Professor Murray has justly styled the father of rational philology, has successfully reduced the parts of speech to nouns and verbs, shewing that all other words are merely these abbreviated,—thus finding a rich mine of discovery, as some chemists have done, in the residuum which others were wont to cast unexamined away. The proposition of Leibnitz, that original words must be drawn from sensible objects, Horne Tooke has carried on with great success, and has illustrated with a variety of instances; and the conclusion which he draws is a just one,—that the language must be the most original, which furnishes in its roots the most meanings, derived from sensible objects, to the etymologist.

Were the subject pursued still farther than Horne Tooke has done, it might be shewn that the primitive nouns and verbs are convertible,—the action and the agent being denominated by the same root, and an example of this might be found in the Sanscrit radicals, which become either nouns or verbs, according as they are declined. A second step in advance might be made, by shewing that the elementary terms are not only sensible, but also imitative, according to the principle of sufficient reason. Leib-

nitz justly observed, that the language which gives the signification of the names of the great features of nature,—the mountains and the rivers,—must be the original language of the country, because there is no sufficient reason why one insignificant sound should be given instead of another, and that the significance of the sound is the only determining cause. Neither he nor Horne Tooke appear to have perceived that this reasoning would apply much farther, and would shew that original words must not only be significant but imitative ; for if a river could only be originally named by a sound that was significant, we must apply the same principle to the things which were first named, and as no sounds are significant otherwise than by convention, except those which are imitative, it follows, by parity of reasoning, that the first words were imitative of the actions they expressed. Thus the most ancient words are imitative terms, and hence these imitative terms were at once verbs and nouns. This would afford an hypothetical account of language consistent with the account of Scripture, and not irreconcilable with the appearances which language at present presents ; because, though signs of mere convention could scarcely be agreed upon, without some medium, however scanty, and without some determining cause, still a small basis is sufficient to build upon, as we see by the scantiness of all roots, when compared with the

number of derivatives which proceed from them,—and it is easily accounted for, that these radical sounds should often be laid aside, when languages are once formed, for other terms designating properties more useful to man, in the progress of civilization; and why imitative terms were disused for those which related to domestic purposes, or to customary rites.

The application by Leibnitz of the principle of sufficient reason to the formation of language, is evidently just. In choosing, the mind must be determined in its choice. Had this principle been attended to, it might have saved from many errors. Professor Murray, for example, might have spared the elaborate absurdity of his two volumes, and the whole of that theory, by which he makes the syllable *Ag* the foundation of the Indo-European tongues; because there was no sufficient reason why *Ag* should be pitched upon rather than any other sound. In imitation alone we have a sufficient cause and a determining reason for the first fixing of names.

But all theories, even the most specious, are of no worth, unless supported by facts; and the proper facts are still wanting, notwithstanding so many works on etymology. No language has been sufficiently analysed; and to trace the original condition of speech, we would require to have the roots, not of one only, but of many tongues. It is pretended that

the roots of the Sanscrit are determined ; but they have been determined by the Bramins themselves, it is likely, too often upon arbitrary principles ; and it would require the acuteness of some new Horne Tooke, with a more sober judgment, and an intimate acquaintance with the language, to develope its structure, and shew its original form. In the Sanscrit, two characters ought to be discoverable,—the primitive, where it closely resembled the ancient Persian, when those who spoke it carried their arms and their religion into India ;—the artificial, when it had become a sacred language, apart from vulgar use, cultivated by the priests, as the speech of the gods, deflected from all vulgar appliances, and flowing into sesquipedalian verse and mystical philosophy. It would be extremely curious to compare the two extremities of the chain,—the Sanscrit and the Gothic,—the Sanscrit, so elaborately wrought up, and the Gothic, long retaining its rude simplicity ; and to shew in what manner languages, so very dissimilar in their fortunes, have retained so many marks of their common origin. But there is small hope that etymology should be rapidly progressive—so many false lights beset the traveller, that he is almost certain, sooner or later, of losing his way. Yet in etymology we have the only records of our race, previous to the dawn of history, and the only traces of the progression of thought, previous to philosophy ;

words alone, like the debris of former worlds, bear testimony to revolutions, of which no other trace remains behind.

If, leaving the origin of language, we come to consider words as the instruments of present thought, and not as the records of what men have thought thousands of years ago, we shall find little that is satisfactory.

Mr. Stuart observes, "It is with the doctrine of the nominalists that my own opinion coincides;" and afterwards he continues, "It may frequently happen, from the association of ideas, that a general word may recall some one individual to which it is applicable; but this is so far from being necessary to the accuracy of our reasoning, that excepting in some cases in which it may be useful to check us in the abuse of general terms, it always has a tendency, more or less, to mislead us from the truth. As the decision of a judge must necessarily be impartial when he is only acquainted with the relations in which the parties stand to each other, and when their names are supplied by letters of the alphabet, or by the fictitious names of Titius, Caius, and Sempronius; so in every process of reasoning, the conclusion we form is most likely to be logically just, when the attention is confined solely to signs; and when the imagination does not present to it those individual objects which may warp the judgment by casual

associations." Now, this attitude, which is considered to be the most favourable for just reasoning, is exactly the posture the understanding takes, when carelessly following in a beaten tract of thought, or giving its easy assent to a string of truisms. In the writings of the nominalists, such is supposed to be the state of the mind in following every chain of reasoning; but nothing is less uniform than the process of the mind, with respect to thoughts and to words. If the mind is startled in the midst of a succession of common-place thoughts, by finding a new expression, and words not placed in their usual order, the exact similarity between language and algebra immediately disappears. The words no longer stand as the signs of thought, but are discarded for the thoughts and the objects themselves; not for individuals, as supposed in the above extract, but for those classified thoughts, about which our reasonings are generally conversant; and if we resort to an individual instance, it is for the sake of illustration rather than argument; but the whole of this subject requires to be handled anew, the varying value which we attach to language determined, and the discriminating shades of thought to be marked, by which we pass, from considering words merely as algebraic signs, to almost discarding words, that we may examine the propriety of terms anew, and form a new channel for thought, by giving a new direction to language.

The third subject, which has scarcely, if at all, been touched upon, is, that suggestive power of style by which the arrangement of words, in every original and powerful author, not only indicates to us his thoughts, but lends to us his peculiar intellectual vision, and communicates to us almost a new life, by transporting us, not only to distant places and ages, but to modes of thinking and feeling, it may be, very alien from our own; and all this effected by so fine a texture of expression, that a very slight change of words destroys the charm, though it still retains the full sense, and may still depict to us the scenery of Homer and Shakspeare, but deprived of the warmth and the animation, and, above all, of the individuality, which enables the poet to repay the reader, not for his second, but for his ever-renewed life in other's breath, by giving them an extension of existence, as far as imagination has spread her wings over the dark tide of time.

We merely throw out hints, to shew how imperfect the views of the nominalists are; and that there is less in language, and yet far more in it, than what we conceive the exaggerated statements of Mr. Stuart represent it to be.

The pyramids may represent the greatness of the departed kings of Egypt, but language is the only fitting monument of those geniuses, that have given their light to the earth for a season, and of the

thoughts which have passed with such intense rapidity through their master minds. It was an argument which struck the ancients, and which is forcibly expressed by Cicero, that the mind itself must be immortal, since its produce is so. And not only is its immediate produce, thought, imperishable, but the material vehicle, whether language or writing, in which it is conveyed,—the characters which the hand of man has graved, still rekindle and reanimate, though in a succession of other bosoms, the images and the emotions which the authors desired to trace; and even when the connection between the character and the thought has been broken, and the meaning appeared to have perished, as well as the hand which traced its signs, a resurrection may be awaiting all these buried workings of the mind, over which thousands of years had cast their veil, and then they may awaken again to life and to greater interest, than when they were first chisselled upon the stone. Thus the hieroglyphics of Egypt, engraved with a careless hand, and as a matter of mere formality, are viewed anew, and with intense interest, after their superstitions and their institutions so long have perished. Nor can we conceive otherwise, when the slightest shade of emotion awakens a corresponding movement within ourselves, nor believe that the cause can cease while the effect remains; or that the mind that composed the Iliad and the Odyssey, removed to another stage

of being, has lost any of the vividness with which it contemplated existence. But the argument becomes still stronger, when it is considered that the moral effects of thought never perish,—that the succession of generations forms only one community,—that the virtues or the vices of ancient times, and of minds so long removed from the earth, still affect the moral condition of the present world,—that the measure of benefits and of injuries is still filling up,—and that if the condition of men after death is to be determined by their fruits, that those fruits are still ripening and augmenting,—and if their quality in many cases can be easily ascertained, that their full amount can only be determined, when the earth and all its concerns are brought to their final period, and the ultimate reckoning is closed.

“Whether it might not have been possible,” says Mr. Stuart, “for the Deity to have so formed us that we might have been capable of reasoning concerning classes of objects without the use of signs, I shall not take upon me to determine. But this we may venture to affirm with confidence, that man is not such a being.” It is a pity that Mr. Stuart, who seldom affirms any thing with confidence, should have been so unfortunate in his first venture. But we may venture not only to affirm, but to prove the contrary, as, indeed, we have done before. Without a process of reasoning, no classification,—without classification,

no general names ; but though differing from him in considering language, not the sole, but only the chief, instrument of thought, we can perceive, along with him, not the less on account of that difference, the benevolent intention of the Creator, and “remark the advantages which we derive from our actual constitution ; and which, in the present instance, appear to me to be important and admirable : inasmuch as it fits mankind for an easy interchange of their intellectual acquisitions ; by imposing on them the necessity of employing in their solitary speculations, the same instrument of thought, which forms the established medium of their communications with each other.”

It is well to recollect, that in the power of communicating their thoughts to others, men incur the deeper responsibility ; even in the silence of the mind, our thoughts accuse, or else excuse, each other ; but when uttered in speech, they become public property, —we are judged not only of ourselves, but of others also, and, above all, by the Supreme Judge. The winged words that often so hastily escape from us, must again be passed in review ; who can stand that single test, “by thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned ?”

SECTION FOURTH.

REASONING AND LOGIC.

OUR knowledge we acquire, first, by sensation, reflection, and suggestion ; and then by the operation of our minds on the information we acquire through these three inlets. The last process of the understanding remains now to be considered,—judgment or reasoning.

“The power of reasoning is very nearly allied to that of judging ; and it is of little consequence in the common affairs of life to distinguish them nicely. On this account, the same name is often given to both.” “Yet there is a distinction between reasoning and judging. Reasoning is the process by which we pass from one judgment to another, which is the consequence of it.” Reid does not seem to have attended to the circumstance, that we are led to form so many involuntary judgments by the structure of our constitution, that when we come to form any

voluntary judgment, it must in almost all cases be based upon some previous proposition which we have formed involuntarily, and that, therefore, the judgments about which our mind is conversant in its mature state, are not only called reasonings in popular language, but ought to be so in philosophical language also. Every belief is attended with the act of judgment, and therefore judgment, like other acts of the mind, is continually active in all that we perceive, and in all that we remember. It is not to these early and unpremeditated judgments that the remarks generally made upon judgment apply, but to those reasonings founded upon former judgments, by which, though we frequently gain no new knowledge, yet we give a better arrangement to the information we already possess. Judgment, then, is the mental act of belief, or negation—reasoning, the inferences we deduce from previous judgments; and both are to be distinguished from reason, which not only includes them both, but denotes the exercise of all our intellectual powers. This is the more necessary to be observed, as a perpetual fallacy runs through the syllogistic logic by which reasoning and judgment are ever confused together.

Reasoning is but the last step of the processes of reason,—the most important in one sense, because it consummates the whole; but the least important in another, because, if the other steps are secured, we

are secured of that also. A correct conclusion inevitably follows correct premises. We may here observe the great mistake of any pretended art or science, which should attend to the last step, and neglect the many previous ones. Such a process must distract the attention from the quarters where errors are likely to arise, and confines it to that point where attention is of less avail, because if an error has already been committed in the structure of the premises, the forms of syllogism cannot remedy it, but are only calculated to rivet it still more firmly upon the conviction.

Aristotle himself has expressed the whole theory of the syllogistic logic in one sentence. "If A may be predicated of every B, and B of every G, it is a necessary conclusion that A may be predicated of every G." And the whole science of logic resolves itself into this admirable and truly incontestable principle. This is the centre and sun of the whole system, around which all logical disputes have been revolving in endless cycles for thousands of years. Well might Reid observe, "The general principle on which the whole terminates, and of which every categorical syllogism is only a particular application, is this, that what is affirmed or denied of the whole genus may be affirmed or denied of every species and individual belonging to it. This is a principle of undoubted certainty, indeed, but of no great depth. Aristotle, and all the logicians, assume it as an

axiom, or first principle, from which the syllogistic system, as it were, takes its departure ; and after a tedious voyage, and great expense of demonstration, it lands at last in this principle, as its ultimate conclusion.

“ O curas hominum ! O quantum est in rebus inane ! ”

The peculiar beauty of this science is, that it requires no science at all,—it matters not whether we attach any ideas or not to A, B, or G ; the principles of logic are alike demonstrative and certain. Give it only the letters of the alphabet, and it reaps all the harvest of discovery, of which it is capable. Then, indeed, it is in its highest form, and in the state of pure and unmixed science. When it descends to particular instances, to Peter, man, or animal, it loses somewhat of its certainty, along with its high supra-mundane character.

The futility of logic has received the highest confirmation from the admirable work of Archbishop Whately. Had the subject been susceptible of defence, it would have been rendered impregnable by so clear and powerful a thinker. Archbishop Whately has great merit in restricting the ground to be defended,—he entirely gives up the claims of logic to be “ an engine for the investigation of nature ; ” he equally gives up its claim to “ furnish a peculiar method of reasoning ; ” and restricts it to “ a method of analysing that mental process which must

invariably take place in all correct reasoning." We deeply regret that such distinguished abilities should be employed in the defence of, what we sincerely believe to be, an imaginary science; yet the position which he occupies is so far withdrawn from the usual limits of conflict, that his opponents may rejoice that so formidable an adversary has not chosen a more advanced line of defence. One might be permitted to doubt whether the mental process which must invariably take place in all correct reasoning, can be strictly analysed, for it consists of simple acts of the mind. Logic merely enumerates the steps of reasoning; it cannot analyse the judgments themselves into simpler elements. The preparatory processes of the mind, in framing the terms previous to reasoning, may be analysed with propriety and profit; but this the logic of Aristotle, as Bacon long ago observed, preposterously neglects. Syllogisms consist of propositions,—propositions consist of words,—words are but the signs of notions; if, therefore, the notions themselves, upon which the whole is based, are not correctly drawn from real existence, the whole superstructure falls to the ground,—therefore our only hope rests upon true induction. "*Syllogismus ex propositionibus constat, propositiones ex verbis, verba notionum tesseræ sunt. Itaque si notiones ipsæ (id quod basis rei est) confusæ sint, et temere a rebus abstractæ; nihil in iis, quæ super-*

struuntur, est firmitudinis: itaque spes est una in inductione vera."

But as remarks are less easily understood when they consist of general observations, we may take an instance from Archbishop Whately's book itself:—

" Every true patriot is a friend to religion ;
Some great statesmen are not friends to religion ;
Some great statesmen are not true patriots."

In a case like this, if we only manage matters scientifically,—neglect the meaning of the terms,—shut our eyes, and suffer ourselves to be carried along with the logical current,—we touch the land without difficulty, and in an instant ; and are only surprised that any one should have thought it worth while to put into a logical form, a truth which most great statesmen proclaim by every action of their public life. But when we attend to the meaning of our terms, our difficulties begin ; and every term would require a treatise. The great statesman, indeed, will generally be referred to the prime minister of the day, along with his coadjutors high in office ; and most of those who are out of place, will have no difficulty in concluding that these are not true patriots.

The next difficulty to finding a true patriot, is to determine what is true patriotism. The third, and greatest difficulty, is to determine the import of reli-

gion. Those who have signed the thirty-nine articles, may well be surprised that any doubt should be attached to the term religion ; still, we must believe that there were true patriots in the ancient republics, who would have shewn their friendship to religion, by dooming every believer in what we justly deem to be religion, to immediate death.

We agree to the syllogism ; but in that case we must give a restricted application to the term patriotism, and a very extended one to the term religion. Patriotism is the love of our country ; but love is both a passion and a purpose, and influences the understanding as well as the affections. It seems a truism, when Cowper remarks, " Can he love the whole who loves no part ? " And yet it may not only be a truth, that a patriot can do so, but it is of frequent occurrence. Affection for an ideal object is very consistent with indifference for real objects. But independent of this, patriotism may be a passion without being a settled purpose,—a person may love his country without knowing in what the well-being of that country consists. Several " great statesmen " we believe to have been true patriots in the lowest sense, but not in the highest, ready at any time to sacrifice their lives, but never their vices, for the good of their country. We merely hint at the " boundless field " which is opened out by only one of the terms of the syllogism, the formation of which

terms the logic of Aristotle entirely overlooks, attending only to their arrangement, when formed, and to the variety of their modifications.

But if the term patriotism would open so large a field of discussion, what limits could be set to the term religion? From the vagueness of the terms about which logic is generally employed, we might play at fast and loose for ever. Instead of "some great statesmen are not friends to religion," we might place the proposition,—some eminent dignitaries of the church are not friends to religion. This is evidently a startling paradox; but determine the church to mean the universal Church of Rome, and religion to mean the only true religion, namely, the Protestant, and instead of a startling paradox, we arrive at the safe conclusion, that some eminent dignitaries of the Church of Rome are no friends to the Protestant religion. But by religion here, it is probably not intended the Protestant religion, nor the Catholic, nor any of the religions contained in the summaries of all the denominations; for if we do not acknowledge Cato and Aristides to be true patriots, we shall be hardly bested to find one; and yet the articles of their religion were rather strange ones. But it is subjective, and not objective religion, which is here applicable. The belief of some superior power or powers, (for we must not be nice either as to their nature or numbers,) who add the sanction of their au-

thority to human laws, who are the avengers of crime, however concealed, and the rewarders of virtue, however oppressed upon earth. Such a belief as this, all true patriots have either possessed or feigned; but the reason why so vague a belief (and to render it less vague, would be to exclude many undoubted patriots) should contribute so much to the well-being of nations, requires to be separately handled, and belongs not to logic, but to polity,—not to the art of forming syllogisms, but to the art of forming states.

Thus, notwithstanding the excellent treatise of Archbishop Whately, (the only defect of which arises from the subject,) those who owe no allegiance to Oxford or to Aristotle, will still deem the syllogistic art futile,—it only decides what no one can dispute, and leaves untouched the main merits of every question. The syllogism of Aristotle implies a previous reasoning, upon the correctness or incorrectness of which every thing depends; itself, it is scarcely a process of thought, it is merely an arrangement of terms; and withdrawing the attention from what is important to what is unimportant, it is not only futile but hurtful. As Dr. Whately observes, it is barren of discovery, being neither “an engine for the investigation of nature,” “nor furnishing any peculiar method of reasoning;” but if barren of discovery, it is the fruitful parent of disputes; it cannot promote truth, but it has lent a helping hand to every error.

It has been doubted whether logic is an art or a science. Dr. Whately decides that it is both. It is, indeed, as much the one as the other,—it is the science of a self-evident truism, and the art, without understanding any subject, of disputing upon all.

True logic, like all other true sciences, is universally inductive. It is the history of the processes of the mind in the search after truth, and the results of that history. Such a science can scarcely be said to exist as yet. Each successful inquirer forms rules for himself, adapted to his own peculiar situation and peculiar turn of mind. The regulative arts are always behind-hand ; the art of poetry flourished in the decline of poetry, and rhetoric prevailed when eloquence decayed. Nor was the loss great, that these arts were born out of due season. Homer would rather have lost than gained by attending to such remarks as those of Aristotle, and Demosthenes would never have fulminated over Greece, had he modelled himself upon treatises of rhetoric. Genius draws immediately from nature,—art only at second-hand. Had an organum been provided for natural philosophers, suitable not only to one age, but to all succeeding generations, we might have had such inquirers into nature, as abound in all times and places, each adding a little pittance to the common stock ; but the genius of Newton would have been tamed down much nearer to the ordinary level, and,

indeed, in some respects, below it; for inferior powers would accommodate themselves more readily and happily to prescribed rules.

Unmerited praise has often been bestowed on the *novum organum* of Bacon; his own maxim gives a juster value to his own work, "the arts of invention must grow with the inventions themselves." Bacon, who lived before the commencement of inventions, could only draw a shadowy picture of that which was yet to be. Of the multitude of inventions since the time of Bacon, many may be attributed to the spirit he diffused; few can be traced to the observance of the rules which he laid down. Bacon has done what man in his best estate, and in the height of his faculties, could do,—he has gone as far as induction, in his own age, could carry him. Like great genius, he has even something prophetic,—he has glimpses into far off futurity; but he would have been even more than a prophet, had he possessed full and distinct views of that which was yet to be. He had the merit of justly appreciating what the human mind, when not aided by induction, was able to accomplish, in the case of the philosophers of Greece; and he saw that all their efforts, when they sought for a model of the universe within themselves, ended in vanity and vexation of spirit. He saw also what the weak and bewildered understandings of many of the moderns had been able to accomplish in their

imperfect and empirical method of induction, and he drew the right inference from comparing the labours of both. He discerned with the clearness of intuition, the relation which the mind of man bears to the universe around him, and the first sentence of the novum organum is as superior to all the speculations of ancient philosophy, as the first verse of Genesis is to all the old theories about the formation of the world.

But having gone thus far, he reached the necessary limits of his province, and was obliged to give imaginary laws for the prosecution of a study yet in the birth. He has been censured for the use of fantastic and improper terms, but such terms are the only refuge of him who must write upon a subject, which it was beyond the power of man to comprehend, because in great part yet shaded in the darkness of futurity; and his terms have this advantage, that, being imaginative and vague, and having no determinate import, they are the better qualified for reflecting back to the reader his own discoveries respecting the laws of nature, and thus allowing him modestly to admire his own sense while ascribing it to Bacon.

It was probably necessary to form an organum, in order to supersede, or at least to rival, that of Aristotle, for men had so long been accustomed to walk upon crutches, that they would only have consented to

exchange one crutch for another ; and the organum of Bacon has the merit of one of the Orphic hymns,—half revealing the mysteries to the intelligent, and filling the mind with lofty aspirations and sublime images, though it rather embroiders the veil of universal nature, than raises it up.

The logic of Aristotle is connected with the power of reasoning, and, therefore, required some notice in this place ; but true logic, which is connected with all the powers of the mind, if treated at all in connection with a view of the structure of the mental powers, would find its proper place at the close. It would be doing it injustice, however, to consider it as a mere appendage to the philosophy of the mind ; it is a subject of itself, of still ampler dimensions, and of yet higher importance, but a subject which would require the genius of Aristotle or of Bacon. It is not intimately connected with the origin of our ideas, or with the minute structure of our mental powers, though, as in the first aphorism of Bacon, it presupposes that our knowledge of nature is founded upon observation and experiment, and that the mind of man is incapable of excogitating truth upon any subject whatever. A very general view, however, of the origin of thought, of the faculties of the mind, and of their application to external nature, is sufficient for induction ; it was enough for Bacon to determine the power of the mind without minutely examining its

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very, than to tie down an observer, as soon as he has discovered a fact, to ascertain, in the first instance, whether it is either solitary, migrating, ostensive, clandestine, or belonging to any of the rest of the twenty-seven fantastic "prerogatives of instances." Such a method never has been followed, and never will be followed, while the world lasts. It was contrary to the principles of Bacon, to form an art of invention previous to the inventions themselves ; that art, like all other knowledge, must be founded upon induction, and must follow inventions instead of preceding them.

Far different is the merit of Bacon, when confined to general observations regarding the powers of the mind, and its progress, when guided by inductive philosophy. He appears to view all things from his own lofty tower of discovery, while the rest of mankind see them only from the plain below ; and his spirit-stirring enthusiasm utters oracles like that of Delphi, which are "the daughters of golden hope," and prophetic of triumphs yet to come.

The great art of discovery consists in exciting a general desire for the revelation of hidden truth, and in the stirring up many minds to pursue the search after it. Discovery consists less in any preconceived rules, than in hitting on a rich vein of thought, which men again lose by lingering too long on the same spot, when the vein is there exhausted.

New labourers in the mine of truth, when the vein changes its direction, are the first to detect the dislocation, and recover the treasures that have disappeared. The ancients compared the search after truth to hunting; and success in the chase depends, in some measure, on the number of the pursuers. Wherever a fault occurs, the more that are spread over the ground, the sooner the tract will be rediscovered, and the speedier will be the burst forward again.

The true organum for the discovery of truth, is the encouragement which a nation affords to the pursuit of knowledge; the State which confers the greatest rewards and the highest honours, on the attainments of philosophy, does more for the advancement of knowledge than any mere method of discovery which can ever be proposed.

True discovery is founded upon the knowledge of ourselves, and upon the knowledge of the Creator and his laws. Both these coincide, proving that man is made in the image of his Maker, and that the laws of the human understanding are harmonious with the laws of nature. He who is best acquainted with the style of a human author is best able to unravel his difficult passages; and he who most sedulously beholds and admires the vestiges of the Deity, is best enabled to follow his divine guide, and to pursue the path of genuine discovery.

SECTION FIFTH.

EMOTIONS.

THE mind, furnished only with the powers hitherto enumerated, would have been but an intellectual mirror, contemplating the existence of other beings with philosophic indifference ; it is the addition of emotions which principally gives it movement and life. As, with respect to the intellectual powers of the mind, truth is the end to be pursued, and falsehood to be shunned, so the active powers have their appropriate objects of choice or avoidance, good and evil, and are directed towards each by corresponding emotions of pleasure and pain. Hence the first, (and for poetry) sufficiently accurate, division of our emotions, which Pope has made

“ Love, hope, and joy, fair pleasure’s smiling train ;
Hate, fear, and grief, the family of pain.”

The subject of our emotions, in their more complicated form, so affects both the businesses and the

pleasures of life, that it has been the perpetual theme of poets, essayists, and moralists, and is rather passed over by the metaphysician in general, hastening to what are considered more important views. Some of the most acute remarks on this subject, are those of the late Dr. Brown ; his metaphysical views appear to us very defective and erroneous ; and, therefore, we the more readily acknowledge his excellence here. Mr. Steuart terms him to be too much of a poet to be a good metaphysician, and too much of a metaphysician to be a good poet, not with much justice, for neither his poetical nor metaphysical powers were so great as to injure him in any other branch of pursuit ; and Shakspeare, the greatest, at least of modern poets, has thrown more light upon the operations of the mind than most of those who make the study of the mind their principal pursuit. But whatever powers Dr. Brown had, (and they certainly were considerable,) seemed to lie chiefly on the confines of poetry, metaphysics, and rhetoric ; and in treating of the emotions of the mind, which border on all these, he met with the subject most congenial to his powers. It is striking to observe, how the peculiarities of each mind display themselves in the partial clearness of each individual's views. Dr. Brown, who has treated best of the emotions themselves, has failed in the analysis of the mental operations which accompany them, while Mr. Steuart, who has

rather passed over the emotions themselves, has been more successful in enumerating the processes of our more active powers.

With respect to our emotions, as formerly observed with respect to our sensations, both of them, we believe, are resolvable into simpler elements than any that have hitherto been stated; but in a rapid sketch of the mind, any attempt of this kind would be out of place. Every first attempt must lead into long discussions disproportioned to the limited space allotted to other parts of the subject, which are more important; and what is worst, every first enumeration of simpler elements is generally defective—he who takes the mechanism to pieces, leaves out, or loses some minute but important springs of movement, and the machine that he reconstructs, is defective in some of its principal parts. This has been the usual course of error, and it is the great danger of metaphysical inquiries; the imperfect enumeration of the elements lead to erroneous conclusions, and these conclusions are fearlessly carried forward from inference to inference, while the inquirer after truth, as he designates himself, determines to exclude all truths which are not contained in the inventory which he himself had made. But, as we often have occasion to state, it is in mind as in matter, the primary elements are of less consequence than what may be termed the secondary,—those combinations into which

the elements immediately run, and from which they can scarcely be disengaged, and which, though complex in themselves, are yet simple to ordinary apprehension, and form the foundation of all the combinations in actual use.

It may be laid down as a general rule, though, like all general rules, attended with frequent exceptions, that every act of the mind, every sensation, and every emotion, is, in a slight degree, a source of pleasure. To exist in health and in youth, is of itself a faint pleasure, which may easily be kindled up by favourable circumstances into cheerfulness and joy. On the contrary, inactivity of itself is irksome, and the want of any thing to move or interest, soon becomes a positive pain. Thus cheaply has the Deity provided for our activity, and for our pleasure. Another law more frequently observed, is the decay of passive impressions, and the increase of active habits—gentle activity of mind, and gentle emotion, are both pleasant, but the same emotions repeated become more and more languid, while, on the contrary, the active powers of the mind move more freely and with less effort, in consequence of the continual repetition of their action. In this, as in every part of our frame, the hand of benevolent design is constantly apparent,—we are warned not to rest in passive enjoyment, and in the barren luxury of emotions, but to carry every improvement of the mind to its appropriate

act, and not to stop short of that which is the ultimate end of all our feelings and powers—the performance of duty.

The decay of passive impressions naturally leads to the power which novelty possesses over the mind. It is impossible to renew our old emotions in the vividness which they possessed when we were first acquainted with them. The story of the Arabian shepherd, who got one glance of the gardens of Paradise, and then lost sight of them for ever, is the history of the daily life of mankind. Our commonest notions, at their first rising on the mind, have been invested with a lustre which has left them to settle on others in brief and transitory succession, till there remains nothing new under the sun, and the mind looks forward to other worlds for the splendour which dawned for a moment on its earlier prospects. Surrounded as we are with different objects that court the attention, and urged by the briefness of our day of life, to cast but a rapid glance at each as it comes under our view, we find the utility of novelty in impelling us forward from object to object. What is novelty with respect to new objects, becomes wonder with respect to new laws, and a varied arrangement of nature; and wonder passes into astonishment, in instances where we are brought to suppose, that our previous observations are reversed, and that the laws of nature are suspended or changed.

Hence wonder is justly termed the mother of knowledge,—it required as powerful an emotion to rivet the wandering attention, and force it to solve the various difficulties that were presented to its view.

But as the mind, if left to novelty alone, would have made no selection, but would for ever have hastened from that which was valuable to that which was new, another series of emotions was annexed—those of the beautiful, by which the attention might be detained on the fairest works of creation ; which emotion of the beautiful, blending in one current, as under one denomination, all pleasure, liking, and love, might throw its own hue over the objects it selected, and repeat, vary, and multiply their images within the mind.

Beauty, though contradistinguished from sublimity, yet passes into it by insensible gradations, as is well remarked by Dr. Brown, in the case of a river, which, beautiful in its earlier course, may become magnificent towards its termination, and sublime, as it is blended with the ocean ; or as, in the view of Longinus, and in the Odes of Sappho, where the intensity of passion is united, in the mind of the critic, with the beautiful and sublime. In the emotions of novelty, beauty, and sublimity, besides the direct purposes of utility which they subserve, we have the first seeds of that new existence which the mind works out for itself in poetry, and in the fine

arts, in fiction and mythology, which seem to form the foreshadows of a future and more glorious world.

Power, which is the source of the sublime in our emotions, is, in our desires, the origin of ambition, and fills the mind with conscious exultation, in the exercise of our energy, over all the objects that surround us. Our principal desires have been classed as five by Steuart,—the first, the desire of knowledge; the second, of society; the third, of esteem; the fourth, of power; the fifth, of superiority. Though this is the form in which they present themselves, in after life, these desires are neither simple nor original.

First arises in the mind the pleasure of activity, then the results which that activity produces, and the desire to repeat them. This unites with the painful feeling of helplessness, and the sense that to be weak, is to be miserable. Hence the natural design of using as aids, then as instruments, both things and persons. Full-fledged ambition is a late and complex principle.

The love of knowledge is the mature form of curiosity,—the simple elementary state is mere inquisitiveness, which is common even to some of the lower animals; then the perplexity, not of mere ignorance, for that is a state of repose, but of passing from darkness into twilight, the time of questionable shapes and shadows; and then curiosity, to which

novelty lends its aid; and last of all, love of knowledge for its own sake, as well as the dowry it may be supposed to bring with it, the power which it commands, and the esteem which it attracts.

The desire of society has its first spring in the dreary feeling of loneliness,—that which makes solitary confinement the severest of punishments; then the sympathy of man with man, and the enlargement and diversity of each one's existence, by participating in the thoughts and feelings of others.

With respect to the desire of esteem, it is scarcely necessary, to search for a new principle, to explain why our own esteem is desirable, and if we seek our own approbation, the principle of sympathy explains why we court the good opinion of others. Pride and vanity, though contrasted with each other, are twin sources from the same fountain; but as the good opinion of others is easier secured by shew than by reality, vanity appears the most deceptive, as reduced to the greater number of shifts, though pride only escapes from this meanness, by having the easier dupe to deal with.

The desire of superiority, or principle of emulation, may be considered as simple and original, as it is observed to be powerfully operative even in the lower animals. It is striking how often emulation has been confounded with envy, its corruption, a confusion which, however, shews how readily the one

passes into the other, and serves as a caution that emulation, as an incentive, should be kept general, and never, if possible, particular. Rivalry with all, is blameless and generous; rivalry with an individual is mean, painful, and degrading.

Mr. Steuart has regarded avarice, though erroneously, as not one of our original desires. The principle of hoarding is common to man with several of the lower animals. It is the sense of property which gives complexity to this desire. Man not only hoards, but appropriates, and on the principle of property are founded the rules of justice. The love of property mingles with other passions, as property becomes an instrument for attaining very various ends. When property is convertible into money, which is reconvertible into whatever is desirable, then the love of money, or avarice, blends with every other passion, till money, sought at one time only as the mean of procuring some remoter possession, becomes to the besotted mind the end, instead of the instrument, and the passion ends where it first began, in the second infancy of life, as in its earliest childhood, in hoarding for the sake of hoarding, and in turning, what was intended to circulate through the world, into a worthless and stationary idol.

The only mode by which man gains acquaintance with the thoughts of others, being by attributing his own thoughts to them, seems naturally to lead to

sympathy, and indeed to involve it, without calling for any additional principle. Yet, in order that man might be doubly guarded against selfishness, an additional principle does appear to have been given to him, that he may go out of the narrow sphere of his own peculiar views and interests, and enter the more thoroughly into the feelings and sentiments of others. Members, one of another, we should suffer, by reflection, in the sufferings of others; but we naturally shrink from pain, and unless we could remove the pains of others, are disposed to avert our view from that for which there is no easy or ready remedy. "On the sight of distress," says Steuart, "we are distinctly conscious, I think, of three things: first, a painful emotion, in consequence of the distress we see; second, a selfish desire to remove the cause of this uneasiness; third, a disposition to relieve the distress, from a benevolent and disinterested concern about the sufferer. If we had not this last disposition, and if it were not stronger than the former, the sight of a distressed object would invariably prompt us to fly from it, as we frequently see those men do in whom the second ingredient prevails over the third." This excellent analysis of pity gives an insight into the workings of the mind with respect to its other affections, and shews, that though the emotions occupy the larger share of the attention, and are most taken notice of by writers upon the subject,

yet that they are complicated, by being accompanied with several processes of the mind. The growth and changes of the passions, we may see exemplified in the various stages through which anger passes, as it blends with other emotions, from its first rise in the sudden and instinctive resentment at injuries threatened or received, when it either swells into the tumult of anger, in which the whole frame is in commotion, or is kept down into moral indignation, at unpunished wrong, and finally settles into the purpose of revenge, that "wild and natural justice," out of whose hand the infliction of punishment is taken, on earth, by human laws, and in futurity, by the Divine retribution. Then we may contrast how feeble our sense of favours is, compared with our sense of injuries; how faint our gratitude, which was once called resentment, when contrasted with that resentment which, from its hearty permanence, has retained and appropriated the name; how the one, from its perishing nature, requires to be nursed, and continually cherished, and the other, from its vigour and vehemence, to be as assiduously restrained.

In all these, we perceive the constructive power of the mind, drawing its materials from different and distant quarters, and bringing them together into one ever growing whole. The first seeds of thought are so minute, and buried in obscurity, that we are scarce conscious of their existence, till they shoot up,



and attain some degree of maturity. It is the full stream of thought, and current of affections, on which the light first breaks in its expanded course, while the rills that fed it remain in remoteness and obscurity, like the Nile, which filled the ancient world with its fame and its fertility, while it veiled in impenetrable mystery the fountains which fed its flood, and supplied its unfailing waters.

In almost all circumstances, final causes are more easily discerned than proximate ones; while the rise of the appetites, desires, and affections, is obscure, the end for which they were given is obvious, and has been placed in a variety of lights, to display still more distinctly the traces of Divine benevolence and wisdom. The first moving cause, in many instances, is pain, as that which is most effectual in rousing the mind from its lethargy, and in hurrying it on to the task to be accomplished; but what deserves remark, is the economy with which pain is inflicted, only meted out, where necessary, and in the necessary proportions, and immediately remitted where the end is gained, and then turned into pleasure; for example, the sensation of hunger is dull and obscure at first, and is only augmented in proportion to the danger of injury from want of sustenance, and it is rather the fear of it than the actual experience, which impels the majority of the world to an ever-renewed course of labour and self-denial, in procuring

a subsistence ; and that which is at first a pain, and which attaches to mankind a greater labour than that of slavery, is changed into a pleasure, and that, according to some, one of the most important in life, —the expectation of the regular recurrence of our meals. The principle of hoarding, converted into reasonable love of property among the many, or into the insane and avaricious love of money in the few, changes men from the consumers of the entire produce of their own labour, into voluntary and frugal stewards for a distant futurity. Vanity supplies the public with a host of servants, whose only wages is praise ; and ambition supplies still more disinterested ministers, to whom the exercise of power becomes its own reward, notwithstanding that the paths of ambition are more thorny and abrupt, than that which leads to the eminence of virtue. But while these passions are subservient to the public interests, even in some degree of excess, when not very immoderate, yet for the sake of individual happiness, they require to be kept under due restraint, subjected to the controul of reason, and the voice of conscience, so that they may form one great and harmonious whole, according to the original and Divine intention, where no principle being in excess, and none being wanting, the whole action of the soul is complete, both as it respects the life which now is, and that which is to come.

SECTION SIXTH.

TASTE.

THE mind is continually shaping and rebuilding its various thoughts and feelings, but is most constantly operative upon those which leave the deepest trace in the memory, or are recalled with most pleasure to the view. Men endeavour to live over again their past life, but above all, to repeat and multiply in remembrance the few sunny spots of existence ; and the efforts of individuals are seconded by the bard and the story-teller, who exaggerate and embellish the few incidents of the simplest and earliest times. Novelty, beauty, and sublimity, which are the elements of the ideal world, are what form the staple of the earliest verses, and though rarely discoverable in the world around us, throw back their gorgeous hues upon antiquity, or become the golden tissue of the dreams of futurity.

Hence a new world is gradually created, as full of interest and emotion, as the every-day scene is stale and flat ; and wild as the imaginary world is, yet legislators arise in the shape of critics, to prescribe its laws ; and metaphysicians, like the Tuscan artist, apply the optic tube to descry its diversities, and describe its shadowy realms.

But to which of the two great divisions of existence does this ideal world belong ? To matter in part, or solely to mind ? When the original beauty of the material world had been generally given up, and its lustre, like the light of the moon, allowed to be derived from a superior source, Mr. Steuart appears in some degree to retrograde to former and discarded opinions. After remarking of Mr. Alison's theory, " I am disposed to ascribe more to the mere organic impressions, independently of any association or expression whatever, than he seems willing to allow," he afterwards adds, to the same purport, " Still, I think that beauty, in its literal sense, denotes what is presented to the organ of sight ; and that it is afterwards transferred to moral qualities by an associating process."

The question of whether matter is beautiful, independent of mind, is solved at once, by inquiring what we mean by matter. That which is extended, which fills space, which is a congeries of innumerable particles, all possessing impenetrability, mobility, &c.,

may be the object of philosophic investigation, but not of love and admiration, independent of their arrangement, by the infinite mind, or of the relations in which they stand to us, when stripped of the colours and the ideal forms which our minds throw around them. Matter, then, as it stands by itself, can neither be beautiful nor sublime; the only inquiry is, respecting the material world, not such as it exists in itself, but such as our minds conceive it; and therefore beauty and sublimity evidently originate with, and are inseparable from mind.

With respect to the theory of the beautiful, every writer's pen has been wielded against that of his predecessor; all feel alike, but think differently, or rather express themselves diversely. In what relates to the mind, there must at least be partial truth, but mixed with general error, where so many contradict each other, and are contradicted in their turn. The true theory is that which reconciles all, and gives to each its proper, though often a very subordinate place.

Longinus, who describes the sense of the sublime as a certain inward glorying, must be reconciled with Burke, who conceives that terror is the characteristic ingredient of the sublime; Steuart, who supposes that the only link of the beautiful consists in a common name to objects, in most respects dissimilar, must be reconciled with Alison, who sees a common

but complex pleasure, to which he gives the term of delight, as that which constitutes the beautiful.

The origin of the beautiful consists in the emotions of beauty ; and as the sensations of colour are spread over the body that excites them, and the hidden cause of colour is supposed to be similar to the effect produced, or rather, the effect is transferred from the mind to the colouring body ; so that which produces the emotion of beauty within us, is immediately arrayed by the mind in the garment of beauty itself.

Mr. Alison has been unfortunate in denying, that the simple emotion of beauty is beautiful, and restricting the term to the complex pleasure, which results from pleasing emotions, and the pleasures of imagination combined. "I should wish to appropriate the term delight to signify the peculiar pleasure which attends the emotions of taste, or which is felt, when the imagination is employed in the prosecution of a regular train of ideas of emotion ;" and he mentions it as the design of his work to shew, that the "emotion of beauty or sublimity is never produced, unless, beside the excitement of some simple emotion, the imagination also is excited, and the exercise of the two faculties combined in the general effect." It is to be regretted that this very ingenious theory has been pushed too far ; for though the emotion of beauty is beautiful, without any addition, yet what we actually experience, is, in general, such as Mr. Alison describes it,—a complex emotion, and a

double pleasure, united in different proportions and degrees.

There is a pleasure attached to every exercise of imagination, which is felt in reveries about objects, even in themselves without interest ; and as the imagination is never altogether at rest, it comes in for a share of the delight which we feel, though often a slight one, in cases where we are deeply affected. The deeper the emotion, the more the mind broods upon it, and the less it wanders. Where the emotion is slight, the imagination is often active, and here the pleasure arises chiefly from the imagination, with the addition of a number of slighter emotions, that merely glance over the mind.

With similar restriction and modification, the work of Mr. Alison applies to a very considerable portion of the pleasure which we derive from the fine arts ; and in this point of view he may be reconciled to his opponent Dr. Brown. "I have no hesitation," observes Dr. Brown, "in saying, that the more intense the feeling of beauty may be, the less is the tendency of the mind to pass from the delightful form which fills the heart, as it fills the eyes, to images of distant analogy,—that this transition takes place chiefly when the emotion is of a slight kind,—and that what is said to constitute beauty, has thus an inverse, and not a direct proportion, to that very beauty which it is said directly to constitute."

Though etymology is not a safe guide in metaphysics, some of our past impressions can be most readily traced by the derivation of words. Mr. Steuart appears correct in considering the various terms for beauty, as first applied to objects of sight; it does not follow from this, however, that much stress can be laid upon the mere organic impression. The entrance of light gives the first vivid consciousness of life, and the delight with which it is viewed in early childhood, may be owing, not only to the sensation which it excites, but to the curiosity and movement which its presence inspires. In another respect, Mr. Steuart appears decidedly erroneous, when he says, "I shall begin with supposing, that the letters A, B, C, D, E, denote a series of objects; that A possesses some one quality in common with B; B a quality in common with C; C a quality in common with D; D a quality in common with E; while, at the same time, no quality can be found which belongs in common to any three objects in the series." This case he supposes to occur, when the epithet beautiful is applied to colours, forms, motion, not in consequence of the discovery of any common quality belonging to them, but because the transference of the word beauty from the first of the series to the last, arises solely from their undistinguishable operation in producing the same agreeable effect, in consequence of their being all perceived by the same organ, and at the same instant.

Here etymology prevails over philosophy. Mr. Steuart's notions of beauty are somewhat confused. He speaks of the ideas of beauty, when he should have fixed his thoughts on the emotion of the beautiful; and then all things would have become clear and simple. Whatever excites the emotions of beauty is beautiful, at least for the moment. Steuart defines beauty, that which is agreeable to the eye. It is simply that which is agreeable to the mind.

It is a different inquiry to examine what objects are to be classed as beautiful; the list would not be easily exhausted. Not only colour, form, and movement are beautiful, but matter in all its shadowy resemblances to mind, or as indicating the existence of other minds. Not only that which is beautiful in itself, but even that which is associated with it, becomes beautiful likewise. The difficulty consists, not in finding beautiful objects, but, on account of their wide range, in the necessity of withdrawing many of these from a denomination become too general, as too extended.

The distinction of the sublime, first cuts off a portion, and, if it were necessary, to this might be added the pathetic—but the gradations are so gentle, that these divisions are a matter of convenience, rather than deriving their origin from any decided separation in the order of things. Mr. Steuart, by the assistance of etymology, traces the sublime to literal

height, but his first reflection is not a happy one. "In reflecting on the circumstances by which sublimity, in its primitive sense, is specifically inspired, the first thing which strikes us is that it carries the thoughts in a direction opposite to that in which the great and universal law of terrestrial gravitation operates." Hence, according to Mr. Stewart, the true sublime consists in struggling with and overcoming the force of gravitation, and every other sublimity must derive its title, by some imaginary circumflexion, from this source. Were it not for this mistake, it were needless almost to observe, that sublimity has its seat and origin in the heavens, the place of power, and the source of all the changes we observe.

" *Asper hoc Sublime candens quem invocant omnes,
Jovem* "

Power, and not height, is the essence of the sublime; but as power resides on high, both physically and spiritually, height and power are from the earliest ages associated together. Keeping in view always, that power is the essential element of the sublime, we are able to reconcile apparent contradictions. Longinus described the sublime as a certain inward glorying and exultation. Burke attributed to the sublime, the depressing effects of terror;

hence a controversy which is still recent—(Knight opposing the sublimity of the ancients, to that of Burke,) where both parties are right as to what they assert, and wrong as to what they deny.—There are two sublimes—the sublime of terror, and the sublime of enthusiasm, both derived from one source, though flowing in opposite directions; from power, favourable, or adverse, with which we sympathize, or of which we stand in awe. Enthusiasm was the sublime of antiquity, for there the mind could sympathize with the limited, and not inimitable, prowess of the ancient heroes and demigods. The other sublime more frequently occurs to pure Theists, overwhelmed at the operations of Infinite Power, and lost in astonishment and awe. It requires Christianity to familiarize the mind with God, as our reconciled friend, in order that we may sympathize with His Almightyness, in the firm belief, that it is accomplishing the designs of infinite and everlasting love.

Thus, we have the whole sphere of emotion,—that which pleases is liked—that which intensely pleases is loved—and that which is universally loved, is the supremely beautiful. Love rises, by admiration and devotion to the One sublime, and sinks by pity and by terror to the other.

The theory of taste, which reconciles so many varying opinions, is in itself sufficiently simple.

Beauty, first founded upon the agreeable emotions, is extended by association, and is reflected back upon the material world. Mr. Alison draws too narrow a line, when he asserts that natural qualities may be "said to produce agreeable sensations, but not agreeable emotions,"—for what is an agreeable sensation, but a sensation attended with an emotion of pleasure. It is true, that the pleasure we derive from the mere view of material objects, does not remain simple and uncompounded, but is speedily mixed up with other feelings and operations of the mind. Most disputes respecting theories, arise from fixing too precise boundaries, and contracting nature within too narrow limits. It is scarcely, perhaps, necessary to say, that beauty is founded upon agreeable emotions; for all the movements of the mind, in the hand of a master, may become delightful, directly or indirectly; either beautiful in themselves, or adding to beauty by the force of contrast; nor can beauty be absent from the mind, when filled with the emotions of the beautiful.

The pleasures of imagination are not needed to complete the beautiful, where it already exists and has full possession of the mind—but the action of imagination necessarily accompanies the beautiful, because it is impelled into full exercise by the tide of emotions swelling in the breast. Dr. Brown, as formerly quoted, justly observed, that the form of beau-

ty filled the heart as it filled the eye ; but emotions do not exclude images, on the contrary, they excite them. The emotions, as being the more prevalent, occupy the attention ; but while the mind seems solely occupied by the passions which possess it, a thousand darkened images, unattended to and unrecalled, are hastily sweeping past ; and when the tumult has subsided, reappear in returning light, and assume their due place. Rousseau, in depicting himself, has well described, without fully comprehending, the inverse proportion which deep feeling and rapid imagery bear towards each other.

“Deux choses presque inalliables s’unissent en moi sans que j’en puisse concevoir la manière : un tempérament très ardent, des passions vives, impétueuses, et des idées très lentes à naître, embarrassées, et qui ne se présentent jamais qu’après coup. On diroit que mon cœur et ma tête n’appartiennent pas au même individu. Le sentiment, plus prompt que l’éclair, vient remplir mon âme ; mais au lieu de m’éclairer, il me brûle, il m’éblouit, je sens tout et je ne vois rien.”

Instead, however, of saying, with Mr. Alison, that the beautiful or sublime is the combined result of a train of images, and a series of similar emotions, it would be as correct to consider them as cause and effect,—the mind being once moved, the rest follows of course. Associated images spring from emotions,

and give birth to similar emotions, which prolong deepen, or diversify, that current of feeling which has already begun to flow.

After observing the growth of the beautiful and the poetical in the individual mind, it might be curious to trace its history in the progress of society. Of the three elements into which the subject has often been divided, according to the method of Addison, novelty takes the lead,—the new, the strange the wonderful, are what naturally attract the attention of the earliest tribes of mankind. To this, is added the pathetic, occasioned by the various turns of prosperity and adversity; then the sublime, in what relates to the operations of unseen power; and the beautiful always comes last, and seems to mark, that the first fervour of genius and of nations has passed away. When beauty fails, magnificence succeeds, and when magnificence fails, it gives place to false ornament, exaggeration, and bombast. At last genius itself gives place to taste, and nations, losing the susceptibility of youth, sit in judgment, in the decline of their existence, over the images that dazzled, and the feelings that warmed them, when their pulse beat high, and when the sun of life was yet in its zenith.

In addition to the pleasures of imagination, a new pleasure is derived from the medium through which the imagination conveys itself to the mind. Besides

the beauty of the scene that the painter intends to express, and which, could it pass from mind to mind instantaneously, would possess the charms of the ideal alone, there are all the varied resources that colouring possesses for the production of secondary beauties, and which, while they fix the fleeting landscapes, that otherwise would pass like a dream through the mind, may give to them somewhat of the purer sun and brighter day which is assigned by the poets to Elysium. In music, the very absence of words, and the use of sounds, which speak a universal language, give an opposite advantage to the sister art, and come over the soul like the first awakenings of the poetical spirit, yet unprovided with a definite subject, but which sees before it innumerable visions of beauty, faintly disclosing themselves in the dimness of distance. While poetry embraces the interval between both these wide extremes, able, by the more or less definite use of words, to raise up an immediate picture before the mind, or to escape, amidst a thousand shadows, into a world of dreams, while its accents vibrate with only undetermined melody.

One of the greatest sources of pleasure in works of imagination, has been far too much passed over. It is not the subject of the poem alone, or the picture, or the music, which gives us pleasure, but our sympathy with the master minds, which have produced the great works of art, and have reflected new

beauty over nature, and have given new energy to the soul of man. The same subjects might have occurred to ourselves, the same images presented themselves, and the delight which every one would have experienced, would have been proportioned to the depth of his feelings and the vigour of his fancy by the works of genius we are lifted above ourselves and receive an infusion of new life ; and we are admitted, not only to contemplate the earliest dawn of poetry, and the feelings which spring fresh from the contemplation of nature, but behold at once, without delay, the working of those mighty minds in their last result, and in the most finished form. In reading the writings, or beholding the works of the masters of antiquity, we thus enjoy a complex pleasure, arising at once from the subject and the manner of its treatment ; from the intellectual riches which great mental power has accumulated, and from the dazzling hues which genius, viewing every thing through its own richly-coloured medium, shows down upon the stores it has collected, and in which it is clothed with an undecaying brightness. As the Ancients contemplated the same cycle of tragic subjects, deriving new interest from the diversity of genius which gave variety to the confined range of topics, so we, on a far grander scale, may behold the images of nature remoulded into fresh creations, and arising more than the variety that we may suppose

worlds to possess which are illuminated by a plurality of diversely-coloured suns.

We shall find a striking similarity through all the parts of our intellectual frame, however dissimilar at first view; and in the present instance, we may observe a remarkable analogy between perception and taste. The world without us, would have resembled that scientific skeleton of matter presented by metaphysics, denuded of all the colouring which mind throws over it, were it not for our sensations being immediately superfused over the external world, and were it not that the scattered notices which we obtain of what exists without us, were moulded into shape by the plastic power of our intellect, and combined, though originally distinct and separate, into one harmonious whole. This is the first step of the rising scale of existence, where the dream of the ascending metempsychosis is found true, at least in the world within the mind. Imagination gives a second scale of ascent, in spreading a higher order of mental attributes over that world, half perceived, and half felt. The mental qualities which perception gives to nature, appear to inhere in the external world, while the hues which taste sheds over it, play around it with a variable lustre, withdraw their brightness from the objects which they first illuminated, and enlightens others in succession. We do not, therefore, ask what objects are beautiful, with the same confidence with which

we might pronounce what objects are green. beauty, though more changeable than the most fleeting play of colours, is yet supposed to be attached to some qualities of external existence, which, if they could be discovered, would be found, like the fabled Cestus, to confer the power of charm on whatever object possessed them. Mind is only sun that can shed such light around it, beauty expires, whenever the gaze of admiration is withdrawn.

Jupiter, according to the very ancient tradition was reported to have given to the inferior deities a portion of matter, that each might display his power in fabricating a world. The fable becomes a truth when applied to the human mind. We have given to us atoms and motion ; out of these we have constructed a splendid theatre of life, with its shifting scenery. The first era of our mental creation produced light, and gives form, to the dark and unshaped mass ; the second era gives a reflection of heaven to earth, changes that which is material into that which is half spiritual, and gives the bloom of unfaded youth and beauty, to that which is continually changing, and ever decaying. The final cause of the Creator opening so large a space for our minds to converse, is in some respects obvious. The benevolence of the design is, in the first place, conspicuous. In the enchanted gardens, which were to receive

adventurer in the midst of his toilsome journey, and to recreate him, by their refreshments and delights, for new labours, the ideal world receives us, worn out with the disappointments and the turmoil of real life, and inspires us with new spirits and fresh hopes for the future. Its very air is vital, and the lamp of life burns more brightly in its atmosphere. The final cause of this ideal enjoyment is all benevolent, for delight is the very element and principle of its nature ; only we must recollect, that it is intended as a refreshment, and not as a permanent rest ; for novelty is one of the talismans of its enchantment, and if that is lost, like the disenchanted of the Arabian tales, we find the magic gardens and palaces crumbling around us, and ourselves in the midst of a desert ; we have lost, not only the beauties of the ideal, but of the real world also ; the imaginary has vanished, and the real world has become doubly a wilderness.

Another final cause of the ideal world is observable in the progress of society. All the improvements which have taken place upon earth necessarily existed first in the visions of imagination before they could be realized in the affairs of life. Imagination may lead us to sigh for that which is unattainable, but without it man would have remained for ever in the narrow and contracted condition of the rudest tribes. That golden age, continually varying, sometimes re-

ferred to antiquity, and sometimes to futurity, the source of regret in fables and traditions, however unapproachable, and distant as are the heavens, still urges forward the steps of mankind in their progressive changes. It is to imagination that we trace the double aspect which history often presents of the same times and nations. The heroic ages, and the ages of violence—the real world, and its reflection in the imagination, the ideal world, like the substance and the shadow, are ever combined together in our recollections of the past, and our aspirations for the future.

But the ideal world is not only the anticipation of an improved condition of society, but it is the passage from the earth on which we tread, to the illuminated regions beyond it. To mere sense, all is narrow and contracted ; but imagination throws down the narrow boundaries of our terrestrial existence, and enlarges us into a middle state, whose limits are ever receding, till its confines appear to be lost in the expansion of the interminable heavens. They who are on earth, and whose notions are derived from the earth, seem to have no common medium of intercourse with the dwellers in heaven, who have ever abode in the light, and breathed the air of immortality ; but poetry and imagination serve as an interpreter between them, and God, through the vehicle of images, and uniting the character of prophet and

poet, has lifted up our minds by His heavenly messages and inspired messengers, from this "dim spot which men call earth," to behold the skirts of His far glory, and to elevate our thoughts and affections to the highest heavens ; imagination serving not only as a vehicle of communication, but also as a preparatory instructor, withdrawing us from immersion in matter, to a world which is akin to spirit, and the native abode of mind.

SECTION SEVENTH.

FREEDOM AND THE WILL.

God governs matter by necessity ; brutes by the simplicity of their instincts ; man, amid the multiplicity of his desires, by reasonable and moral choice. All action presupposes freedom ; for, as Clarke justly observes, “ to be an agent, signifies to have a power of beginning motion ; and motion cannot begin necessarily, because necessity of motion supposes an efficiency superior to, and irresistible by, the thing moved ; and, consequently, the beginning of the motion cannot be in that which is moved necessarily, but in the superior cause, or in the efficiency of some other cause still superior to that, till at length we arrive at some free agent ; which free agent, may either (which is the case of men) have received the power of beginning motion, from the will of a superior free agent ; or (which is the case of Almighty God) he may be himself necessarily existent, &c. ; but he cannot be a necessary agent

without an express contradiction in the very terms. All power of acting, essentially implies, at the same time, a power of not acting; otherwise, 'tis not acting, but barely being acted upon by that power (whatever it be) which causes the action."

If all action implies freedom, moral action still more so, when the present gratification is sacrificed to future advantage, and when the strongest desires are checked and directed by the spiritual law of conscience. Therefore, if the question were concerning the freedom of man, it appears to be plainly answered in the affirmative, both by the nature of things, and the uniform testimony of his consciousness; and this is quite sufficient for all practical purposes, for, excepting metaphysicians, none would dream of a higher liberty than that of acting according to the will, and of every one doing what he pleased. And the only sane wish that could be formed would be, not that such liberty should be augmented, which is impossible, but that it should be more wisely used, and that far from desiring any such chimera as the "*Fatis avolsa voluntas*" of the Epicureans, or the will of the Arminian divines, separated from the plan of Divine providence, man's desire and his prayer should be, that the human will should be more according with the Divine will, unerringly wise, and determinately holy.

Thus far in favour of liberty all are agreed, if we

confine the question to the freedom of action, or, that man does what he chooses to do. "By liberty," says Hume, "we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determination of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then, is no subject of dispute." And yet, with all this promise of peace and agreement, there has arisen here, as Hume justly observes, "the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science." This question is, whether the will be free or not. It is agreed on both sides, that the question is nonsensical, for since freedom consists in acting according to the will, the question of the freedom of the will can only be interpreted, whether the will wills as it wills? Upon a question begun under such auspices, it is not surprising that more absurdity has been written than upon any other topic whatsoever.

The first remarkable effect of the dispute consists in the absurdity, that those who at the entrance of the dispute, had protested against the phrase; yet are in the end, carried into the vortex, and earnestly contend for or against that, which is either an abuse of words, or the starting of a new and separate inquiry. Locke justly calls it "that long agitated, and, I think, unreasonable, because unintelligible question, whether

man's will be free or no? for if I mistake not, it follows from what I have said, that the question itself is altogether improper; and it is as insignificant to ask whether man's will be free, as to ask whether his sleep be swift, or his virtue square; liberty being as little applicable to the will, as swiftness of motion is to sleep, or squareness to virtue."

"To talk of liberty," says Jonathan Edwards, "or the contrary, as belonging to the very will itself, is not to speak good sense;" and yet the treatise from whence this remark is taken is entitled, "On the Freedom of the Will."

Two very different questions are mixed up together—the freedom of action, and the determination of the will. Since the last question is one of little use, and, as ordinarily happens in such circumstances, of great difficulty, it was of the utmost importance to have kept it distinct, and not farther to embroil it, by terms relating to another inquiry, and which, when misapplied, become either unmeaning or absurd.

As is usual in disputes, both parties are in the wrong. Those who take the side of necessity, having their minds too much filled with images, and terms borrowed from the material world; those who contend for free will, on the contrary, contend for a freedom in man, greater than that which is ascribed to the Deity himself,—a freedom which may be ex-

pressed in words, but scarcely can be conceived, even in thought or imagination.

Those who contend for necessity, abuse the meaning of words. "Philosophical necessity," says Jonathan Edwards, "is really nothing else than the full and fixed connection between the things signified by the subject, and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be true." "In this sense, I use the word necessity in the following discourse, when I endeavour to prove that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty." Here we have an alarming, and, in the hands of most men, an immoral paradox, which, with Edwards, turns out to be a poor truism, and to have nothing remarkable, except the misapplication of the word; instead of necessity, use the proper term certainty, and we have the safe and politic conclusion, that certainty is not inconsistent with liberty. Through the whole of this controversy, there is a continual war of words, and secret change of propositions, which greatly adds to the original cloudiness of the subject. We have also the phrase in Edwards of "moral inability," which may serve in popular discourse, but is altogether improper in a strict treatise, where it is intended to express, not a want of ability, but simply a want of willingness to obey the law of conscience. If the term necessity, when applied to the will of man, is immoral; when ascribed to the Divine will, it is both absurd and profane.

For necessity, substitute the word certainty, and the assertion that the Divine determinations are certain, will not provoke many disputants. What is chiefly objectionable in Edwards' treatise, is the improper use of terms; alter a few words, and the whole will appear so simple and reasonable, that at least nine tenths of the work might be dispensed with.

It is amusing to find not only Lord Kaimes, from whose co-operation Edwards is anxious to free himself, but even David Hume, contending for the scheme of necessity; he who boasted that he had destroyed the necessary connection between cause and effect, and reduced the scholastic notion of power and causation, merely to constant conjunction. His demonstration is an easy one, as there is no other necessity in the material world than constant conjunction, wherever there is constant conjunction, there is necessity, and there being a constant conjunction between motives and volition, the determinations of the will are as necessary as the movements of matter.

The opposite party, who maintain the other extreme, have fallen into still more striking errors. Reid, in order to escape from the scheme of necessity, has made the strange assertion, that "if a deliberate action means only, as it commonly does, an action done by a cool and calm determination of the mind, with forethought and will, I believe there are innumerable such actions done without a motive."

Here, to do honour to the will, there is volition supposed without a motive, and action without an object ! “ This,” says Reid, “ must be appealed to every man’s consciousness. I do many trifling actions every day, in which, upon the most careful reflection, I am conscious of no motive.”

Steuart, though in general an undeviating follower of Reid, has deserted him on the present occasion. “ Every action,” says Steuart, “ is performed with some view, or, in other words, is performed from some motive. Dr. Reid, indeed, denies this with zeal, but I am doubtful if he has strengthened his cause by doing so;” but Steuart has committed a more grievous error than Reid. “ The argument for necessity,” Steuart observes, “ derives all its force from the maxim, that every change requires a cause. But this cause, although true with respect to inanimate matter, does not apply to intelligent agents, which cannot be conceived without the power of *self-determination*.” Such violent modes of escape would naturally give one a high notion of the arguments of the necessitarians, which a perusal of their writings, or even a simple inquiry of what they mean by necessity, (not to mention the vagueness and impropriety of other terms,) is well qualified to dispel.

The prescience of the Deity is supposed to be another stronghold of the necessitarians, because events, it is agreed, could not be foreknown, unless they

were necessary. Here, be it observed, we have the usual mistake of necessity for certainty. Clarke has no other way of meeting the argument than supposing two presciences in the Deity,—one certain, for certain truths; and the other almost certain, if he durst say so, for uncertain events. Mr. Steuart seems rather inclined, though with his usual caution, to invalidate the doctrine of the divine prescience, in its fullest extent. “Shall we venture to affirm, that it exceeds the power of God to permit such a train of contingent events to take place, as his own foreknowledge shall not extend to? Does not such a proposition detract from the Omnipotence of God, in the same proportion in which it aims to exalt his Omniscience?” It might seem a hopeless attempt “to aim to exalt Omniscience,” and it is a new feature in natural religion, to take from one infinite attribute in order to bestow upon another.

Here is, again, the confusion between necessity and certainty. There can be no certain knowledge of uncertain things, and if the mind were exempted from the law of causation, according to Steuart, or could will without a motive, according to Reid, then, being under the dominion of chance, and every thing being arbitrary and unfixed, the uncertainty of events would preclude the certainty of knowledge. But if the same certainty be allowed to the operations of the mind; if God has given laws to it, as well as to

the material world, the same certainty, though not the same necessity, attends moral as well as material phenomena, and no difficulty remains respecting the divine prescience and human liberty, excepting the mode of the divine intelligence, which is equally beyond our comprehension, whether in regard to events past, present, or to come. And though many pitiful arguments are allowed to pass on such subjects as the present, it would scarcely be permitted to any one to say, except under the disguise of technical terms, "I neither foreknow future events, nor see how they can be foreknown, except as necessary results from existing causes, and therefore must deny that knowledge to the Deity which I do not possess myself."

To do as we will—this is freedom, and this, it is acknowledged, we possess; but the holders of the chimaera of "free-will," are not content with this; the liberty they wish, consists, not in doing, but willing—not in free action, but in a free nonentity; the will is not free unless they will to will; as each act of will, therefore, supposes a pre-act of the will, in order to make it free, they must have existed in a state of volition from all eternity; and yet the first will could not be free, because there was no act could be previous to the first. Others have preferred the will of indifference, that is, of choosing without choice. All seem inclined to claim the same privilege for their

will, as that of the divine existence—that it should exist without a cause. Thus they would withdraw themselves from the empire of Jehovah, and fix their abode in the chaos of Milton, where uncaused effects were continually taking place under the sway of the Anarch Old.

Such is the result of having the continual fear of necessity before their eyes; they properly wish to withdraw the soul from the conditions of matter, and they have withdrawn it from the conditions of all existence. Even the Divine will, always regulated by that which is wisest and best, does not enjoy that liberty of indifference, which they would claim for the mind of man. The necessitarians, on the other side, seeing that the human mind, in the scheme of the libertists, was given to the empire of chance; to escape from uncertainty and anarchy, threw themselves under the dominion of necessity.

What better could be hoped from the issue of a dispute begun by confounding two separate questions—the freedom of our actions, and the determination of our will—and carried on with a scholastic subtilty, with all the shifting, and uncertainty that general and ill-defined terms afford? The will, for example, is used with every variety and latitude of signification,—from simple volition to the concurrence and complexity of all the powers of the mind, which precede a choice, after long and difficult deliberation.

Motives are treated of, as if they had an actual existence, independent of and extrinsic to the mind on which they act; and the mind is spoken of as if it were passive under their influence, whereas it is the mind which makes the motive, and no object could have any influence over us, were it not for our appetites, desires, and affections. The true way of getting any insight into the question, has as usual been overlooked, and men who could not trace the process of their mind in coming to the simplest determination, respecting objects before their eyes, have been boldly dogmatising about the limits of the human faculties, and even the determination of the will of God. To supply the want of reflection upon their own minds, so rare, from the difficulty of turning the attention inwards, disputants have largely availed themselves of figurative terms, and analogical reasonings from the material world; and, instead of endeavouring to arrest the fleeting operations of mind, have thought the whole question to be decided, by problems about weights and balances, or the relative strength of impelling forces.

But the more we contemplate our minds, at the farther remove do we perceive them to be from matter,—activity and choice have no resemblances. And the difference is still more striking when compared with the inactivity of matter. The mind, instead of yielding to the first impulse that presents itself, or at

once choosing of two objects, that which appears to be the more preferable, often suspends its choice till after long investigation, or even defers that choice until a distant period.

When our eye is first turned inwards on our own existence, no object at first is discerned in the obscurity; but when the mental sight is accustomed to the darkness, we begin to perceive the dim outlines of that which lies nearest to us, and entertain hopes that, by practice and patience, we shall altogether penetrate into the recesses of our being. But shadows and thick-coming fancies cheat our gaze, till we end as we began, unable long to fix our attention on that which is so dark and evanescent. Consciousness itself is partial; the soul contemplates not itself, and has no knowledge of its own existence, till that is revealed to it by its acts and emotions. We see not ourselves in that internal mirror, but only the partial flickerings of our shadow; and reflection comes too late to overtake even all the scanty and imperfect notices of consciousness. We seek to look at a picture, but find it in vain to arrest the fleeting image, which has glanced and disappeared. We see, in the operations of our will, the impress of the Deity, and the remains of that image in which man was created, but we are soon baffled in tracing these hidden and mysterious movements to their source. Yet the general outline may be partially marked, and

may, perhaps, be filled up in some of its details by careful induction. We ascend, but **step by step**, to the summit of existence,—actions depend on the will, the will on the mind, the mind on the creation and its laws, the creation on the will of God, the divine will on the divine attributes, and these attributes on the nature of God, necessary, absolute, and perfect,—the fulness of being.

The mixture of two separate questions in the dispute concerning the freedom of the will, has not only raised needless difficulties, but has withdrawn the attention from the moral improvement of both the subjects, which have been so confusedly jumbled together—the freedom of action, and the determination of the will. The only true freedom resides with virtue; the vicious have the power of volition, but they voluntarily resign it, since their volitions are not accompanied by reason, and the will is enslaved to appetite, instead of continuing its master. All men are born free, but that freedom admits of continual increase or diminution, in proportion as men control or submit “to the inferior laws that rule our clay.” Of all slavery, vice is the most hopeless and the most tyrannical, since, for it, the trumpet of jubilee sounds in vain; the wretch is in love with thralldom, and clings to his fetters.

On the other hand, there is a continual enlargement of liberty, from the pursuit of virtue. That

which was only spontaneous, becomes at last voluntary; the will obtains a wider command over the thoughts, and even where it does not exert a direct influence, yields a cheerful assent to the laws which regulate our intellectual frame, and which are so clearly the emanations of infinite wisdom, and everlasting love.

Again, with regard to the second question, the determination of the will, human volitions are only too indeterminate, and if we might apply so absurd an expression to the will, it abuses an excess of freedom. To-day the will chooses happiness, and to-morrow pleasure. At one moment it is ready to resign every thing, for the sake of ultimate well-being, and, at another, it regards nothing but the base and perishing gratification of the present instant. The human will is much more indeterminate, and what some would call more free than the divine will. God always chooses that which is best,—man often permits himself the liberty of choosing that which is worst. We would earnestly desire that such freedom should speedily be abridged; that man should not act according to reason one day, and to passion the next—should not submit his will to his desires, but his desires to his reason, and that the will of man should ever be in accordance with his understanding and his conscience. It is but too evident that this is not the case in the present world; to see the bet-

ter, and the worse pursue, is the history of the
man race, and this can only be changed and ame-
red by changing the will :

“ He who’s convinced against his will,
Is of the old opinion still.”

An outward change, without an inward, may
favourable to hypocrisy, but not to virtue. The
the question, what determines the will ? may be
use. The will is determined by the mind. The o-
ly real change for the better must take place wit-
in. The evils which prevail, will continue to do s-
till there is a renovation of the heart of man ; as
thus the doctrine of the necessity of regeneration,
not only inculcated by Revelation, is proved by the
light of nature.

SECTION EIGHTH.

THEORY OF MORALS.

"THERE is no part of philosophy," Reid justly observes, "more subtle and intricate than that which is called the Theory of Morals. Nor is there any more plain and level to the apprehension of man than the practical part of morals." That which is important is plain—that which is dark is comparatively useless.

Metaphysics treat of the origin of our notions ; but it is not with our notions in their origin, but when full formed, that we have to do in the affairs of life. Philosophers with difficulty arrive at a few scanty rills, which they suppose to be the sole fountain-heads of our information, and would cut off a portion of the full current of knowledge, in order to reduce its size to what they suppose to be the limited supplies deduced from its source. The natural and reasonable conclusion is overlooked, that we have

mistaken the true branch of the Nile, and that a mightier flood rolls on, though in darkness, and in a different direction, to that in which we have been prosecuting our discoveries.

These are the great sources of error ; first, the imperfect analysis of our ideas,—when we have a little untwined the complicated thread of thoughts, we suppose that we have reduced them to their greatest simplicity. The second error is, that, having in part taken down the machinery, in attempting to reconstruct it, we often leave out some of the principal springs of movement. The third error is, that, even if we had perfectly analysed and completely reconstructed the mechanism of our minds, we should treat it too much as simple mechanism, and not make sufficient allowance for the growth and expansion of life, and that enlargement, which our notions are continually receiving from the plastic power of the mind. All the rudiments of the oak may exist in the acorn, but yet our surprise would not be the less, could we bring together, without a wide interval of time, the seed and its mature production ; and part of the paradoxical appearance which metaphysics wears, proceeds from bringing the seeds of thought, and their mature growth, into immediate contact and comparison, and not making sufficient allowance for the vast variety of notions which have separated their origin from their completeness, and the

many combinations of thought that have occurred during the intermediate time.

Hence the intricacy of the theory of morals—moral philosophy is most complex—other subjects engross but a part of the mind, but as the moral faculty is the governing power, morality embraces the whole of man. Moral notions are not only complex but evanescent. Conscience pronounces its sentence amid a multitude, and often a tumultuous one, of thoughts, and having spoken, and that only perhaps in whispers, seems to retire from observation; and not acting separately, but conjointly with other powers, such as judgment, the reasoning faculty and the affections, it is often hid from the inattentive view by its concomitants, which hold a more prominent station in the mind. Hence the variety of opposing systems, from the same cause, as in other branches of the study of the mind, but to a greater extent. Each system is partially true, but, viewed as a whole, imperfect; each writer's object is to make his theory pass for a full representation of the truth, and hence he is forced to exaggerate a part, till it occupies a disproportionate space; and each theorist is at war with his neighbour, mistaking a friend for an enemy, and endeavouring, by a multitude of arguments, to drive him from a position, which, instead of being an annoyance, might prove a support to his own. Thus truth, as Milton observes, resembles the

mangled limbs of Osiris ; and it is the task of a lover of truth to recompose the scattered members, and unite them, if possible, in one well proportioned body.

In following this task we have the advantage of the arguments which each writer urges in favour of his own theory, and escape the conflicting shower of missiles, by which each party, very unnecessarily, endeavours to harass and vex his opponents.

As moralists lean to the head, or to the heart, they place the source of morality in the understanding, or in the affections. The lowest ground that can be taken is that, which fixes morality upon the basis of prudence, and yet this, though no splendid theory, is not altogether to be rejected, "Be ye wise as serpents, and harmless as doves." He who does well for himself, is but too apt to do ill to his neighbour, for the goods of the present life, even if equally divided, being limited in their nature, could afford but a scanty portion for each, and most men, therefore, if it were in their power, would take more than their share. But the prudence which would avoid evil without inflicting it, is recommended by reason as well as divinity, and forms, in the Book of Proverbs, a portion of the instruction which the wise king addresses to all the children of men.

Prudence, many would justly enlarge into wisdom, not confining themselves to the present transitory life, but extending the regards of morality to our in-

terests beyond the grave, and providing for our well-being through the endless flow of ages. And though interest, separately considered, stands apart in the conception of our minds, though not in the reality of things, from duty; and, therefore, must be considered as the concomitant of morality, and not its essence, still an interest that penetrates so deep into futurity, removed far above the low cares and degrading pursuits of mortality, seems to throw off the inferior nature that it once possessed, and to pass into a higher and nobler order of being.

A third class, like Wollaston, may place morality in the observance of truth in our actions, and believe that every man gives the lie to himself, who is guilty of vice, and such a notion, though easily caricatured, may be allowed to come in for some portion of consideration. Still more respect is due to the fourth opinion, which places morality in conformity to the eternal relations of things, or founds it on truth without the mind, and in following nature according to the ancient moralists,—that nature, which is the emanation of divine wisdom and goodness, with its immutable relations, such as Clarke and others have described, the eternal fitness of things.

Those who have placed morality in feelings have much to urge in their behalf; for till the heart is engaged, as well as the head, on the side of virtue, how little is gained by empty, airy speculations, except to deaden the conscience. The benevolent feelings

form so large a portion of morality, that those who rather feel than think, have an excuse for resting the basis of morality there. When benevolence is joined with the conviction of the understanding, it is easy and obvious, at first view, to adopt, with Hume and with Paley, under different modifications, utility as the essence, or, if not the essence, as the test of morality. A scheme which unites the most agreeable of our passions with the most obvious observations of the understanding, and unites both, if the theorist be a Theist, with the primal design of the Deity in creation—the happiness of his creatures.

Others, not contented with the freedom with which theories may be shaped and altered, that are founded merely in the benevolent affections, would give them a still more airy, elegant, and gentlemanlike character, like Lord Shaftesbury, by resting morality chiefly upon taste, and those scarcely definable beauties and graces,

“ Which Theocles in raptured vision saw.”

Or, if they wish for a theory, still more indebted to the imagination, others, with Smith, may construct the moral sense upon sympathy, and ascribe the instantaneous approbation of conscience to a complicated, circumflex process, by which we put ourselves into the situation of other men—enter into their feelings—approve or condemn them, if they coincide with our feelings, and then invert the process, and con-

demon our feelings, if they do not coincide with what we imagine to be the feelings of other men, and test our whole conduct by the view of that ideal representative of the human race, which Smith styles "the man within the breast."

* So many powers contributing to the moral decisions of the mind, many have considered that no additional faculty was needed, and that reason of itself was sufficient to regulate our affections, and to preserve them all in their due order. But the opening of our moral faculties, like the opening of many of our powers, belongs to an earlier period of life, than the development of reason, and the decision of conscience is instantaneous, while the understanding, to reach its conclusions, has need of a previous train of thought. There are also notions peculiar to our moral powers, which can only justly be derived from their being suggested by the operations of conscience, since they are not attributable to any other inlet of knowledge.

We may dispute about a name, whether this new inlet of knowledge should be called the moral sense—the moral faculty—or conscience; but as any of these will serve the purpose, we may use them indifferently. Far too much stress is laid upon defining terms, as if names, by the influence of magical sounds, could instantly put a period to our difficulties and darkness. In using the word conscience, we express at one time the moral sense—at another time, the

whole process of thought, and the union of all our powers, by which we reach moral determination, in the same manner as by the word will, we express at one time a simple volition, and at another time, all the operations of the mind which were previous to volition. Nor, did we restrict these two terms to their simplest sense, should we be much advantaged; for the mind, rejecting narrow logical fetters, would, before we were aware, resume its ancient free train of proceeding—and now viewing notions, more solitary—now grouping them together, and changing, however slightly, yet continually, the combination of its thoughts, would leave to the precision of our definitions merely a verbal accuracy.

Conscience is the revelation of nature,—brief, oracular, and imperfect. Such as its edicts are, they are the pre-intimations of a more full disclosure of the Divine Will—they are propounded to us in the form of laws, and as transcripts, however partial, of the great and eternal law of God which bears sway over all his intelligent creation. They make a marked distinction between that which is and that which OUGHT TO BE—they are prophetic, as looking forward to the period when the latter shall supersede the former, and when the equity of God shall prevail over the iniquity of man. They carry the thoughts from the visible, to the invisible—from the false opinions and unjust decisions which prevail

on earth, to the tribunal of an unseen Judge, to whom all secrets are known, and to whom all hearts are open. It is, however, but a momentary lightning, which reveals to us for an instant far distant objects, and leaves us again in our usual state of dim-sightedness. Besides, from the combining power of the mind, the elements of thought, like the elements of matter, never remain separate, but enter immediately into new unions. The other faculties of the understanding, immediately blend with the moral sense, and conscience and reason appear but as one conjunct power.

It is a usual question—on what is obligation founded, and especially the obligation of conscience? some ascribing obligation to moral fitness, and others to power, and the penalties which power enacts. Conscience owes its binding force to its legislative character—it obliges, because it is a law, and law requires both conditions—moral fitness, and also rewards and penalties, to complete its sanctions. A tyrant may attach pains and penalties to the infraction of his edicts, yet are they not, strictly speaking, laws. Lycurgus or Solon might propose wise rules which deserved to be obeyed, but without the power of the state to back them, these rules were only exhortations and precepts, and became laws only when enforced by the civil power, and guarded by penalties attached to their infraction. All laws ultimately owe

their authority to the Supreme Law, and the Divine Lawgiver, and derive their obligation from the sanctity of the Lawgiver's character, as well as from the awfulness of his justice.

From conscience we derive the sentiment of moral approbation or disapprobation; "our thoughts accusing or excusing each other;" the perception of right and wrong; of merit or guilt; of remorse and a retributive future;—notions which, even in the ignorance of the Pagans, scooped out the depth of Tartarus, and unbarred the gates of Elysium; and which let in, even amid the apathy and obstruction of the grave, far deeper cares and absorbing joys, than were agitating the breasts of the living in the busiest scenes of life. It is here that we have an inlet for Christianity, when everything else seems closed to its proposals; the rudest savage and the most obdurate infidel having in conscience, one part of their intellectual frame at least, which vibrates to the message of mercy, though every thing else may be callous, past feeling, and utterly hopeless; for the life of the spirit makes its last stand there.

As, in the body, the functions that are the most delicate and the most important, are the most strictly guarded against injury, so the tenderness of conscience, which is of most importance to preserve, is strengthened and surrounded by many concurring powers, all ready to guard it, and to act along with

it. "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," is the divine standard of morality; and though it serves to condemn, rather than to direct, in the present fallen condition of our nature, yet how many tendencies are there, to enable us to recover the right position, and to bring the lower portions of our nature into due subjection. How pity pleads against hardheartedness and selfishness, and beneficence is profitable for this life, as it would be, if acting on right motives, for the life to come; while reason is ever pointing out, that interest and duty are combined, and that he who transgresses the Divine Law, independent of positive punishments, is sinning against his own soul. In other portions of our frame, wherever many springs of movement combine to one end, the result generally surpasses our expectation; and, had there been no great disturbing cause, such as exists in the fall of man from his original rectitude, conscience, receiving so many tributary currents, would have had a force proportioned to the station assigned to it, more than enlarging with the growth of all our other faculties, and, as in sovereign place, so in regal majesty, would have held an undisturbed sway, and preserved, by its pervading influence, the harmony and the unity of the mind.

But the case is far otherwise: when we enumerate the classes of men by their prevailing bias, we readily find the ambitious, the covetous, and the volup-

tuous ; but with some difficulty should we find any great numbers who were steadily and uniformly conscientious, except where conscience has found a much more powerful ally, in the new and renovating principle of religion. Instead of the dictates of conscience becoming clearer and clearer, and making their voice heard above all the notices that we derive from the other faculties of the mind ; even the moralist seems to doubt, whether we have a conscience at all, and the ruling power is so fallen from its high supremacy, that one of the attendants is continually mistaken for the sovereign. It is well, therefore, that conscience is strengthened from a higher source. Conscience being given to us in the form of a law, necessarily refers us to the Lawgiver ; thus the Eternal Law and the Supreme Will enter into the constitution of Morality, and the passage is short and unavoidable from Ethics to Religion.

Warburton had the great merit, in modern times, of first endeavouring to reconcile the unnecessary disputes concerning the origin of morals : he, himself, with great candour and ingenuity, points out that Chrysippus had been beforehand with him, in antiquity ; but it must be owned, that the text of Chrysippus, admirable as it is, owes its chief value to the commentary of Warburton.

Warburton first remarks on the confusion produced by the disputes concerning morals :—" A con-

fusion so great, that was Morality herself, of which the ancients made a goddess, to appear personally, and be questioned concerning her birth, I am persuaded she would be tempted to answer, as Homer does in Lucian, that her commentators had so entangled and embarrassed the dispute, that she was now as much at a loss as they to account for her original."

Warburton goes on admirably to observe:—"Each animal hath its instinct implanted by nature, to direct him to his greatest good. Among these, man hath his; to which modern philosophers have given the name of, first, the Moral Sense,—an instinctive approbation of right and abhorrence of wrong, prior to all reflection on their nature or their consequences."

"Second, The Reasoning Faculty improved upon its dictates; for, reflecting men, naturally led to examine the foundation of reason, in this moral sense, soon discovered that there were real essential differences in the qualities of human actions, established by nature; and, consequently, that the love and hatred excited by the moral sense, were not capricious in their operations; for, that the essential properties of their objects had a specific difference."

"Third, A Superior Will; and such a will could not be found, till the being and attributes of God were established, but was discovered with them."

"On these principles, then, namely, the moral

sense, the essential difference in human actions, and the will of God, is built the whole edifice of practical morality; each of which principles hath its distinct motive to enforce it; compliance with the moral sense being attended with a grateful sensation; compliance with the essential differences of things being the promoting the order and harmony of the universe; and compliance with the will of God, the obtaining reward and avoiding punishment." "This admirable provision for the support of virtue hath been, in great measure, defeated by its pretended advocates; who, in their eternal squabbles about the true foundation of morality, and the obligation to its practice, have sacrilegiously untwisted this threefold cord; and each running away with the part he esteemed the strongest, hath affixed that to the Throne of Heaven, as the golden chain that is to unite and draw all to it."

As Warburton was successful in pointing out the coincidence of the different sources of morality, so Butler excelled in establishing the supremacy of the moral sense or conscience. He improved upon those noble views of the ancients, the elder Academics, and the Stoics, which considered human nature as a whole. "Every bias, instinct, propension within, is a real part of our nature, but not the whole; add to these, the superior faculty, whose office it is to adjust, manage, and preside over them, and take in

this its natural superiority, and you complete the idea of human nature. And as in civil government, the Constitution is broken in upon and violated by power and strength prevailing over authority ; so the constitution of man is broken in upon and violated by the lower faculties, or principles within, prevailing over that which is in its nature supreme over them all."

But we cannot look abroad upon the world, without perceiving that, among the generality, conscience, though the sovereign place be due to it, is either dethroned, or mocked with an empty title of royalty, while it is deprived of the supreme power ; and, as in the Republics of Greece, before the Legislators arose, every portion preponderates in turns, to the manifest injury of the whole. There is order in the structure, but none in the working of the machinery. Nothing can be more different than the duty of man and the history of man, and, while conscience points out that *which ought to be*, that *which is* sufficiently demonstrates the anarchy into which the human mind has fallen.

But though conscience is disregarded, it is by no means obliterated ; the actions of men may be governed by appetite, by passion, or custom, and, above all, by false, though apparent, interest ; yet what conscience dictates to be done, may still be as manifest, as the laws of a State continue to be, though their

authority is disregarded. The actual disorder neither annihilates nor entirely conceals the original and designed order ; as Butler justly observes :—"The body may be impaired by sickness, the tree may decay, a machine be out of order, and yet the system and constitution of them not totally dissolved. There is plainly somewhat which answers to all this in the moral constitution of man."

As in a State where the power is on one side, and the right on the other, it requires an intervenient aid to re-establish order, and to replace the legitimate authority in the exercise of its functions ; so it requires more than human power to restore conscience to its rightful dominion, and to bring the inferior principles and passions into their due subjection.

If the moral faculty is weak in most men, it is owing to want of culture. There is ample provision in the mind for its complete development ; no other power is aided by so many concurrent faculties, or derives accession from so many different sources. We have only to attend to the dictates of conscience, to render its oracles more frequent and more distinct, and those parts of the human frame which are most apt to resist its authority, when once brought into subjection, would augment its power, and aid in enforcing its dictates. There is no need of dreaming, with the Stoics, of extirpating the passions ; if

duly regulated, they become the ministers, not the opponents, of duty, and pleasure herself, though considered the chief foe of virtue, is ready to act as her handmaid.

Mistaken notions of Christianity have discouraged the culture of Moral Philosophy in latter days, and the moderns have not effected so much as the ancients, with all their disadvantages, in this branch of the study of the mind. Christianity was not intended to supersede the exercise of our powers, but rather to invigorate their exertions, by giving them the right direction, and supplying them with the true data on which to proceed. Instead of furnishing a system of morals, Christianity has afforded a new fountain of spiritual existence, from which that system may be deduced, by implanting a new and stronger principle of virtue, by conferring upon its disciples a renovated and god-like nature, and by exchanging that external law, which only enforces an outward compliance, for that inward law which is written on the fleshly tables of the heart. Where our faculties cannot penetrate into the invisible world, and into the secrets of futurity, Christianity affords us the light and information of a supernatural revelation ; but where our native faculties are commensurate with the attainment of truth, we are called to press forward in the pursuit of excellence and of knowledge, and to advance in moral science,

as in natural, by the sincere and diligent exercise of our faculties. "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things."

SECTION NINTH.

RELIGION.

THERE are two inlets by which the belief of a Deity is received into the soul,—the philosophic and the moral ; the principle which refers every event, to a cause,—and the form which conscience assumes of a law, thereby carrying the mind necessarily to the notion of a lawgiver.

The argument for the existence of a Deity has been divided, according to the scholastic jargon, into the arguments, *à priori*, and *à posteriori*. The term *à priori*, in this case, it has often been observed, is an absurd mistake, and a ridiculous misnomer. It has not, however, been remarked, that both these arguments are different forms of the same principle,—that every event must have a cause.

The popular proof for a Deity, consists in design ; and this is so independent of metaphysics, that all which speculative philosophy can do, tends rather to

diminish than to increase conviction. This is the method which Paley has followed in his admirable work on Natural Theology. He enters into no disquisition concerning the way in which design may be inferred from its effects,—appeals to no law in the mind by which the belief in design is founded,—refutes few metaphysical sophisms of speculative atheists, but merely details the facts as he finds them, selecting and giving prominence to those which are most likely to affect a plain and unbiased understanding; and the result is most triumphant and satisfactory. The proof, in the cumulative augmentation of moral probability, approaches so indefinitely near to demonstration, that all objections may be safely and wisely disregarded, as belonging to a far lower order of argument; since possibilities have no weight, when balanced against probabilities, nor probabilities, when weighed against demonstration.

In a treatise on the mind, however, matters are different. There nicer doubts must be resolved, and slighter scruples weighed, than merit attention in theology or in morals, where the question is, not how our notions are formed, but what we ought to believe, or what we ought to practise.

Hume has denied, and Reid has affirmed, “that design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred with certainty, from marks or signs of it in the effect.” As the existence of other minds, however, is inferred,

not from an immediate intuition of the existence of other minds, but from the marks and signs of intelligence in their conduct and actions, Hume's rashness, and unphilosophical presumption, incurred some ridicule, from composing, printing, and publishing, a work without having any reason, on his own philosophy, to infer the existence of any intelligent beings capable of benefiting by its perusal. It is sufficient to observe, without entering upon metaphysical sophistry, that no one acknowledged to be sane, doubts the existence of his fellow-creatures; and whoever will give himself the trouble of summing up his reasons for the belief of their existence, will find that the same arguments apply with still greater force to prove the being of the Supreme and Original Mind. We infer design from its effects,—the question how we do so, is speculative and not practical; whether a law of thought be original or acquired, impressed upon the mind from the first, or the result of its matured powers, does not affect its title to authority, nor lessen its claim to our obedience; we therefore do not question the justice of the axiom, or its importance, when we hesitate to pronounce, with Reid, that “the metaphysical principle” of design being deduced from its effects, is a peculiar and ultimate law of thought.

To constitute it so, we must carry with us, from the first, “marks or signs” by which to judge of design.

If this were the case, the child must be possessed of criteria, which the philosopher is unable to assign; but the readiest mode to shew that this is not an ultimate action, is to resolve it into simpler terms. Instead of stating the proposition, as Reid has done, "design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred with certainty from marks or signs of it in the effect," and yet without specifying what these marks or signs are; this law of thought may be simply expressed thus: Fitnesses imply design. We use the plural number, for in popular apprehension one fitness does not exclude chance,—a single arrow may hit the mark, and yet be accounted a random shot; but a flight of arrows, equally successful, imply not only an aim, but a steady one. Wherever, therefore, there is a concurrence of means towards an end, the mind no longer retains any hesitation in ascribing this concurrence to designing intelligence.

Now, that fitnesses should imply design, requires no new inlet of thought, and no additional power of thinking. Fitness implies an end for which it is fitted, and the perception and choice of an end, equally implies mind and design. The proof, indeed, for a supreme mind, is short and simple. There are but three hypotheses. Whatever happens, must happen by chance,—by necessity,—or by design. These three conditions exhaust all possibilities. Chance is the first refuge of ignorance, and necessity the se-

cond. Every event has a cause; when the mind ascribes any event to chance, it merely pleads its ignorance of the cause. The plea of necessity is only a more learned ignorance. Necessity is not a cause, but an effect,—not power, but the want of it,—the not being able to offer resistance to superior force. The term necessary, has been applied, though not in strict propriety, to the Divine being, to designate absolute and unlimited existence. It has also been applied, with still greater impropriety, instead of the term certainty, to the determinations of the will. That which is necessary, is that which cannot be otherwise; it is true, the Divine being cannot be otherwise, because his essence is the fulness of being, to which nothing can be added, and from which nothing can be taken away; but this is a necessity solitary and incomparable, for which the term absolute were better substituted. Every other necessity of existence, except that which is connected with unlimited, indeterminable, and absolute being, is a necessity which is not original, but which is so constituted by the will of a superior. Blind necessity could perceive no ends,—admit no limits,—and use no means; therefore, fitness is altogether incompatible with necessity. Power also implies choice and will, for that which does not will to act, if it acts at all, must be previously acted upon. Hence original power and choice are inseparable, and the supreme

power must inevitably have its seat in the supreme mind.

Necessity, far from being a cause itself, must exist by the appointment of an ulterior cause, and that cause must be mind. Every effect must have a cause,—every true and ultimate cause must have a choice,—and therefore intelligence. Therefore all effects, in the last instance, originate from mind ; and if there be any other causes but mind that deserve the name, they are merely instrumental causes, acting with borrowed power.

We are thus led to adopt, in a higher sense, the notion of Thales,—wherever there is motion there is mind ; and to ascribe every change to a cause, and every cause to the first cause.

The argument from design, and the general proof from causation, rests upon the same ultimate law of thought, and possess the same evidence of moral demonstration ; but even to such profound thinkers as Reid and Steuart, the argument from design appears much the clearer, and more certain of the two. Reid and Steuart have so far misconceived the more abstract mode of demonstration used by Clarke, as to suppose that it necessarily involved the peculiar notions entertained by himself, as well as Newton, respecting space. But these peculiarities might be set aside, as we before observed, and the argument would still remain unbroken and entire.

It may be propounded in a very brief, and sufficiently comprehensible form. Every change has a cause. Then, (since an infinite series of causes is absurd,) there must be a first cause, eternal and unchangeable. Existence, without a cause or origin, must be unlimited and absolute, as well as eternal; for where there is no cause to constitute, there is no cause to limit. The first Being, since unlimited and absolute, must be all-being, infinitely wise, good, and perfect; containing the fulness of every excellence that can exist, without defect, as without limit.

We have already noticed in what manner the Divine Existence excludes number; but it may be proper to remark on the mistakes regarding the Divine Unity in a note [D]. The reason why the argument from design is more popular than that from causation, though both are alike certain, is, that we must think before we can be struck with the force of the latter; in order to be convinced of design, we have only to use our eyes, and we see it exemplified in multiplied instances and endless varieties.

But the argument from design, in standing alone, has one great defect. Design, doubtless, proves wisdom, and power, versatility in contrivance, and abundance of resources; but the world is finite, and finite effects, however numerous, cannot demonstrate an infinite cause. Were we restricted to the argu-

ment from design alone, we might denominate the Deity and his attributes infinite, but the proper term for them would be indefinite. We could not assert they had no limits,—all that we could legitimately maintain, would be, that we had discovered no limits to them. “The degree of knowledge and power,” Paley observes, “requisite for the formation of created nature, cannot, with respect to us, be distinguished from infinite.” “We ascribe power to the Deity, under the name of Omnipotence, the strict and correct conclusion being, that a Power which could create such a world as this is, must be, beyond all comparison, greater than any which we experience in ourselves,—than any which we observe in other visible agents,—greater, also, than any which we can want for our individual protection and preservation, in the Being upon whom we depend. It is a power, likewise, to which we are not authorized, by our observation or knowledge, to assign any limits of space or duration. Very much of the same sort of remark is applicable to the term omniscience, infinite knowledge, or infinite wisdom.” So far Paley has correctly stated the limits of what design proves, with the exception of ascribing to the Deity “a power which could create such a world as this is.” Design does not go so far as to prove creation,—it only proves formation; it demonstrates that the materials of the world have received their form;

but it can offer no evidence that they have also derived their existence from intelligence.

Though, perhaps, this is saying too much, after the following observations of Sir John Herschel, which seem to stamp, with the impress of design, even the atoms themselves.

“ The discoveries of modern chemistry have gone so far to establish the truth of an opinion, entertained by some of the ancients, that the universe consists of distinct, separate, indivisible *atoms*, or individual beings, so minute as to escape our senses, except when united by millions, and by this aggregation, making up bodies of even the smallest visible bulk ; and we have the strongest evidence that, although there exist great and essential differences in individuals among these atoms, they may yet all be arranged in a very limited number of groups or classes, all the individuals of each of which are, to all intents and purposes, *exactly alike* in all their properties. Now, when we see a great number of things precisely alike, we do not believe this similarity to have originated, except from a common principle independent of them ; and that we recognise this likeness, chiefly by the identity of their deportment under similar circumstances, strengthens, rather than weakens, the conclusion. A line of spinning-jennies, or a regiment of soldiers, dressed exactly alike, and going through precisely the same evolutions, gives us no idea of independent existence : we

must see them act out of concert before we can believe them to have independent wills and properties, not impressed on them from without. And this conclusion, which would be strong, even were there only two individuals precisely alike, in *all* respects, and *for ever*, acquires irresistible force when their number is multiplied beyond the power of imagination to conceive. If we mistake not, then the discoveries alluded to, effectually destroy the idea of an *eternal self-existent matter*, by giving to each of its atoms the essential characters, at once, of a *manufactured article* and a *subordinate agent*."

That the atoms of matter are created, is shewn demonstrably by the abstract argument from causation. Whatever is finite is created. That which is limited in time or in place, must be so constituted by an extrinsic cause. That which exists by itself, is absolute and unlimited. Essential existence is unchangeable existence, and admits no modifications from a foreign source. Bossuet has justly observed, "Notre Dieu est un, infini, parfait, seul digne de venger les crimes et de couronner la vertu, parcequ'il est seul la sainteté même. Il est infiniment au-dessus de cette cause première, et de ce moteur que les philosophes ont connu, sans toutefois l'adorer; ceux d'entr'eux qui ont été le plus loin nous ont proposé un Dieu qui, trouvant une matière éternelle et existante par elle-même, aussi bien qui lui, l'a mise en œuvre, et

l'a façonnée comme un artisan vulgaire, contraint dans son ouvrage par cette matière, et par ses dispositions qu'il n'a pas faites ; sans jamais pouvoir comprendre que, si la matière est d'elle même, elle n'a pas dû attendre la perfection d'une main étrangère, et que si Dieu est infini et parfait, il n'a eu besoin, pour faire tout ce qu'il vouloit, que de lui-même et de sa volonté toute-puissante."

The argument from design fails still more in establishing the unity of the Deity. Paley remarks, "of the unity of the Deity, the proof is, the *uniformity* of plan observable in the universe." But he very rightly concedes afterwards, "that the whole argument for the divine unity, goes no farther than to an unity of counsel." We have already shewn, when treating of the writings of Aquinas, that unity of design proves the unity of the ordaining mind, not by direct, but by somewhat abstract arguments. Paley is, therefore, quite right in asserting that unity of design, when regarded in itself, "goes no farther than to a unity of counsel;" and hence it follows, that the argument from design, though so popular, and so convincing, requires to have its defects supplied from another source.

The popular argument, and the abstract argument, exactly fit into each other, and mutually support each other's weaker points. They have been generally opposed to each other ; instead of this, they ought

always to have been conjoined together. Owing to the disuse of abstract thinking, (what was misnamed) the *à priori* proof of the divine existence affords to the general reader but a moonlight and uncertain view ; the argument from design gives sunshine and reality to the foot-prints of God in the creation. We are enabled, even to the conviction of sense, to touch and handle the impressions of divine skill and power.

Design, on the other hand, cannot prove the infinity and the unity of the Godhead—the abstract argument is here at home, and can amply demonstrate that there is no God but one, and that his wisdom and power are in the highest sense infinite. Thus the mind, as in its earlier operations, is enabled to complete its knowledge, by uniting the information it receives from sources originally separate and distinct.

Still we should have no direct arguments for the divine benevolence, were it not for the existence of sentient creatures ; the inanimate creation might exhibit undoubted traces of wisdom and power, and we might justly conclude the excellence of the divine nature, from the abstract argument, that absolute being must be possessed of every possible perfection ; yet, in order to have a vivid perception of the divine goodness, it is needful that we are able to shew, that the tendency of design throughout the universe, is to promote the general amount of happiness.

Here we come to the first great difficulty in theology—the existence of misery and evil. There are no instances in the world of the want of contrivance ; for whatever has been urged to that purpose is plainly the result of presumption and ignorance. There is, therefore, no deduction from the proof for the divine wisdom, and no allowance to be made for the force of opposing arguments. With regard to the divine goodness, the case, at the first view, is different—the amount of happiness concludes for the benevolence of the Deity ; proportionable diminution must be made in the strength of that proof, by taking into account the amount of misery also. The mind is here perplexed, by perceiving two opposite tendencies, each in operation through the system of nature.

When the apparent opposite movements of the planets gave rise to so many clumsy theories, the admission of the true hypothesis reconciled all these seeming contradictions, and gave the true and harmonious order of the whole. What the hypothesis of Copernicus did for the natural world, the hypothesis of a state of probation does for the moral world. It may not reconcile all difficulties, but it presents an harmonious plan. The design of divine benevolence seems no longer to be immediate and unbroken enjoyment, but unending happiness, after a state of trial.

The belief of this world being a state of probation

receives its full confirmation from the structure of the human mind. All our thoughts accuse or else excuse each other—conscience both passes a present judgment upon every movement of the mind, and at the same time refers the final decision to a higher tribunal.

Contrivances for the production of happiness prove the divine benevolence, in the structure of sentient beings. The moral conformation of the human mind, and the increasing probability that this world is a state of probation, first lead us to what have been called the moral attributes of the Deity. It is remarkable that the arguments for the sanctity of the divine being are more explicit, and admit of less contradiction, than those for the divine benevolence—the matter is reversed in the conceptions of mankind. A soft, luxurious, and unprincipled age, shapes a Deity after its own degenerate likeness; supposes that the divine benevolence is the most certain attribute of the Deity, and that its favourite exercise is exhibited in indulgence to themselves or to their vices. What a liminary power would preside over this world, if all the resources of its ruler were expended in providing for the moderate amount of enjoyment it contains! But how are our notions of the supreme existence enlarged, when we consider this transitory stage, not the theatre of pleasure, but of virtue. Do what he will, the most fortunate can appropriate but

little solid satisfaction to himself; and the more eagerly he thirsts for delight, the less frequently, and the less pure, he is likely to find it. But no imaginary world could be conceived more favourable than the world we live in, for trial, endurance, and victory in the moral warfare, and where, after the short, but successful, combat of this brief and uncertain existence, the water of immortality will be more gratefully drunk, as a refreshment after the toils of time.

Thus the deficiency of the proof from design, is supplied by the argument from causation; and where both fail, the moral proof comes in, to supply their place, and establishes the moral attributes of the Deity. But the light of natural religion does not grow brighter and brighter unto the perfect day—it is most full and complete at the first. It indicates the divine existence more clearly than the divine attributes; and less evidently the moral attributes, than what are termed the natural attributes. Fewer objections occur to the divine wisdom than to the divine benevolence, and the proofs of justice and of holiness in the Deity are less to be sought in the external world, where we trace, indeed, a plan of divine government, but only in its faint outlines and early commencement. We must seek these in the mind of man, and that mind so disturbed and disordered, and in our moral feelings, so complex and evanescent as to escape from the examination of

many inquirers themselves; how much less likely are they to lead these inquirers to the same characters, in a transcendent degree, in the author of our frame.

What a proof of the necessity of revelation, is the philosophy of so moral a writer as Steuart. The notice of revelation is scrupulously avoided, as if that heavenly light, once admitted, would put out the grosser and earthly fires which we have kindled, as the only beacons to guide ourselves in the darkness of this world. The great aim of many moral philosophers is avowedly and determinedly to close their philosophic shutters against the meridian sun, in order to enjoy by day, the flickering light of their slender tapers.

Steuart confesses, with respect to the immortality of the soul, that not any single argument that he adduces, is conclusive—all that he hopes is, to make up by their number, for their want of weight. He assigns as proofs, first, the desire of immortality; second, the fear of immortality, or the effects of remorse; third, the formation of the soul for immortality; fourth, the growth of moral habits; fifth, the imperfect administration of justice on this side the grave; sixth, and last, universal belief. We agree with Steuart, that these arguments conjoined are sufficient to prove the doctrine of immortality in the calmness of reason, and in the absence of temptation; but how little effect would such arguments

have on the generality of mankind. Even to those who adopt them, immortality is proved, but not revealed—they may believe that they shall live, after the dissolution of the body, but how or where, they have still to seek, after the utmost force of all these six arguments combined is exhausted.

Neither does Steuart's reasoning throw more light upon the character of the Deity. That a wise and powerful Being exists, is proved with comparative ease; but what are his thoughts to us-ward, and in what relation shall we stand to him after death? On this all important subject Steuart throws no light, and seems, for anything that appears to the contrary, to take but little interest in the inquiry.

With respect to the general laws of nature, Steuart observes, "their tendency will be found in every instance favourable to order and happiness." If we meet with apparent exceptions, then we have only to "acknowledge that the ways of Providence are unsearchable, and we must strive to fortify our minds by the pious hope, that the sufferings we endure at present, are subservient to some beneficial plan which we are unable to comprehend." Steuart takes comfort where few besides would find it—"The common complaint that we hear of the prevalence of vice in the world (I mean the opinion of good and candid men on the subject, for I speak not at present of the

follies of the splenetic and censorious), ought rather to be considered as proofs of the high standard of excellence presented to our view by the Author of our moral constitution, than as proofs of any peculiar degeneracy in the manners of our contemporaries. He subsequently adds, "A distinction which I shall afterwards have occasion to illustrate between absolute and relative rectitude, will enable me to explain away a much greater proportion of the apparent wickedness of our species." It is melancholy to consider a professor of morals and an instructor of youth not only sedulously shutting his eyes under the blaze of that illumination which has brought life and immortality to light, but encouraging others also to rejoice in sparks of their own kindling, rather than to hail at once the rising of the Sun of Righteousness with healing on his wings. And that one, whose office it was to point out the sources and distinctive of morality, should have endeavoured to perplex and explain a question as the fallen condition of humanity which even the heathens acknowledged, and the most eminent moralists among them made the groundwork of their philosophy.

There is a God. He has stamped the impress of his wisdom on all above us—around us—and within us. The soul is simple; consciousness cannot be divided. Death is dissolution. The soul, which

simple, cannot die. What shall be our existence after death? We receive no response from nature or reason.

The religion of nature is altogether preliminary. It claims our deep attention, not to what God has already revealed in nature, so much as to what the Divine voice is about to speak. We are enabled in part to decipher the hieroglyphics of the universe, and everywhere we find inscribed the name of Jehovah—the sacred character of the Self-existent. But the writing fails us at the moment when we are about to read our own sentence and doom. Our conscience condemns us—for we have neglected its dictates, and it appeals from its violated jurisdiction, to another judge and another tribunal. In vain, by our own unaided vision, do we seek to pierce the darkness and the uncertainty of futurity.

Instead of vain and endless conjecture, we require inspired testimony, confirmed by supernatural proof, to tell us,—“I beheld till the thrones were cast down and the ancient of days did sit, whose garment was white as snow, and the hair of his head like the pure wool; his throne was like the fiery flame and his wheels as burning fire. A fiery stream issued and came forth from before him; thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him: the judgment was set and the books were opened.”

Conscience has lost its supremacy—it no longer retains the authority of a ruler, though it still records the sentence of a judge. The religion of nature makes no provision for this state of mental chaos—the moral world is without form and void, and darkness is upon the face of the deep—it is necessary that the Spirit of God should move over the ruins of a former existence, and restore all to light and harmony. Nature cannot cancel guilt—remorse, far from absolving the guilty, cannot even terminate itself, but only grows more vivid by reflection. Revelation, while it shews still more plainly our moral ruins, provides an efficacious remedy ; other systems may amuse the imagination, or occupy the mind with dogmas and disputes—Christianity alone is the religion of the awakened conscience.

NOTES.

NOTE A.

THEORY OF DR. BROWN.

ACCORDING to Dr. Brown, "we have an irresistible, immediate, and universal belief of our identity, as often as we think of the present and the past. We cannot think of any feeling as truly a former feeling, without it." But though the mind be "strictly identical," it is "far from being at every moment the same in every respect, and scarcely presents for two successive moments the same phenomena. It is by its changes, indeed, indirectly, a sentient, or percipient, and only by its changes, that all other changes become known to us." Dr. Brown allows, that it is "paradoxical" to state, that the mind is ever the same, and yet continually changing, but into such a paradox, a false theory has led him. He gives up the ideal theory in name, but retains it in essence; he substitutes for ideas and impressions the term feelings; and resolves all our knowledge into the modifications of the soul. The soul being simple, it is argued, can only have one modification at a time; but how is it possible to separate the soul from its

modification? Therefore, that which was the soul in the first instance, when looking abroad upon nature, becomes greenness,—then the smell of a rose,—then the voice of a bird,—with more frequent and wonderful transmutation, than the metamorphoses of Ovid; and the mind becomes a greater magician than the princess in the Arabian Nights' Entertainments, who became in quick succession a sword, a serpent, and an eagle.

According to Dr. Brown, the soul only undergoes one modification at a time,—on such terms, it would be easy to be a metaphysician; but how comes it, if all our modifications are simple, that the mind views them so inveterately as complex; and that to be able even partially to reduce them to a state approaching to simplicity, is the lot of so few? Dr. Brown says, “the mind is simple and indivisible. Every feeling of the mind, therefore, being only the mind itself existing in a certain state, must be equally simple and indivisible, and hence, as there is no real plurality in a sensation or thought, or emotion, to admit of integral separation, the analysis, which is real, where self-subsisting elements of matter are detached from other self-subsisting elements, must in mind be virtual only, like the virtual complexity of the feelings on which it is exercised. It must always be remembered, that the feelings which we term complex, are, as truly as the feelings which we term simple, states of a substance that cannot be divided into elementary parts. But while we admit this distinction, we must be conscious, at the same time, that it is the very nature of certain feelings to *seem* to involve certain other feelings as elements of themselves; and this seeming complexity, which it is impossible not to feel,” &c. &c. &c. It is impossible not to feel, that this seeming complexity in the mind is a cause of

real perplexity to Dr. Brown,—that the theorist has involved himself in an inextricable maze, and might exclaim with Sir Walter Scott, “O what a tangled web we weave.” A much simpler theory might have been produced, by giving up the simplicity of the soul, and the singleness of each feeling,—allowing the soul to have more than one modification at a time.

The most complete refutation of any theory, is to shew that it leads to total scepticism. All our thoughts are assumed by Dr. Brown to be modifications of the soul; the same argument applies here as in the case of ideas, and the scepticism of Hume is equally applicable as to the idealism of Berkeley or of Locke. All our thoughts are modifications of something else; the soul, as we conceive it, is merely an idea, and can have no absolute existence; the same may be said of the Deity,—like all our other thoughts, the conception of the Divine existence is merely a modification of our own. The argument is still stronger, if possible, against the external world. Our conception of matter is only a modification of our own existence, which is different from matter altogether. Brown endeavours to escape from the conclusions of Hume, by admitting certain instinctive principles of belief; but the admission of these will by no means serve his purpose,—they may even be turned into new arguments to complete the system of scepticism. The sceptics understood their profession too well to be contented with being dogmatic sceptics, and with proving that nothing could be known; even this, they contended, was beyond our powers to ascertain. They delighted to oppose the instinctive principles of belief, to the speculative doubts of the understanding; and thus to make the war interminable between scepticism and credulity. What signifies an instinc-

tive belief in an external world, if, at the same time, we adopt principles which make that belief preposterous and absurd?

Dr. Brown is certainly not the original author of considering ideas as the modifications of the mind ; but he has the merit or demerit of having pushed an absurd theory into its minuter details, and to have clung to these errors with all their confessed paradoxes, after Reid had so clearly pointed out “ a more excellent way.”

He is not more fortunate in the details of his theory, than in the general outline, (always excepting the subject of emotions, and criticisms of other writers, in which he shews, as we have before observed, great acuteness,) and he has made one of the most portentous blunders in metaphysics, which is so unusually fertile in them, having had the singular distinction of completely jumbling together time and space. “ The infant does not know that he has fingers which move, even when, from an instinctive tendency, or other primary cause, to which we are ignorant how to give a name, he sets them in motion ; but when they are thus in motion, and a consequent series of feelings, already familiar to him, has commenced, he knows the regular series of feelings that are instantly to follow. In these circumstances, let us imagine some hard body to be placed in his little palm. The muscular contraction takes place, as before, to a certain extent, and with it a part of the accustomed series, but from the resistance to the usual full contraction, there is a break in the anticipated series of feelings, the place of the remaining portion of which is supplied by a tactual feeling, combined with a muscular feeling of another kind,—that feeling of resistance which has already been considered by us. As often as the same body is placed again in the hand, the same portion of the series of feelings is inter-

rupted by the same new complex feeling. It is as little wonderful, therefore, that this new feeling should suggest or become representative of the particular length of which it supplies the place, as that the reciprocal suggestion of one object by another, should be the result of any other association as uniform. A smaller body interrupts proportionally a smaller part of the accustomed series,—a larger body a larger portion : and while the notion of a certain length of sequence interrupted, varies thus exactly with the dimensions of the external object felt, it is not very wonderful that the one should become representative of the other ; and that the particular muscular feeling of resistance, in combination with the tactual feeling, should be attended with notions of different lengths, exactly according to the difference of the length of which it uniformly supplies the place. The only objection which I can conceive to be made to this theory,—if the circumstances be accurately stated, and if the inadequacy of touch, as itself the direct sense of figure, have been sufficiently shewn,—is, that the length of a sequence of feelings is so completely distinct in character, as to be incapable of being blended with tactual notions of space. But this objection, as I flatter myself I have proved, arises from inattention, not to a few only of the phenomena of tactual measurement, but to all the phenomena : for in the measurement even of the most familiar object, as we have seen, a difference of the mere rapidity or slowness with which we pass our hand along its surface, and therefore of the mere length or shortness of the accompanying series of feelings, is sufficient to give, in our estimate, a corresponding difference of length or shortness to the surface which we touch. Length, indeed, considered abstractly, whether it be of time or of space, is nothing more in our conception than a number of continuous

parts, and this definition is equally applicable to it in the one case as in the other."

Continuous parts of what ? give an intelligible answer, and the flimsy fallacy, if it is not flattering it too much to call it a fallacy, disappears. Dr. Brown had evidently in his mind a chimera of abstract length,—of length abstracted from longitude, consisting of parts of nonentity, which might be changed on the one side into parts of time, and, on the other, into parts of space, by the wand of the metaphysical enchanter. Dr. Brown claims to be a discoverer in metaphysics, and his discoveries are such as few plagiarists will seek to deprive him of. He has found out a sixth sense, he conceives, in muscular action, and this new sense reveals to us a series of feelings,—we become acquainted with resistance and "outness," by the stoppage which a hard body occasions to a part of the series of feelings, and the length of the series which is stopped, becomes a measure to us of length in the abstract, which metaphysical length is capable of being transformed either into space or into time. "Time or succession, then, involves the very notions of longitudinal extension or divisibility." "I am inclined to reverse exactly the process commonly supposed, and instead of deriving the measure of time from extension, to derive the knowledge and original measure of extension from time." To such discoveries, and thickcoming fancies, it is time to bid a long, but not a lingering adieu.

NOTE B.

THE IDEAL THEORY.

DR. REID writes to Dr. Gregory :—" It would be want of candour not to own, that I think there is some merit in what you are pleased to call *my philosophy* ; but I think it lies chiefly in having called in question the common theory of *ideas, or images of things in the mind*, being the only objects of thought : a theory founded on natural prejudices, and so universally received, as to be interwoven with the structure of language."

Upon this, Steuart remarks :—" It is probable, indeed, (now that the ideal theory has, in a great measure, disappeared from our late metaphysical systems,) that those who have a pleasure in detracting from the merits of their predecessors, may be disposed to represent it as an idle waste of labour and ingenuity, to have entered into a serious refutation of a hypothesis at once gratuitous and inconceivable."

Steuart's anticipations were not long of being realized. Dr. Brown observes :—" The confutation of mere metaphors, such as I cannot but think the *images in the mind* to have been, which Dr. Reid so powerfully assailed, seems an undertaking not very different from that of exposing, syllogistically and seriously, all the follies of Grecian Paganism, as a system of theological belief, in the hope of converting some unfortunate poetaster or poet, who still talks, in his rhymings, to his mistress, of Cupid and the Graces." Where is truth to be found, if men of integrity, and competent information, give such

discordant pictures of the past? All are agreed in one point, which, indeed, admits of no controversy, in confessing that the ideal theory prevailed throughout antiquity. Plato, whose writings are the stronghold of the ideal theory, derived these ideas from the numbers of Pythagoras, and transmitted them to after times, though varied and modified. Aristotle, though he rejected the ideas of Plato, substituted for them species and forms. The Atomists, though so various, and even opposite, in their opinions, still retained the slender images by which perception is carried on. If the ideal theory be an error, as obviously it is, it must be one of the great and permanent errors, or “*Idola*,” as Bacon terms them, of the human mind. We, ourselves, must be in some danger from it, and require to guard against a mistake which beset writers of such different genius, and of so opposing schools.

To understand the ideal theory thoroughly, we must point out its origin. In perception, three things are to be distinguished: the mind, which perceives; the act of perceiving; and the object perceived. By that great tendency of thought, as we have elsewhere observed, according to which all the acts of the mind, and our attention too, are directed outwards, we pass from the mind and the act to the object, and, blending the three together, give a common name to them all. In practice, the object has the most important place; though, in metaphysics, we endeavour to arrest the attention, also, upon the act of perceiving. From the structure of the mind, we must always be liable to blend the act and the object too much together,—a blending which is useful in life, but which is the source of many metaphysical errors. Reid had great merit, therefore, in exposing the ideal theory; but he did himself injustice, when he considered that to be his chief claim

to distinction ; his distinguishing excellence consisted in analyzing the complex mental process, and separating so clearly between the mind, the act, and the object ; not only demolishing an erroneous theory, but pointing out the source whence new errors might arise, under another form. The great fallacy of the term *idea*, consisted in confounding three different subjects under one common name ; nor did either Dr. Brown, or those who anticipated him, escape from this besetting fallacy, when they considered an *idea* to be equivalent to a modification of the soul. The error was the same, though it took a more determinate shape ; each of these pretended modifications of the mind is a complex term, including the three distinct subjects formerly mentioned—the mind, which perceives ; the act of perception ; and the object perceived. Dr. Brown, himself, was an idealist, without knowing it ; he commits the same error as the ancient idealists ; the only difference between them, consists in his giving that importance to feelings, which they assign to images.

The ideal theory was capable of great variety of form, while it retained the same ultimate fallacy. As it included three terms,—the mind, the act, and the object, each of these, in their turn, might take the prominent place, and present an appearance of novelty. Where the mind itself occupies the principal station in the theory, as in the writings of Fichté, we have a transcendental idealism, in which the mind shapes out its own thoughts by its internal activity, and creates for itself both an external world and a Deity. Where the objects alone are chiefly considered, we reach the opposite extreme of materialism, in which the mind becomes the mere passive receptacle of impressions from without. Where the middle term, or the act of perceiving, casts the other two into the

background, if it be the intellectual part of our mental operation, we have the philosophy and the ideas of Plato and of Aristotle ; or if it be the passive part of our nature, our sensations and feelings, which chiefly attract our attention, we are last of all presented with some theory similar to that of Dr. Brown.

NOTE C.

CAUSATION.

HUME, as previously quoted, observes,—“ I am sensible, that, of all the paradoxes which I have had, or shall hereafter have occasion to advance, in the course of this treatise, the present one is the most violent, and that it is merely by dint of solid proof and reasoning I can ever hope it will have admission, and overcome the inveterate prejudices of mankind. Before we are reconciled to this doctrine, how often must we repeat to ourselves, that the simple view of any two objects or actions, however related, can never give us any idea of power.” Nor, were the mind constituted according to Hume’s philosophy, could we ever have had any idea of power at all ; constant conjunction, and unfailing priority, could only have more strongly associated two objects in the mind, but never could have originated any new relation. This view did not escape the acuteness of Hume :—“ When I consider the *relations*, I can find none but those of contiguity and succession, which I have already regarded as imperfect and unsatisfactory. Shall the despair of success make me assert, that I am here possessed of an idea, which is not

preceded by any similar impression? This would be too strong a proof of levity and inconstancy, since the contrary principle has already been so firmly established, as to admit of no farther doubt, at least, till we have more fully examined the present difficulty." But, in what manner was it so firmly established? The only proof was, that Locke asserted that all our ideas may be traced to sensation and reflection, and that, therefore, sensation and reflection are the only two inlets of thought. The idea of power, Hume justly observes, cannot be traced to these two inlets; the legitimate conclusion, therefore, is, that there must be a third source of our knowledge; instead of that, Hume adopts the absurd conclusion, that the idea of power must be sacrificed to that arbitrary hypothesis, which the very existence of the notion of power in the mind completely overturns. We have, a second time, adduced these quotations, because they are the evidence of a reluctant witness, and are, therefore, peculiarly valuable; they are extorted evidence, but extorted by the force of truth.

NOTE D.

UNITY OF THE DEITY.

WE have seen, from Paley, that the Unity of the Deity cannot be proved, merely from the consideration of design in the universe; and that unity of design merely concludes for uniformity of purpose. It appears to be an impression, among the generality of reasoners, that God must be one, because he is infinite, and that one infinite must exclude every other infinity. In this, probably, there enters some metaphorical

sophistry, borrowing our notions from matter, where a material world, if entirely full, would exclude every other existence of a like kind ; it is evident that the infinity of the Deity does not exhaust existence, but leaves possibility and room for the additional existence of finite beings.

He who believes in an infinite Deity, believes also in one only God, for a plainer and more satisfactory reason—one infinite Deity sufficiently accounts for the whole of existence, and there is no “sufficient reason” for even imagining the existence of a second.

“To suppose,” says Clarke, “two distinct beings existing of themselves, necessarily, and independent from each other, implies this plain contradiction, that each of them being independent from the other, they may either of them be supposed to exist alone, so that it will be no contradiction to imagine the other not to exist ; and consequently neither of them will be necessarily existing.” This argument has the same defect as that of Descartes—it mistakes that which is subjective for that which is objective—it passes, without marking the difference, from our mode of thinking to external existence.

The other argument of Clarke is more legitimate, “The self-existent being must of necessity be but one. This evidently follows from his being necessarily existent. For necessity, absolute in itself, is simple and uniform, and universal, without any possible difference, difformity, or variety whatsoever ; and all variety or difference of existence, must needs arise from some external cause, and be dependent upon it, and proportionable to the efficiency of that cause, whatever it be.”

We have shewn, in its proper place, in the body of the work, that which is the true proof of the unity of the Deity, namely,

that number is totally inapplicable to the divine nature. God is one in a negative sense, in that sense which excludes plurality. Another argument might be stated thus ; if a plurality of Deities be possible, there is no sufficient reason why number may not be possible, (if one does not exclude a second, there is no reason why two should exclude a third, &c.), and if so, why an infinite number may not be possible, which is absurd, (for number being indefinite and capable of continual addition, can never be infinite) ; the stop is evidently at unity. But the simple proof is, that the absolute and eternal must be one. Beings that can be numbered are evidently created, (as we have already stated,) constituted so far to differ, that they may be individuals, and so far to agree, that they may be enumerated in the same class.

Our reason for pointing out the difficulties regarding the Divine Unity, is to acknowledge that it is a subject above all others which should teach our reason humility—it is, however, the subject on which the Socinians, with their usual modesty, have chosen peculiarly to dogmatise ; not one Socinian writer, that we have met with, has been able to state the doctrine of the Divine Unity correctly ; how much less qualified were they to derive just inferences from it !

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